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Labor markets play a fundamental role in the economic restructuring process
over the business cycle. A comparison of labor market structures across economies
unveils a high degree of cross-country heterogeneity in employment arrangements.
Developed economies tend to have large salaried employment shares (often protected
by social security and labor laws) as well as small self-employment shares in total
employment. Conversely, developing countries exhibit the opposite pattern: a sub-
stantial portion of salaried workers have no access to social security and coverage by
employment laws, and a large proportion of individuals run owner-only firms as self-
employed workers. Understanding how labor market structures differ and how they
can alter the dynamic behavior of the economy can yield important insights into the
observed disparities in macroeconomic performance across economies. Also, delv-
ing deeper into the structural differences of labor markets and their implications for
short-run and long-run economic activity can help us devise the best policy measures
to respond adequately to adverse shocks to the economy.
This dissertation analyzes the link between two related themes in the business
cycle literature – aggregate volatility and cyclical persistence – and the structure
of labor markets, with an emphasis on informality. I follow the International La-
bor Organization (ILO) and consider informal employment as embodying two main
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groups: employed workers who lack a formal employment contract (not registered
with social security by their employer); and the self-employed. I also label firms
that do not pay payroll taxes or comply with labor regulations (and hence do not
register their workers) as informal (Bacchetta et al., 2009). Both informal salaried
workers and the self-employed are more vulnerable to increased turnover and to
higher separation rates, unemployment risk, and earnings volatility, which in turn
affect labor flows. From a macroeconomic perspective, informal labor flows can
play an important role in driving the resource reallocation process over the business
cycle and hence determining how economies respond to shocks. By circumventing
burdensome regulations and contributing to a flexible sector, firms and workers in
the informal sector may lower the costs of adjustment that would otherwise prevent
a swift adjustment of the economy in response to shocks. However, cyclical labor
flows between the different employment states also have the potential to exacer-
bate short-run fluctuations in economic activity by modifying the incentives that
affect firms’ and individuals’ decisions. Surprisingly few studies have explored the
consequences of informality for short-run economic performance. One of the main
objectives of this dissertation is to shed light on how differences in the structure of
labor markets can influence short-run economic activity using quantitative business
cycle models with frictional labor markets.
A large part of the empirical literature has focused on the determinants of
informality as well as the relationship between the informal sector and long-run
macroeconomic outcomes. For example, a series of cross-country studies have docu-
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mented a positive relationship between employment regulations and the size of the
informal sector and a negative one between institutional quality and informality
(Djankov et al., 2002; Botero et al., 2004; Loayza, Oviedo, and Servén, 2005; John-
son, Kaufman, and Zoido-Lobatón, 1999; and Perry et al., 2007). Others have found
a positive link between the size of the informal sector and unemployment, and a neg-
ative link between informality and the level of development (Djankov and Ramalho,
2009; Loayza and Rigolini, 2011). In general, the literature has highlighted a num-
ber of plausible determinants of informality, ranging from the regulatory framework
and the tax structure to the quality of governance and institutions in the economy,
with the latter being particularly relevant for explaining cross-country differences in
the size of the informal sector. The empirical literature on informality and business
cycles is much less developed, with Ferreira-Tiryaki (2008) being one of the first to
document a positive causal relationship between the size of the informal sector and
the volatility of consumption, investment, and output.1
In “Institutions, Informal Labor Markets, and Business Cycle Volatility,” I
explore whether the underlying source of cross-country differences in the size of the
informal sector is important for characterizing the link between informality and busi-
ness cycle volatility. I build a parsimonious business cycle model with labor market
frictions and informal salaried employment that can shed light on the connection
between the economy’s institutional foundations, the structure of labor markets,
1Loayza, Oviedo, and Servén (2004) find that more rigid labor regulations lead to higher
variability in the cyclical component of real GDP per capita. Barseghyan and DiCecio (2009) show
that higher entry costs lead to greater output volatility in a sample of developed and developing
countries, while property rights do not seem to have a significant impact on volatility. These
papers suggest an interesting link between the determinants of informality and aggregate volatility
without explicitly mentioning the informal sector.
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and the business cycle. The main idea behind this paper is simple: the empirical
literature on informality has highlighted institutional quality as one of the most
important determinants of informal sector size. However, institutional quality can
manifest itself and operate through different channels and hence alter agents’ deci-
sions in distinct ways. While institutions themselves may have similar consequences
for the size of the informal sector, the specific margin through which these institu-
tions affect informality may not lead to a uniform relationship between the informal
sector and macroeconomic aggregates such as consumption, unemployment, invest-
ment, and output.2 Addressing whether the root source of differences in informality
across economies matters for the behavior of short-run and long-run economic activ-
ity is particularly challenging from an empirical standpoint since most studies make
use of aggregate measures of institutions. Thus, relying on a model to address these
issues is particularly useful since we can identify the channels through which changes
in the economy’s underlying institutional structure operate, how they determine the
composition of employment, and how economic activity is affected. I use a standard
business cycle model and expand it to have search frictions in the labor market and
informal salaried employment. Search frictions allow me to address the implications
of the size of the informal sector for unemployment volatility, which have received
much less attention in the business cycle literature on informality.
The main results of the paper are as follows. I show that the model can success-
fully capture the positive connection between informal sector size and consumption
2This idea is related to Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Thaicharoen (2003), who link the
quality of institutions to the economy’s aggregate volatility and crisis incidence. The authors claim
that institutional quality is an important contributor to volatility by altering the economy’s micro
and macro linkages.
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and investment volatility documented in the empirical literature. In addition, I find
that the root cause of changes in the size of the informal sector matters for establish-
ing the relationship between (1) informality and particular long-run macroeconomic
outcomes, and (2) informality and the volatility of unemployment.3 In particular, for
the same change in informal sector size, changes in different proxies for institutional
quality in the model have contrasting quantitative implications for the economy’s
steady state, the volatility of the labor market, and the volatility of output. I con-
sider two main experiments. The first exercise considers changes in institutional
quality that are purely reflected in differences in enforcement of regulations in the
informal sector. In this case, stricter enforcement reduces informality and unem-
ployment volatility, but generates a counterfactual relationship between informality
and the level of output in the economy. The second experiment consists of changes
in overall or economy-wide institutional quality that affect productivity in the for-
mal sector and the likelihood of detection in the informal sector simultaneously. In
this case, a general improvement in institutions reduces informality and increases
output levels, in line with the data, but leads to higher unemployment volatility. In
both cases, more informality leads to higher volatility in consumption and invest-
ment, but to drastically different outcomes for labor market dynamics and long-run
macroeconomic aggregates across economies with the same informal sector size. The
reason behind these results can be traced back to the contrasting response of the
average level of unemployment to institutional quality changes. While stricter en-
3Some of the results regarding the link between informality, enforcement, and unemployment
in my paper confirm the findings in Ulyssea (2010), who focuses on regulations and enforcement,
informality, and welfare.
5
forcement in the informal sector leads to a sharp increase in unemployment, better
overall institutional quality reduces unemployment in the economy. The level of un-
employment determines how fluctuations in formal and informal employment affect
the variability of unemployment over the business cycle.
A limited number of papers have recently explored the link between infor-
mality and aggregate volatility in a business cycle framework. Restrepo-Echavarŕıa
(2011) uses a two-sector real business cycle (RBC) model where the informal sector
is modeled as home production and studies the connection between informality and
consumption volatility. She stresses that having a sector whose activity is imper-
fectly measured leads to higher observed volatility in consumption; as measurement
improves, consumption volatility should decrease. Granda-Carvajal (2012) builds a
two-sector business cycle model with a multitude of shocks and explores the link
between informal activity and business cycle fluctuations. She generates changes in
informal sector size through differences in the probability of detection and through
changes in tax rates. Neither of these papers allow for unemployment. Castillo and
Montoro (2010) study how technology and demand shocks are transmitted through
the informal sector in a New-Keynesian model with labor search frictions. In related
work, Bridji and Charpe (2011) use an RBC model with search frictions to analyze
how a dual labor market affects aggregate volatility. Both papers suggest that the
presence of informal labor generate more volatile aggregate fluctuations.
A subset of the results in my work are in line with some of the particular find-
ings in these papers. Similar to Restrepo-Echavarŕıa (2011) and Granda-Carvajal
(2012), I capture a positive link between informality and consumption volatility, as
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in the data. In my model, the source of volatility in consumption and investment
arises mainly from the impact of informality on formal employment, which in turn
influences the steady-state marginal product of capital in the formal sector, and the
sensitivity of the hiring behavior of formal firms to changes in aggregate economic
conditions. The fact that the steady-state marginal productivity of capital in the
formal sector and the value of employing formal workers change with the size of
the informal sector affects the sensitivity of formal vacancy postings and investment
in response to aggregate shocks. Since households own all firms in the economy,
changes in the volatility of investment across economies translate into similar qual-
itative changes in the volatility of consumption. Also, in contrast to most of the
literature, I explicitly address the volatility of unemployment, which turns out to
depend critically on both the root cause of changes in informality and on the substi-
tutability between formal and informal production. More importantly, I show that
only focusing on the size of the informal sector and aggregate volatility without
taking into account the root cause of differences in the size of the informal sector
across economies will yield an incomplete picture of the aggregate consequences of
changes in informality. This point is critical for several reasons. First, informality
itself should not be immediately associated with higher volatility or lower levels
of economic activity. Second, we must be careful not to make inferences about
changes in economic activity from observed differences in informality without iden-
tifying the factors that might explain the size of the informal sector. Third, the fact
that informality and particular indicators of business cycle volatility are positively
related does not mean that changes in informality will have a uniform impact on
7
unemployment and labor market volatility. In other words, a comprehensive view
of each market is warranted to make the correct inferences about the business cycle
consequences of informality. These results are particularly relevant for analyzing
cross-country differences in business cycle dynamics, but also for policymakers in
economies that aim to implement reforms that explicitly address the size of the in-
formal sector, or other reforms whose implementation may result in changes in the
composition of employment.
While there is a rapidly expanding theoretical literature on informality and
labor market policy using search frictions, the majority of existing business cycle
models have ignored the role of self-employment.4 In the previous chapter, I ab-
stracted from self-employment to have a tractable environment and to convey the
message from the model in a clear manner. There are two main reasons why mov-
ing beyond salaried employment and addressing the presence of self-employment is
important. As previously pointed out, a large segment of total employment is com-
posed of self-employed workers, who generally operate owner-only businesses but
still account for an important share of economic activity (Perry et al., 2007; Kucera
and Roncolato, 2008). Indeed, self-employment can range from 10 or 20 percent
of employment in developed countries up to 70 or 80 percent in certain develop-
ing countries. More relevant to the study of business cycles, recent studies have
shown that self-employment exhibits different cyclical dynamics relative to salaried
4Rissman (2003, 2007), Kumar and Schuetze (2007), and more recently Narita (2011) and
Margolis, Navarro, and Robalino (2012) incorporate self-employment as an additional employment
state in labor search models. Rasteletti (2009) and Astebro, Chen and Thompson (2010) merge
occupational choice with a search and matching framework. None of these papers focus on business
cycle dynamics.
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employment: self-employment tends to be countercylical, and more surprisingly, en-
try into self-employment from non-employment increases during recessions (Bosch
and Maloney, 2007; Loayza and Rigolini, 2011). In “Self-Employment and Business
Cycle Persistence: Does the Composition of Employment Matter for Economic Re-
coveries?” I explore whether differences in the composition of employment between
salaried work and self-employment (as opposed to within salaried employment) af-
fect the speed of economic recoveries in the aftermath of adverse aggregate shocks.
To motivate my focus on business cycle persistence, I document a new stylized fact
that shows a negative connection between the share of self-employment in the econ-
omy and the persistence of output over the business cycle for a large sample of
countries. The existing literature on small firm financing documents that interfirm
input credit is one of the most important sources of financing for small firms. I use
this fact as a basis to introduce search-based entry frictions in the self-employment
sector in a two-sector business cycle model with standard search frictions in salaried
employment. Self-employment in the model is meant to capture own-account (or
independent) workers, which make up the majority of the self-employed in both
developed and developing countries.
Whether self-employment can have an impact on recoveries from recessions
is an area that has not been explored in recent theoretical models of the labor
market and the business cycle. In particular, existing business cycle models with self-
employment and liquidity constraints would predict that self-employment expands
during booms, contrary to what we see on average across countries. Moreover,
recent search models with self-employment would also struggle to reconcile the fact
9
that self-employment increases during downturns and individuals require external
resources to produce. From a broader perspective, the specific channels through
which self-employment and cyclical persistence are connected are ex-ante unclear.
Self-employment may represent a large share of the employed labor force in certain
countries, but does this difference in employment composition by itself necessarily
have a non-negligible impact on how aggregate production responds to shocks? In
other words, while there may be a large universe of small, owner-only firms in
the economy, their weight in total production may not be large enough to affect
macroeconomic aggregates and their behavior over the business cycle. If this is
the case, what are the mechanisms that generate a negative relationship between
self-employment rates and the cyclical persistence of output across countries? A
natural starting point to address this issue is to determine how self-employment
affects the static and dynamic structure of the labor market, and hence the decisions
of salaried firms that generally account for a large share of total output in the
economy. Understanding how self-employment affects the allocation of resources in
the economy can therefore help us understand how the labor market structure may
influence the speed of recoveries from recessions.
The model can successfully replicate the countercyclicality of self-employment
and self-employment entry in the data, even if unemployed individuals require capi-
tal to transition into self-employment. Furthermore, the model highlights three key
characteristics of self-employment that generate differences in the recovery path in
the model economy: (1) the role of self-employment as an alternative outside option
to salaried work; (2) the frictional nature of entry into self-employment, which is al-
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lowed to vary with aggregate economic conditions; and (3) the impact of fluctuations
in this outside option on salaried wage dynamics, which in turn modify the incen-
tives of firms to hire workers and invest in the salaried sector. I show that differences
in the ease of entry into self-employment in the aftermath of an adverse economy-
wide productivity shock play a key role in driving employment, investment, and
output dynamics during the recovery phase. In particular, I find that after a neg-
ative aggregate productivity shock, economies with larger self-employment shares
exhibit long-lasting salaried wage contractions. The path of wages during the re-
covery phase pushes firms in the salaried sector to increase investment and hiring
at a faster pace, thereby creating a faster recovery in salaried employment, invest-
ment, and output in the economy. Differences in the contraction of salaried wages
are driven by the cyclical response of the ease of entering self-employment and the
influence of the self-employment sector on aggregate labor market conditions. Thus,
even if self-employment and output in the self-employment sector expand by more
during downturns in economies with lower self-employment shares (consistent with
the findings in Loayza and Rigolini, 2011), it is the salaried sector that determines
the recovery speed of the economy.
When taken at face value, the main results from the paper may initially suggest
that more self-employment in the economy is beneficial as it leads to faster recover-
ies. However, taking a more comprehensive view of the model’s results makes clear
that there is an important tradeoff involved: economies with more self-employment
may exhibit faster recoveries, but they also experience sharper fluctuations in invest-
ment, capital usage, unemployment, output, as well as lower levels of consumption
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investment, employment, and output. These results may be important to consider
when devising policy interventions that may generate changes in the composition of
employment in the economy.
To summarize, this dissertation makes two relevant contributions to the lit-
erature on informality and business cycles, and to the literature on search frictions
in the labor market more generally. The chapter on institutions and business cycle
volatility draws attention to a subtle but crucial point about the link between in-
formality and the business cycle. It stresses that simply observing changes in the
size of the informal sector is not sufficient to draw appropriate conclusions about
the impact of informality on labor market volatility, aggregate fluctuations, and
long-run macroeconomic outcomes. Even though my analysis is purely positive, the
main conclusions of the paper have important policy implications: if policymakers
aim to reduce informality, the specific way in which informality is reduced is critical
for what will happen to the volatility of the labor market, and to unemployment,
consumption, investment, and output. The chapter on self-employment adds to
the literature on cross-country differences in labor market structures by offering a
tractable way to introduce frictional and endogenous entry into self-employment in
a business cycle model with labor search frictions. To the best of my knowledge, this
is the first business cycle search model that explicitly accounts for self-employment
in the form of own-account work as an additional employment state while simultane-
ously capturing the cyclical dynamics of self-employment and self-employment entry
in the data. This chapter also highlights an important yet scarcely explored channel
through which the composition of employment in an economy can have important
12
consequences for economic recoveries.
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Chapter 2
Institutions, Informal Labor Markets, and Business Cycle Volatility
2.1 Introduction
The informal sector, where firms and workers produce legal, market-based
goods and services but explicitly circumvent government regulations, accounts for
an important share of economic activity, ranging from 8 percent of GDP in some
developed countries to almost 70 percent of GDP in some developing countries.
The empirical literature on informality has found that stringent regulations and
weak institutional quality are relevant in explaining cross-country differences in the
size of the informal sector, with institutions being particularly important.1 The
existence of a large proportion of individuals and firms operating outside the official
regulatory and institutional framework has important implications for worker flows
and the speed of factor reallocation in response to fluctuations in aggregate economic
conditions. On the one hand, the informal sector can act as a shock absorber during
downturns (Bosch and Maloney, 2006; OECD, 2009b). On the other hand, informal
firms can swiftly adjust their inputs in response to aggregate shocks (Boeri et al.,
1Throughout the paper, I consider institutions, institutional quality, or governance broadly as
embodying the effectiveness of the rules and norms, established by a country’s governing body,
that underlie and support economic transactions and interactions, including but not restricted
to the effectiveness and quality of the legal system, of contract enforcement, and of property
rights (Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2012). See Djankov et al. (2002) and Botero et al.
(2004) on the regulation of labor markets and firm entry, and Loayza, Oviedo, and Servén (2005),
Johnson, Kaufman, and Zoido-Lobatón (1999) and Perry et al. (2007) for more on informality and
institutions.
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2008), thereby making aggregate economic activity more volatile. This suggests
that the presence of a large informal sector can have important consequences at the
aggregate level (Boeri, Helppie, and Macis, 2008). Ferreira-Tiryaki (2008) is one of
the first to provide evidence suggesting that a larger informal sector is associated
with higher volatility in consumption, investment, and output using a sample of
developed and developing countries. The theoretical literature has followed suit
by analyzing how the informal sector and business cycle volatility are related, but
most papers have ignored whether the determinants of informality play a role in
this relationship. In fact, while the quality of institutions appears to have a uniform
effect on the size of the informal sector in the data, institutional quality can manifest
itself in different ways, work through different channels and hence lead to contrasting
effects on long-run and short-run aggregate economic activity.2 This implies that the
relationship between informality and macroeconomic performance is not clear-cut
and may depend on the root cause of informality in the economy. 3
In this paper, I explore whether the cross-country relationship between infor-
mality and aggregate volatility depends on the underlying cause of differences in
the size of the informal sector. I focus on different manifestations of institutions
(as opposed to differences in regulations or the tax structure) as the main source of
differences in the size of the informal sector across economies. The aggregate effects
of particular institutional differences may be difficult to disentangle in the data since
2For example, institutional quality can be reflected in the effectiveness of debt enforcement or
the enforcement of regulations, in the quality of public services that benefits the private sector, or
in the productivity of the economy as a whole.
3See Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) as well as Mott (2010) on the relevance of exploring the
impact of institutions on economic outcomes at a more disaggregated level.
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most institutional quality measures in the empirical literature are highly correlated
with each other. I use a tractable two-sector business cycle model with labor search
frictions and informal salaried employment that allows me to examine the impact of
different institutional proxies on informality, and in turn the impact of the informal
sector on economic activity. Using the model, I find that both labor market volatility
and the levels of particular macroeconomic aggregates such as output, investment,
and unemployment can differ widely across economies with the same informal sector
size depending on the root cause of the differences in the level of informality. My re-
sults suggest that identifying the specific causes of differences in informal sector size
(and understanding how these factors affect the allocation of resources) is crucial
for correctly characterizing the short-run and long-run macroeconomic consequences
of informality. While a similar result concerning the link between informality and
long-run outcomes was documented in Ulyssea (2010), I delve deeper by considering
the relationship between the determinants of informality, the size of the informal
sector, and aggregate short-run fluctuations.
The model I use is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) version
of the search and matching framework in Ulyssea (2010), with capital accumulation
in the formal sector and an endogenous detection probability in the informal sec-
tor. There are two sectors, formal and informal, that produce intermediate goods.
Formal firms have higher hiring costs and must pay payroll taxes. They accumulate
capital and face search frictions to find formal workers. Informal firms only use
labor, but must still spend resources to find workers. They avoid payroll taxes and
have lower hiring costs, but face an endogenous detection probability that depends
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on the measure of informal workers and on an exogenous enforcement quality param-
eter. I analyze the impact of changing two parameters that proxy for institutional
quality in the model. The first parameter affects the productivity of the economy
as a whole, while the second reflects the quality of enforcement of regulations in the
informal sector, either through higher informal worker separation rates or a higher
detection probability.
The quantitative experiments show that the model can successfully capture
the negative relationship between institutional quality and informality as well as
the positive link between informality and consumption and investment volatility in
the data. These results hold regardless of whether variation in informality is driven
by parameters affecting institutional quality in the overall economy or just in the
informal sector. However, the model predicts the observed negative relationship
between informality and the level of total output only if the variation in informality
is driven by economy-wide institutional quality. Better enforcement of regulations in
the informal sector (either through a higher separation rate for informal workers or
a higher detection probability) reduces informality but generates a fall in the level
of total output.4 Despite this fact, all experiments yield a negative relationship
between the capital-output ratio and the size of the informal sector, although this
link is driven by the counterfactual response of output when variation in the size
of the informal sector is driven by the enforcement parameter. Finally, I find that
the root cause of differences in the size of the informal sector plays a key role in
4See Elgin and Öztunalı(2013) for recent evidence suggesting that informality and output levels
are positively related in economies with weaker institutional quality.
17
the behavior of unemployment volatility: a decline in informality is driven by an
increase in overall institutional quality generates higher unemployment volatility,
whereas a similar-sized decline in informality driven by an increase in the quality of
enforcement in the informal sector leads to lower unemployment volatility.
The response of consumption and investment volatility to changes in the size
of the informal sector can be attributed to the effect of institutional quality on the
marginal product of capital in the formal sector, and to the value of hiring workers
in the formal sector. Regardless of the root cause of informality, economies with a
larger informal sector have smaller formal employment shares and a lower marginal
product of capital. As a result, these economies exhibit higher volatility in formal
vacancy postings and in the marginal product of capital. In response to a positive
aggregate productivity shock, formal firms in economies with a larger informal sec-
tor will post vacancies and accumulate capital more aggressively to take advantage
of the increase in productivity. Thus, a larger expansion in formal vacancies will be
accompanied by a sharper increase in investment in response to the aggregate shock,
thereby generating higher investment volatility. Finally, the increase in investment
volatility leads to higher consumption volatility since the evolution of capital af-
fects the resources available to households for consumption (Andrés, Doménech,
and Fatás, 2008). Ferreira-Tiryaki (2008) suggests that a larger informal sector
could lead to higher volatility since informal firms are credit-constrained and do not
have access to financial markets to smooth shocks. My work shows that one can
explain the link between informality and aggregate volatility without resorting to
credit constraints.
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The link between unemployment volatility and informal sector size depends
on how the steady-state level of unemployment is affected by the underlying factors
driving the level of informality. In particular, a higher informal worker separation
rate (which proxies for better enforcement) generates a sharp rise in steady-state
unemployment and creates a negative relationship between steady-state informality
and unemployment. The higher average level of unemployment dampens the effect
of fluctuations in formal and informal employment on unemployment volatility. As
a result, variation in informal worker separation rates create a positive link between
informality and unemployment volatility. Conversely, a rise in overall institutional
quality reduces unemployment in the economy, and yields a positive connection
between steady-state informality and unemployment. The fall in unemployment in
turn magnifies the impact of cyclical movements in formal and informal employment
on the variability of unemployment. Thus, informality and unemployment volatility
are negatively related. Furthermore, the less substitutable formal and informal
output are in total production, the starker the differences in unemployment volatility
between these two cases. One of the contributions of the paper is to show that
making inferences about the business cycle consequences of informality solely by
looking at the size of the sector can lead to an incomplete assessment of the effects of
informality on both short-run and long-run economic activity: changes in different
parameters reflecting institutional quality that have similar impacts on informal
sector size can generate drastically different outcomes for particular macroeconomic
aggregates and labor market volatility. These results can have important policy
implications since policies to reduce the size of the informal sector can have different
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consequences for aggregate fluctuations and long-run outcomes depending on the
specific approach taken to address the size of the informal sector.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section offers an overview of related
literature. Section 2.3 provides a brief empirical motivation. Section 2.4 describes
the model and Section 2.5 discusses the calibration strategy. Section 2.6 presents the
key results that emerge from the model’s simulations and provides some discussion.
Section 2.7 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
Djankov and Ramalho (2009) provide a summary of several papers on the link
between employment laws, the informal sector, and unemployment in developing
countries.5 In general, more stringent employment regulations tend to be associated
with a larger informal sector and higher unemployment. In related work, Loayza,
Oviedo, and Servén (2005) find a positive relationship between labor market regu-
lations and informality using a sample of developed and developing countries. They
suggest that the quality of governance is important in understanding the link be-
tween regulations and informal sector size. Indeed, better institutions may allow
stringent regulations and low levels of informality to coexist. In complementary
research, Loayza, Oviedo, and Servén (2004) consider the connection between labor
market regulations and the volatility of per capita output and find that more rigid
5Oviedo (2009) offers a comprehensive overview of the determinants and costs of informality.
See Heckman and Pagés (2004), Calderón, Chong, and León (2006), Gasparini and Tornarolli
(2006), Vuletin (2008), and the references in Djankov and Ramalho (2009). Also, see Berg and
Cazes (2007) and Lee, McCann and Torn (2008) for a detailed methodological review and evaluation
of the World Bank’s Doing Business rigidity of employment index.
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labor regulations lead to higher variability in the cyclical component of real GDP per
capita. Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Thaicharoen (2003) provide an extensive
empirical analysis that links the quality of institutions to the economy’s macroeco-
nomic volatility and crisis incidence. They conclude that, by affecting the economy’s
micro and macro linkages, the institutional foundations of the economy are one of
the leading determinants of macroeconomic volatility. Similarly, Barseghyan and
DiCecio (2009) take a complementary approach to Loayza et al. (2004) and docu-
ment that higher entry costs lead to greater output volatility using a large sample
of developed and developing countries, while property rights do not seem to have a
significant impact on volatility.
The surge in empirical studies on informality and the role of employment
regulations and institutional quality has been complemented by an expanding theo-
retical literature.6 Ulyssea (2010) proposes a two-sector search and matching model
based on Acemoglu (2001) that captures various features of labor market institu-
tions in Latin America. In particular, he studies the connection between labor
regulations and informality with a focus on unemployment and welfare. His find-
ings suggest that reducing the cost of entry into the formal sector causes a reduction
in informality without having a detrimental impact on unemployment. Conversely,
reducing informality through better enforcement increases unemployment and is
welfare-detrimental. My model extends his framework to a dynamic stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium environment, and confirms some of his findings. In particular, he
6For some examples of search models of informality in partial equilibrium, see Zenou (2008)
and Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2009, 2012). In a DSGE framework, see Cook and Nosaka (2005)
and Castillo and Montoro (2010). For the growth implications of informality in labor markets, see
Satchi and Temple (2008), among many others.
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documents that increasing enforcement leads to a reduction in informality, to a rise
in unemployment, and a fall in welfare in his model. The two papers can be seen
as complements in the sense that they address the links between regulations and
institutions and informality. However, I take a broader approach and consider the
impact of different manifestations of institutional quality on informality, and on
the behavior of macroeconomic aggregates over the business cycle. In contrast to
Ulyssea’s work, I abstract from the normative implications of informality and offer
a purely positive analysis.7
Restrepo-Echavarŕıa (2011) studies the connection between informality and
consumption volatility by proposing a home production two-sector RBC closed-
economy framework with an informal sector. She finds that having a large informal
sector that is not well measured leads to higher observed consumption volatility,
and argues that this volatility should decrease with the level of development of
the economy, which is accompanied by better measurement of informal activity.
One of the key elements driving changes in relative consumption volatility in her
model is the substitutability between formal and informal consumption goods. My
approach assumes that all data are equally (mis)measured and focuses on the root
causes of informality and the behavior of consumption, investment, employment,
and output in the short run. I also show that the observed relationship between
7If I were to take a normative stand, the paper suggests that more better enforcement leads to
higher consumption, investment, and output levels only if higher enforcement has a positive effect
on the formal sector as well. In this case, welfare would presumably be higher, which stands in
contrast to Ulyssea’s results. This discrepancy depends critically on whether changes in institutions
only affect the informal sector, or whether they affect the formal sector as well. Also, note that I
take the view that enforcement only affects the informal sector. If enforcement also affected the
formal sector, it is plausible that better enforcement may generate an increase in informality.
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informal sector size and consumption volatility can be explained without assuming
mismeasurement of informal activity in the data, or differences between formal and
informal consumption goods.
Granda-Carvajal (2012) presents a real business cycle model with an under-
ground economy to explore the role of the informal sector in driving short-run ag-
gregate fluctuations in the economy. My model is similar to hers in that I assume
that labor is the only input in production in the informal sector. However, I assume
that the only source of fluctuations in the economy is an aggregate productivity
shock that affects both sectors. Furthermore, my emphasis is on whether differ-
ent root causes of informality have different implications for long-run and short-run
macroeconomic outcomes, and I also address the implications of informality for un-
employment fluctuations. Granda-Carvajal (2012) shows that a higher exogenous
detection probability in the informal sector reduces output and consumption volatil-
ity, and increases investment and formal labor volatility marginally. In contrast to
her results, I find that higher enforcement leads to a large reduction in investment
volatility.
Castillo and Montoro (2010) analyze the role of informality in the transmis-
sion of demand and technology shocks in a two-sector sticky-price DSGE model
with search frictions and focus on the effects of informality on inflation dynamics.
Using the structure presented in Blanchard and Gal (2006), they proxy for the cost
of regulations through time-varying hiring costs, but do not explicitly analyze the
economy under different regulatory regimes that have similar consequences for in-
formality. Their findings suggest that the informal sector acts as a shock absorber
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for inflation and wages in response to demand shocks. In addition, their work of-
fers an explanation for the positive link between informality and output volatility
documented in Ferreira-Tiryaki (2008). In contrast to my work, the paper focuses
solely on regulations as the source of differences in informality, focuses on the behav-
ior of inflation, and abstracts from the behavior of investment and unemployment
dynamics.
Bridji and Charpe (2011) explore how a dual labor market affects the cyclical
behavior of output and unemployment using a business cycle model with search
frictions in the formal sector and a frictionless market for informal labor. They
find that informal employment tends to expand during downturns, in line with the
conventional wisdom on the cyclical behavior of informal labor markets, and that
informality tends to lead to higher output volatility. They stress that search costs
and the barriers to entry in the two sectors play an important role in generating
differences in the cyclical behavior of employment and output. In contrast to their
setup, I introduce search frictions that afflict both formal and informal employment.
Furthermore, my main focus is on whether different determinants of informality
that have similar implications for the size of the informal sector can have different
consequences for business cycle dynamics and long-run macro outcomes.
Elgin and Öztunalı(2013) study the interaction between informality, institu-
tions, and GDP per capita. They find evidence suggesting that the size of the
informal sector and the level of output are positively related in economies with
poorer institutions, while countries with better institutional quality exhibit a neg-
ative link between informality and output levels. They introduce a simple general
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equilibrium model that can capture this relationship. My work is similar to theirs
since I also consider the effect of institutions on informal activity and on long-run
macroeconomic performance. Furthermore, my model is able to capture Elgin and
Öztunalı’s results, though I find that weaker institutions must be reflected in weaker
enforcement alone to deliver a positive link between informality and output levels.
Also, my work goes a step further by exploring the consequences of informality and
its determinants for aggregate volatility (including labor market volatility) as well.
Wesselbaum (2010a, 2010b) studies the importance of labor market regula-
tions in developed OECD countries in a one-sector DSGE search and matching
model with firing costs and severance payments as proxies for labor institutions.
He shows that the two types of costs have different implications for labor market
volatility and overall welfare, which is a result that complements the findings in
Garibaldi and Violante (2002). These results are similar to mine in that two seem-
ingly similar regulatory features can have contrasting effects on volatility. Finally,
Sala, Silva, and Toledo (2008) focus on the hiring margin and study the link between
fixed-term contracts and the volatility of employment in a partial-equilibrium labor
search environment. They conclude that fixed-term contracts represent an impor-




The literature has not reached a consensus on a general definition of informality
(Maloney, 2004). In this paper, I use two related definitions. The first one, based
on Schneider et al. (2010), expresses informal sector size as a percent of GDP. The
second definition centers on informality in the labor market, which allows me to have
a clear distinction between the two sectors in the model. One key characteristic of
informal labor markets is non-compliance with the regulatory and tax structures
that govern firm-worker relationships in the economy.
Definition (Informal Sector) The informal sector refers to the sector where
legal, market-based production is explicitly hidden from the government, and there-
fore is not subject to government regulations. The size of the informal sector is
expressed as a share of official GDP (Schneider et al., 2010).
Definition (Informal Employment) Employed workers who lack a formal em-
ployment contract (not registered by their employer) and are therefore unprotected
by their country’s employment laws are informal. Likewise, otherwise legal firms
that do not pay payroll taxes or comply with labor regulations, do not register their
workers, and circumvent employment laws are considered informal (Bacchetta et al.,
2009).
Since part of my focus is on the enforcement labor regulations, I explicitly
abstract from self-employed workers, who are generally included in the definition
of informal employment. Labor market regulations, employment laws that are sup-
ported by labor market institutions refer to the rules, terms and conditions, respon-
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sibilities, and rights established by the country’s governing body that determine
the relationship between firms and workers in the formal labor market. For the
purposes of this paper, institutional quality encompasses the degree of law and reg-
ulatory enforcement as well as the strength of institutions that support economic
activity.8
2.3.1 Determinants of Informality
The literature on informality has documented that institutional quality, en-
forcement, and other types of regulations play an important role in determining the
size of the informal sector (see Loayza, Oviedo, and Servén, 2005, and others). In
this subsection, I briefly revisit the determinants of informality. I use these results
as a basis for the quantitative experiments performed with the model.9
I use a large sample of developed and developing countries. The dependent
variable is the size of the informal sector as a percent of official GDP in 2002,
obtained from Schneider et al. (2010). Since informality in the model is defined
in terms of employment, I focus on labor market regulations when estimating the
impact of regulations on informal sector size. I use data from 2002 since the variables
I use to measure labor regulations are available starting in 2002. In particular, I use
two specific components of labor regulations from the Freedom of the World report,
regulations on hiring and firing, instead of an aggregate measure in order to isolate
8For example, Rule of Law captures, among other things, the extent to which individuals
follow the rules and norms of society that dictate economic transactions and interactions. See the
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) for the definitions of different proxies of
institutional quality.
9Some of the stylized facts in this section have already been documented in earlier literature
(see Oviedo, 2009).
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some of the particular elements of the institutional and regulatory environment that
may have a direct impact on the informal sector. More stringent hiring regulations
and dismissal costs are reflected in lower values for these indices.
Table 2.1: Cross-Country Determinants of Informal Sector Size
Dep. Var.: IS Size
Specification (1) (2) (3)
French Legal Origin 5.859** 6.973** 1.178
(2.650) (3.089) (2.524)
Law and Order (LO) - - -5.442***
(0.816)
Hiring Reg. (HR) -1.140** - -0.761*
(0.459) (0.431)
Dismissal Costs (DC) -0.947*** - -0.379
(0.347) (0.328)
Labor Regulations - -1.189 -
(0.919)
Log RGDP 1999 -1.318*** -1.235*** -0.778**
(0.502) (0.558) (0.347)
R2 0.30 0.17 0.51
Obs. 94 93 87
Note: The constant term is omitted for expositional purposes. Robust standard errors are shown
in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** denotes significance at the 5
percent level, * denotes significance at the 10 percent.
I also consider a widely used measure of overall institutional quality in the
literature, mainly Law and Order from the Political Risk Services (PRS) Group’s
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). I use this variable for year 1999.10 I use
French legal origin as a proxy for enforcement (following Botero et al., 2004) when
I include law and order in the specification.11 Finally, I use the log of real GDP
10Another common measure is Rule of Law from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance
Indicators. The results are qualitatively the same if I use Rule of Law to control for institutional
quality, though the significance of hiring regulations is sensitive to the proxy of institutions used.
11The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators include a measure of regulatory quality,
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in 1999, obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI)
as a measure of the level of development. The main details of the variables are
presented in the Appendix for expositional purposes. Table 2.1 presents the main
results, summarized as follows: more stringent hiring and firing regulations, worse
enforcement (proxied by legal origin), and a lower level of development are associated
with more informality. Once we include the measure of overall institutional quality
(Law and Order), a deterioration in institutions, more stringent hiring regulations,
and a lower a level of development are associated with a larger informal sector.12
The proxy for enforcement and dismissal costs are no longer significant in explaining
informality. The results for law and order and the level of GDP have been previously
documented in the literature (see Loayza, Oviedo, and Servén, 2005, and Oviedo,
2009). One difference relative to existing studies is that the overall measure of
labor regulations is insignificant, while individual measures of labor regulations that
capture separately the ease of hiring and the cost of firing are still important even
after controlling for enforcement and the level of development.
which could in principle capture the degree of enforcement in the economy. This measure is
very highly correlated with rule of law, law and order, control of corruption, and government
effectiveness, all of which are common measures of institutional quality. I use French legal origin
as a proxy of enforcement since it is significant in explaining differences in the enforcement of
contracts, even after controlling for other factors that may account for differences in enforcement
across countries. For country-specific proxies of enforcement, see Ronconi (2010) for Argentina
and Almeida and Carneiro (2011) for Brazil. For some recent work on labor inspections across
countries, see Almeida and Ronconi (2012). I also experiment with the measure of enforcement of
contracts from the Economic Freedom of the World report to determine whether the results are
robust. While this index focuses on debt enforcement and hence provides an imperfect measure
of enforcement of regulations, it provides a reasonable alternative to the raw proxy (legal origin)
in the main results. The results remain qualitatively similar if I proxy for enforcement with this
measure.
12The significance of hiring regulations is not robust to alternative measures of institutional
quality and hence focus on institutions in the rest of the paper.
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2.3.2 Informal Sector Size and Aggregate Volatility
In this subsection, I briefly revisit the analysis of aggregate volatility and
informality presented in Ferreira-Tiryaki (2008). For the purpose of comparison,
I use her dataset on annual consumption, investment, and output volatility, which
includes a combination of developed and developing countries, for a total of 44 coun-
tries (see Appendix A for details). I use the same measure of informality (expressed
as a percent of official GDP) from Schneider et al. (2010).13 Given that informal
sector size is only available for a limited number of years, I use year 2002 for the
data on informal sector size, which is the same year I use for the determinants of
informality.14 To determine whether the relationship between volatility and infor-
mality is robust to other likely factors that could affect aggregate volatility, I use
the government-to-GDP ratio, the share of credit to the private sector as a percent
of GDP, and a measure of openness (imports plus exports as a percent of GDP),
which are all obtained from the World Development Indicators.
While the general results in Table 2.2 confirm Ferreira-Tiryaki’s (2008) em-
pirical analysis in a more parsimonious regression, I find no significant relationship
between informality and output volatility once I control for other factors that might
affect the volatility of output. The results for output volatility are particularly sen-
sitive to the country sample and to the set of regressors included in the analysis. By
contrast, the significance of informal sector size in the investment and consumption
13The results for consumption volatility are sensitive to the inclusion of Argentina (which is
part of the original country sample and has one of the highest levels of consumption volatility in
the sample). The main results exclude Argentina to give a more general picture of the connection
between informality and volatility.
14Using the average for years 1999 through 2002 does not change the main conclusions.
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Table 2.2: Informal Sector Size and Aggregate Volatility
Dep. Var.: σconsumption σinvestment σoutput
IS 0.035** 0.128*** 0.010
(0.015) (0.041) (0.014)
Gov. Spending -0.041 -0.101 -0.066**
(0.038) (0.082) (0.027)
Credit Private Sector -0.003 0.007 -0.001
(0.005) (0.014) (0.004)
Openness 0.004 0.006 0.002*
(0.002) (0.007) (0.001)
R2 0.25 0.38 0.31
Observations 43 43 43
Note: The constant term is omitted for expositional purposes. Robust standard errors are shown
in parentheses. *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** denotes significance at the 5
percent level, * denotes significance at the 10 percent.
volatility regressions is robust to alternative specifications that include a richer set
of regressors (such as a measure of inflation to proxy for monetary policy, trend
GDP growth, and exchange rate volatility).15 In the rest of the paper, I focus on
the relationship between aggregate volatility and informal sector size, and on the
link between informality and labor market volatility. In the next section, I present a
model that can capture the stylized facts about the determinants of informal sector
size and the connection between informality and volatility. I then use the model to
analyze whether the underlying source behind the differences in the size of the infor-
mal sector matters for characterizing the link between informality, macroeconomic
15Following Ferreira-Tiryaki (2008), I also experiment with specifications where I instrument for
informal sector size to address the potential endogeneity between informality and volatility. Note
that using explicit measures of institutional quality as instruments, as in Ferreira-Tiryaki (2008),
gives a mixed picture for the strength and validity of the instruments under richer specifications.
For the specification in Table 2.2, the qualitative results when instrumenting on informal sector
size remain unchanged. The most important result to take out of the evidence in Table 2.2 is that
the positive relationship between informal sector size and consumption and investment volatility
is significant even after controlling for other factors that affect aggregate volatility.
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aggregates, and business cycle fluctuations.
2.4 The Model
I use a two-sector business cycle model that includes search and matching fric-
tions in formal and informal salaried employment. The structure of the labor mar-
ket is similar to the partial-equilibrium search and matching framework in Ulyssea
(2010) and Acemoglu (2001). In contrast to Ulyssea (2010), I introduce capital ac-
cumulation in the formal sector to analyze the behavior of investment volatility.16
Formal firms post formal vacancies and accumulate capital. They face payroll taxes
and higher hiring costs relative to informal firms. Formal workers also have higher
bargaining power relative to informal workers. These last three elements reflect the
presence of hiring regulations in the formal sector. Informal firms post vacancies to
hire workers. They do not pay payroll taxes and have lower hiring costs, but they
face an endogenous probability of detection that proxies for enforcement. There
is no explicit segmentation in the labor market. Following the existing theoretical
literature, I combine informal self-employment and informal salaried employment.17
I also abstract from firm entry and exit as well as job-to-job flows for simplicity.
The formal and informal sectors produce intermediate inputs used in the pro-
duction of an aggregate consumption good. A representative final goods firm aggre-
gates output from the two sectors with some degree of substitutability. I initially
16In a modified version of the model, I introduce capital accumulation in the informal sector as
well. The main conclusions of the paper remain unchanged.
17For a setup with frictional entry into self-employment in a business cycle environment, see
Finkelstein Shapiro (2012).
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assume that the two inputs are imperfect substitutes, in line with the evidence
(Chen, 2007) and the assumptions in Ulyssea (2010) and Acemoglu (2001). Output
from a frictionless final goods firm represents aggregate output in the economy.18
This setup captures the fact that formal firms often purchase inputs and contract
services from other (formal and informal) firms in order to produce output that is
later sold in formal output markets.
Improvements in institutional quality in the economy can manifest themselves
in different ways, ranging from higher productivity in the formal sector (which can
also be coupled with better enforcement in the informal sector and hence represent
an economy-wide improvement in institutions) to better enforcement that only af-
fects the informal sector. I consider two ways of varying the quality of enforcement.
First, I change the separation rate of informal workers, similar to the experiment in
Ulyssea (2010), such that a higher informal separation rate reflects better enforce-
ment of regulations. Second, I introduce an endogenous probability of detection
in the informal sector that depends on the measure of informal workers and a pa-
rameter that captures exogenous changes in enforcement. In the benchmark model,
I assume that this parameter can also be affected by institutional quality in the
formal sector, so that changes in the latter affect both sectors and hence represent
changes in overall institutional quality.19
18See Krause and Lubik (2007) for a similar assumption in general equilibrium. While in
practice there may exist informal sector output sold directly to consumers in informal output
markets, I abstract from modeling informal final goods markets separately from formal ones for
simplicity. This also avoids the problem of making assumptions about the degree of substitutability
between formal and informal consumption goods. Also, most of the literature either assumes that
a representative firm can hire both types of workers, i.e. formal and informal, or separates workers
completely by sector. The latter assumption allows me to make a clearer distinction between
sectors.
19As I show in the firms’ problems below, the way I introduce this parameter allows me to
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The size of the employed labor force in each of the two sectors is determined
endogenously, but there is no firm entry or exit in either sector. The size of the
informal sector can be described in two equally valid ways: by the measure of workers
employed in informal firms or by the ratio of informal output to final output.
The timing of the model is as follows: at the beginning of time t, the aggregate
productivity shock hits the economy. Once firms observe aggregate productivity, ex-
ogenous separations in the two sectors occur simultaneously. After separations, the
total measure of workers in the economy (and hence unemployment) is determined.
Informal workers are considered to be part of total employment. Firms post vacan-
cies in their respective sectors and formal firms make investment decisions, and both
previously unemployed and recently separated individuals look for jobs randomly.
Once matching takes place, real wages are determined through Nash bargaining.
Production occurs and workers receive their wage payments.
2.4.1 Households
The household’s problem is standard. Utility depends on an aggregate con-
sumption good whose price is normalized to one (see Krause and Lubik, 2007). As
in Andolfatto (1996), I assume an infinitely-lived representative household of mea-
sure one, consisting of a large number of family members who supply their labor
inelastically. There is perfect risk-pooling in the economy.20 For simplicity, there
analyze the behavior of the economy when changes in institutional quality affect only the formal
sector, only the informal sector, or both sectors simultaneously. If institutions only affect the formal
sector, the results are similar to the case where institutions affect both sectors simultaneously.
20The informal sector is often characterized as being riskier. However, empirical evidence sug-
gests that there are (formal and informal) insurance mechanisms that partially insulate households
whose members work in the informal sector from idiosyncratic shocks (see, for example, Levy, 2008).
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is no labor force participation margin, so the members of the household are either
employed in one of the two sectors or unemployed. The household’s problem is to

















ct + at = wI,tnI,t + wF,tnF,t +ΠF,t +ΠI,t +Πt + but + Tt +Rtat−1 (2.2)
The choice over assets simply makes the pricing of interest rates explicit. As is typ-
ical in these models, the household does not choose the measure of individuals that
work. Πt, ΠF,t and ΠI,t are profits in the final goods sector, the formal intermediate
goods sector, and the informal intermediate goods sector, respectively. wF,t and nF,t
denote the real wage and the measure of individuals working in the formal sector,
respectively, and wI,t and nI,t represent the same variables in the informal sector.
21
There is no intensive margin for labor. Both wages are measured in terms of the
price of the aggregate consumption good. b denotes unemployment benefits. Tt are
real lump-sum transfers from the government. At any point in time, a household
member can be employed in either of the two sectors or unemployed. The total
21Adding a labor income tax for workers in the formal sector does not change the main conclu-
sions of the paper.
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employed labor force nt is defined as
nt = nF,t + nI,t (2.3)
I normalize the total labor force to one and define unemployment as ut = 1−nt. Let
U(ct) be the utility function over the aggregate consumption good. The first-order
















2.4.2.1 Intermediate Formal Sector Firms
Production in the formal sector depends on formal labor nF , formal capital
kF , and aggregate productivity z. In addition, institutional quality affects formal
sector production and enters the production function as a productivity-enhancing
parameter aF .
22 The firm’s production function is assumed to be constant-returns-
to-scale and is given by
yF,t = ztaFf(nF,t, kF,t) (2.5)
22For a recent empirical investigation on the impact of institutions on productivity and efficiency,
see Bhaumik, Dimova, Kumbhakar, and Sun (2012).
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Introducing institutional quality in this fashion is one reduced-form way of cap-
turing the fact that better property rights, enforcement of contracts, and com-
pliance with the rules of society are productivity-enhancing in the formal sector.













pF,tyF,t − wF,tnF,t(1 + τ




nF,t+1 = (1− δ
F )(nF,t + vF,tq(θF,t)) (2.7)
and
kF,t+1 = (1− δ)kF,t + iF,t (2.8)
where the price of intermediate formal sector output relative to final output is given
by pF,t, the separation rate for formal workers is δ
F , and the depreciation rate of
capital is δ. Firms in the formal sector pay payroll taxes τ p. q(θF ) stands for the
job-filling rate, where θF is labor market tightness in the formal sector. ψF is the
formal hiring cost, which I assume reflects the cost of hiring regulations.23 Taking
















23Introducing firing costs as well does not change the general conclusions of the paper.
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and
1 = EtΞt+1|t {pF,t+1aF zt+1fkF (nF,t+1, kF,t+1) + 1− δ} (2.10)
The job creation condition simply equates the expected marginal cost of posting a
formal vacancy to the expected marginal benefit.
2.4.2.2 Intermediate Informal Sector Firms
Informal firms also face search frictions, but the cost of posting vacancies is
lower than in the formal sector, ψF > ψI (Bosch and Esteban-Pretel, 2006). The
production function for informal firms is linear in informal labor and is given by
yI,t = ztf(nI,t) = ztnI,t.
24 The detection probability is given by ρ(nI,t, aF , ι), where
ι represents the exogenous level of enforcement in the informal sector, aF represents
institutional quality in the economy as a whole, and nI,t is the amount of informal
labor in the informal sector. I follow Choi and Thum (2005) in assuming that the
detection probability is endogenous. The function ρ(nI,t, aF , ι) is increasing in ι, aF ,
and nI,t, so that better enforcement in the informal sector, proxied by a higher ι,
leads to an increase in the probability of getting caught for given levels of informal
employment and institutional quality in the formal sector. Note that a higher aF
proxies for better overall institutional quality in the economy since it makes formal
firms more productive and also affects informal firms by increasing the detection
probability ρ(nI,t, aF , ι). The representative informal firm chooses a sequence of
24Adding an exogenous productivity differential between formal and informal firms does not
change the conclusions of the paper.
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nI,t+1 = (1− δ
I)(nI,t + vI,tq(θI,t)) (2.12)
where the detection probability ρ(nI,t, aF , ι) acts as a tax on informal output, q(θI) is
the informal sector job-filling probability as described above, and pI,t is the relative
price of informal output relative to final output. δI is the separation rate in the
informal sector. Bosch and Maloney (2008, 2010) find that separation rates are
higher in the informal sector, which implies that δF < δI .25 Taking first-order







pI,t+1(1− ρ(nI,t+1, aF , ι))zt+1







Note that the informal sector firm internalizes the probability of being discovered by
the government. Indeed, the firm explicitly takes into consideration that its decision
to use labor will have an impact on its visibility to the public authorities and thus
will affect the likelihood of losing output due to government detection.
25They also document that the job separation rate in the informal sector increases during
recessions and is highly volatile. In addition, the volatility of unemployment is largely due to
the volatility of the informal separation rate and the flows from informality. I assume exogenous
separation rates to have a tractable environment.
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2.4.3 Labor Market Search and Nash Bargaining
Following the literature, I assume a constant-returns-to-scale matching func-
tion mj(ut, vj,t) for each sector j = F, I, where vj,t denotes sectoral vacancies and ut




and the job-filling rate is given by q(θj,t) =
mj(ut,vj,t)
vj,t
, so that sectoral market tight-
ness is given by
p(θj,t)
q(θj,t)
= θj,t for j = F, I.
2.4.3.1 Worker Value Functions
The value to a worker of being employed in the formal sector, WF,t, is given
by
WF,t = wF,t + EtΞt+1|t
{




The value function for a worker in the informal sector, WI,t, is
WI,t = wI,t + EtΞt+1|t
{




The value function for an unemployed agent, WU,t, can be written as





F )WF,t+1 + p(θI,t)(1− δ
I)WI,t+1+
(1− p(θF,t)(1− δ






where I interpret b as the value of unemployment benefits measured in consumption
units.26
26The interpretation of this parameter is not clear-cut for developing countries. Indeed, if we
take the interpretation of b as pure unemployment benefits, then we should set the parameter to
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2.4.3.2 Firm Value Functions
Denoting the value function of having a worker in place during production for
a formal sector firm by JF,t, we have






The value of having a worker for a firm in the informal sector, JI,t, is





where, once again, the probability that the firm’s output is confiscated by the gov-
ernment authorities is ρ(nI,t, aF , ι). I assume free entry in vacancy posting in both
sectors.
2.4.3.3 Nash Bargaining and Wage Determination









zero, as only a small number of developing countries have adequate safety nets. An alternative
interpretation is to assume that b includes the value of home production. For developing countries,
some papers consider home production as a form of self-employment, even though the self-employed
are counted as active labor market participants (Maloney, 2004; Fiess et al., 2010). This does not
seem to be an adequate label since informal work, including self-employment, is tied to market
activities. In this paper, I explicitly interpret b as unemployment benefits.
41
where (WF,t −WU,t) is the worker’s surplus, JF,t is the firm’s surplus, and νF is
the worker’s bargaining power. In a similar fashion, the Nash bargaining problem









where (WI,t −WU,t) is the worker’s surplus, JI,t is the firm’s surplus, and the bar-
gaining power for informal sector workers is νI ≤ νF . We can consider the difference
in worker bargaining powers as an additional reduced-form way of capturing labor




























is the effective bargaining power of formal workers, which
takes into account the impact of payroll taxes, τ p. Intuitively, in a two-sector model
with search frictions and interaction across sectors, the wage should not only depend
on the marginal product of labor, but also on the value of a potential job in the
27The Appendix presents a detailed derivation of the wage equations.
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other sector as it represents an additional outside option. For example, consider
the formal wage equation. Higher informal labor market tightness implies that the
outside option in informal salaried work is more readily accessible if the individual
were unemployed, which puts upward pressure on formal wages. This effect is similar
to what we would obtain with higher unemployment benefits, with the exception
that the informal salaried employment option responds to changes in aggregate
economic conditions.
2.4.4 Final Goods Firm
A representative final goods firm uses output from both intermediate formal
and informal firms to produce final consumption goods. For simplicity, these are the
only inputs used in the production process. As in Ulyssea (2010), the representative














γ − pF,tyF,t − pI,tyI,t
}
(2.23)








γ , 0 ≤ αy ≤ 1 and
γ < 1. Recall that pF,t and pI,t are the relative prices of intermediate formal and
informal output, respectively. The first-order conditions yield the prices of formal














The government budget constraint is given by
Tt + but = wF,tnF,tτ
p + ρ(nI,t, aF , ι)pI,tyI,t (2.26)
where recall that
ut = 1− nF,t − nI,t (2.27)
For simplicity, output confiscated from informal sector firms that are detected be-
comes government revenue.
2.4.6 Market Clearing
As in most models with labor search frictions, the costs of posting vacancies
are a resource cost and thus enter explicitly into the economy’s resource constraint.
Hence, the aggregate resource constraint is given by
yt = ct + ψF vF,t + iF,t + ψIvI,t (2.28)
I assume that y in the model represents aggregate output in the data.
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2.4.7 Competitive Equilibrium
Definition (Competitive Equilibrium) Taking the exogenous process {zt} as
given, a competitive equilibrium consists of prices {wF,t, wI,t, pF,t, pI,t}
∞
t=0 and al-
locations {ct, nF,t, nI,t, θF,t, θI,t, kF,t, ut, Tt}
∞
t=0 that satisfy the formal capital Euler
equation (2.10), the two laws of motion for formal and informal employment (2.7)
and (2.12), the two job creation conditions (2.9) and (2.13), the formal and infor-
mal wages (2.21) and (2.22), the final goods firm’s optimality conditions for sectoral
intermediate inputs (2.24) and (2.25), the government budget constraint (2.26), the
expression for unemployment (2.27), and the aggregate resource constraint (2.28).
2.5 Calibration Strategy
Bosch and Maloney (2008) are the first to have characterized the labor market
dynamics of informal labor markets in two developing countries, Brazil and Mexico,
so they provide a good source of estimates for some of the model’s parameters. I
choose Mexico as the benchmark economy because Mexico actively tracks informal
activity through household and firm surveys and incorporates estimates of informal
production into its national income accounts (Quintin and Pratap, 2006; Oviedo,
2009; United Nations, 2008). The first subsection below specifies the functional
forms and the second subsection addresses the benchmark parametrization. The
main purpose of the simulations is not to determine whether the model can capture
particular stylized facts about Mexico, but to make a specific point through a series
of numerical experiments. However, I use particular moments for the Mexican econ-
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omy to calibrate those parameters for which there are no values in the literature.
This allows me to have a more disciplined parametrization of the model.
2.5.1 Functional Forms and Stochastic Processes






The production function in the formal sector is Cobb-Douglas while the production
function in the informal sector is linear in informal labor:




f(nI,t) = nI,t (2.31)





j,t , 0 < ξ < 1, where Mj denotes the sectoral matching efficiency parameter,
and vj,t denotes sectoral vacancies for j = F, I. Then, the job-finding rate in each














j,t for j = F, I. The aggregate technology shock zt follows an
AR(1) process






∼ N(0, σz) and ρz < 1. Finally, the enforcement probability is assumed to
be ρ(nI,t, aF , ι) = aF ιnI,t, similar to Choi and Thum (2005).
2.5.2 Parametrization and Calibration Targets
To parameterize the model, I borrow a set of parameter values directly from
related studies, and calibrate the parameters for which there are no known estimates
using specific targets for Mexico. Table 2.3 presents the parameters commonly
used in the literature, while Table 2.4 specifies the parameters whose values are
simultaneously obtained by imposing particular calibration targets and solving for
the model’s steady state.
Parameters from Literature The time period in the model is set to one quar-
ter, so β = 0.98. The capital share in formal sector production is set to αF = 0.30,
which is a common value in one-sector DSGE models for developing countries. The
depreciation rate for capital is set to 0.02. The quarterly separation rates in the
two sectors are taken from Bosch and Maloney (2008), who report quarterly tran-
sition probabilities between employment states using quarterly data from 1987 to
2004 from Mexico’s National Survey on Urban Employment (Encuesta Nacional de
Empleo Urbano, or ENEU). The elasticity of substitution between formal and in-
formal intermediate goods in final output is taken to be somewhat higher than the
value assumed by Ulyssea (2010) for Brazil. There are no existing estimates for this
parameter for Mexico. I initially assume that γ = 0.5, which implies some degree of
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Table 2.3: Parameters from Literature
Parameter Value Description Source
αF 0.30 Capital Share, Formal Prod. DSGE Literature
aF 1 Instit. Quality, Formal Sector Benchmark Assumption
β 0.98 Discount Factor DSGE Literature
δ 0.02 Capital Depreciation Rate DSGE Lit.
δF 0.030 Sep. Rate, Formal Bosch, Maloney (2008)
δI 0.060 Sep. Rate, Informal Bosch, Maloney (2008)
γ 0.50 Elasticity of Substit., Final Goods Benchmark Assumption




Worker Bargaining Power, Informal Benchmark Assumption
ρz 0.90 Autocorrelation of TFP DSGE Lit.
τ p 0.12 Payroll Tax Rate OECD Taxing Wages
b 0 Unempl. Insurance -
ξ 0.50 Matching Function Elast. Search, Matching Lit.
substitution between the two inputs.28 The autocorrelation of TFP is set to 0.90.
The payroll tax is set to its average for years 2001 and 2002 (OECD, 2009a), and
is at the lower bound of existing estimates (see, for example, Levy, 2007). The
elasticity of the matching functions and the bargaining power of workers in the for-
mal sector take standard values in the literature, so that ξ = νF = 0.50. For the
bargaining power of workers in the informal sector, I follow Ulyssea (2010) and set




Calibrated Parameters We are left with nine parameters that are jointly cali-
brated using targets from Mexican data: αy,MF ,MI , ψF , ψI , and ι. I choose ψF to
28As I discuss further below, the degree of substitutability plays an important role for the
response of unemployment volatility to changes in aF and to δ
I , but the main message of the
paper holds for alternative values of γ.
29This keeps the job-finding probability in the formal sector bounded below one when the size
of the informal sector is very small in the quantitative experiments. Assuming the same effective
bargaining power for both types of workers does not change the main conclusions of the paper.
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Table 2.4: Calibrated Parameters in Benchmark Model
Parameter Value Description Target Target Source




MF 0.208 For. Matching Eff. nF = 0.50 ENEU, ILO
MI 0.084 Infor. Matching Eff. nI = 0.45 ENEU, ILO
ψF 0.131 Formal Hiring Cost ψF = 0.30wF Levy (2007)
ψI 0.014 Informal Hiring Cost ψI = 0.035wI Benchmark
ι 0.111 Instit. Quality ρ(.) = 0.05 OECD (2009a)
σz 0.0174 Std. Dev. TFP σy = 2.17 Lama, Urrutia (2012)
be 30 percent of steady-state formal wages, as in Levy (2007). Since there are no
data on vacancy posting costs in the informal sector, I choose ψI to be 3.5 percent
of steady-state informal wages, which is the estimate of the scale of hiring costs,
excluding regulations, in Levy (2007). What matters is that hiring workers with
formal contracts is more expensive than hiring informal workers due to the legal
and regulatory requirements to formalize employment contracts. The weighting
factor for aggregate output, αy, is chosen to match a steady-state informal-sector-
to-total-output ratio of 40 percent. While this value is higher than the estimates
for Mexico in Perry et al. (2007) and Schneider et al. (2010), I assume a higher
steady-state share to be able to obtain a longer range for changes in the size of the
informal sector in the numerical experiments. The conclusions of the paper remain
unchanged with alternative calibration targets. Note that in the model, the measure
of informal sector size as a share of final output is given by pIyI/y.
I calibrate the matching scale parametersMj, for j = F, I to match the average
shares of formal and informal employment as a percent of the labor force in Mexico
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from 1987 to 2004, where informal employment is the sum of informal salaried and
self-employment.30 I use Mexico’s ratio of the amount of tax-debt collected to the
total amount eligible for collection, available from the OECD (2009a), as a proxy for
the detection probability ρ(nI , aF , ι) and choose ι to set the detection probability in
the benchmark calibration to 5 percent.31 Finally, I set the standard deviation of
TFP to match the volatility of output reported in Lama and Urrutia (2012).
2.6 Numerical Experiments
This section characterizes the static and dynamic behavior of the model econ-
omy under different institutional environments. I log-linearize the model around
the non-stochastic steady state and compute a first-order approximation of the
equilibrium conditions.32 I simulate the economy for 2100 periods, drop the first
100 periods, use the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with smoothing parameter 1600
on the simulated data, extract the cyclical component and compute the standard
deviations of the model’s variables.
30Depending on the definition of informal labor and the dataset used (urban or national), the
values for the share of informal labor in Mexico range from 27 percent to 60 percent of the labor
force.
31In 2007, which is the latest year available, the ratio for Mexico was reported to be 7.2 percent,
whereas in previous years it was closer to 1 percent. Bosch and Esteban Pretel (2009) use a
monitoring probability of 0.5 percent in their calibration for Brazil, which is closer to the 1.2
percent probability observed for 2005 and 2006 in Mexico.
32I use Dynare for all dynamic simulations. Using a second-order approximations does not
change the results of the paper.
50
2.6.1 Informal Sector Size and Institutional Quality
Figures 2.1 through 2.3 below show the relationship between the size of the
informal sector and various macroeconomic aggregates of interest.
Figure 2.1: Informal Sector Size and Institutional Quality
The columns of Figure 2.1 show the relationship between the steady-state size
of the informal sector (as a percent of total output) and one of the three parame-
ters proxying for institutional quality, holding all other parameters fixed. Column
1 varies overall institutional quality, aF ; column 2 varies enforcement as proxied by
the informal worker separation rate, δI (see Ulyssea, 2010); and column 3 varies
enforcement as proxied by changes in ι that directly affect the detection probability,
ρ(nI , aF , ι).
33 As shown in Figure 2.1, the model can successfully capture one of
the main stylized facts documented in Section 2.3: the negative link between insti-
33A similar experiment can be performed by changing the hiring cost in the formal sector as
a proxy for changes in hiring regulations. Since the empirical motivation above suggests that
institutions play a more prominent role, I analyze the case of hiring regulations as an extension.
The results are in general similar to those obtained by changing aF . Also, the results in columns
1 and 2 are similar if we assume an exogenous detection probability.
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tutional quality and informal sector size, regardless of the specific interpretation of
institutional quality in the model. Indeed, both higher informal worker separation
rates and a higher detection probability proxy for stronger enforcement, and lead
to a smaller informal sector size. Higher overall institutional quality, reflected in
a higher aF , has a similar effect. However, Figures 2.2 and 2.3 below will show
that the underlying source of differences in the size of the informal sector is crucial
for characterizing the relationship between informality and some of the steady-state
variables of the model.
Higher overall institutional quality Column 1 of Figures 2.2 and 2.3 shows the
relationship between informal sector size and various steady-state moments traced
out by variations in overall institutional quality, aF . Higher overall institutional
quality increases the value of hiring formal workers and accumulating capital in
the formal sector, leading to higher formal vacancies, a higher formal job-finding
rate, and an increase in formal employment as formal firms expand production.
Since formal firms increase vacancy postings and both capital and labor are used in
the production process, formal sector labor and capital rise, and formal intermediate
output increases. Formal market tightness and the marginal product of formal labor
are now higher, putting upward pressure on formal wages. The higher formal job-
finding rate puts upward pressure on informal wages as well, but since the informal
job-finding rate is decreasing in aF , a higher aF generates a negative link between
informal wages and informal sector size.
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Figure 2.2: Informal Sector Size and Steady State Comparisons
Note that the increase in formal vacancies dominates the fall in informal vacan-
cies as institutional quality increases, so that the unemployment rate and the size of
the informal sector are positively related. In other words, the informal sector cannot
fully absorb the fall in formal employment when institutions deteriorate (Heckman
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Figure 2.3: Informal Sector Size and Steady State Comparisons (Continued)
and Pagés, 2000). Finally, since capital and formal output respond strongly to the
increase in aF , these economies have higher output and consumption levels, as well
as a higher capital-to-output ratio.
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Higher enforcement of regulations in the informal sector A very different
picture emerges in economies where higher institutional quality manifests itself in
higher (or better) enforcement of regulations (i.e., a higher ι which raises the detec-
tion probability, or a higher informal separation rate).34 Column 2 of Figures 2.2
and 2.3 shows the relationship between steady-state aggregates and informal sector
size traced out by changes in enforcement proxied by changes in the separation rate
of informal workers.35 In this case, an improvement in institutions through stricter
enforcement in the informal sector leads to a drastic rise in unemployment. Further-
more, output and consumption fall with higher enforcement, where the first result
goes against the cross-country evidence on the link between informality and the level
of development. Note that informal wages rise with the size of the informal sector.
This takes place since changes in δI have a larger impact on informal employment
and unemployment relative to changes in ι for the same change in informal sector
size, which causes the price of informal intermediate output to rise sharply at the
same time as market tightness in both sectors is falling. Both elements affect infor-
mal wages but the effect of the price of intermediate output dominates and causes
informal wages to rise.
As previously discussed, an alternative way for enforcement to affect informal-
ity is through a higher ι, which increases the detection probability, reduces informal
34Changes in ι can generate a range of informality from 40 percent to 28 percent of total output
before running into convergence problems. Conversely, changes in δI can generate an informal
sector size from 40 percent of output to 10 percent, similar to changes in aF .
35One of the main experiments in Ulyssea (2010) consists in increasing the separation rate for
informal workers, which he interprets as stricter institutional enforcement. This leads to a larger
formal sector, higher unemployment, and to higher average productivity but lower welfare. As I
discuss below, my results are in line with Ulyssea’s.
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vacancy postings and leads to a fall in informal labor market tightness, a decline in
informal sector wages, and a rise in unemployment (see column 3 in Figures 2.2 and
2.3). Since enforcement under this scenario affects mainly the informal sector, the
rise in vacancies and capital in the formal sector is not large enough to compensate
for the fall in informal output, so that total output falls. Consumption follows the
response of output. The fall in total output is much larger than the rise in formal
capital, which causes the capital-output ratio to rise with enforcement. However,
this occurs for a very different reason than in the case of changes in aF . Finally,
note that both formal and informal wages are increasing in the size of the infor-
mal sector, mainly because of the impact of ι on unemployment and sectoral labor
market tightness. Before concluding this section, note that formal job-finding rates
exhibit important differences even if changes in the informal separation rate and in
the detection probability are both interpreted as changes in the quality of enforce-
ment. In the case of changes in the separation rate, the sharp rise in unemployment
as informal separations rise leads to a fall in formal market tightness. This occurs
even though formal vacancies rise as the informal sector becomes smaller. While
unemployment also rises with a higher detection probability, the rise in formal va-
cancies relative to the rise in unemployment is large enough to generate a higher
formal job-finding rate when informality falls.
The comparative statics results are in line with a point previously articulated
in the literature: improving the economic environment for firms in the formal sector
is more effective than making participation in the informal sector more costly.36
36Ulyssea (2010) makes this point somewhat differently by showing that lowering the burden of
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However, the results in Figure 2.2 go beyond this point and highlight the fact that
the cross-country link between informality and long-run macroeconomic outcomes
in general will depend on the underlying reason for variation in informal sector size.
While increasing informal separation rates can be interpreted as an improvement in
institutional quality through better enforcement, which in turn reduces the size of
the informal sector, the resulting link between informality and output levels goes
against the cross-country evidence. A similar contradiction holds for improvements
in institutions that work through a higher detection probability. The intuition is
simple: a deterioration in institutions that only affects the informal sector allows
informal firms to expand output without necessarily having a large impact on formal
sector firms. This generates a counterfactual positive relationship between output
and informality (measured as a share of total output) in the model since the elasticity
of informal output to changes in ρ(nI , aF , ι) or δ
I is larger than that for formal
output.
2.6.2 Informal Sector Size and Aggregate Volatility
Business cycles in the model are driven by aggregate productivity shocks. Fig-
ures 2.4 and 2.5 show the relationship between the size of the informal sector and
the volatility of several variables in the model. Changes in the size of the informal
sector are engineered in three different ways, as was the case for the steady-state
experiments above. Once again, each column in Figure 2.3 corresponds to a different
regulations in the formal sector can lead to positive aggregate outcomes that would not be present
when we focus on making informality more costly.
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determinant of the size of the informal sector: (1) overall institutional quality, aF ;
(2) enforcement reflected through the informal worker separation rate, δI ; and (3)
enforcement reflected through changes in ι that directly affect the detection prob-
ability, ρ(nI , aF , ι). For expositional purposes, I focus on analyzing the differences
between changes in aF and changes in δ
I in the discussion below.
For all three cases, there is a positive relationship between the size of the infor-
mal sector and the volatility of consumption and investment.37 To understand this
result, note that economies with a larger informal sector have smaller steady-state
formal employment shares, which in turn lower the steady-state marginal product
of capital. This takes place despite the smaller capital stock in these economies, and
affects formal firms’ decisions to post vacancies in response to fluctuations in aggre-
gate productivity. Indeed, these differences in the marginal product of capital make
formal vacancy postings more volatile in economies with a larger informal sector
by influencing the sensitivity of the value of employing formal workers to aggregate
shocks. The rise in the volatility of formal vacancies translates into higher variability
in capital accumulation.38 For example, when a positive productivity shock hits the
37The impulse response functions for other relevant variables are included in Appendix A (Fig-
ures A.1 and A.2) for expositional purposes. Consistent with the results in this section, the impulse
responses suggest that the volatilities of consumption and investment are lower in economies with a
smaller informal sector (even though the steady state exhibits some differences across economies),
which is consistent with the evidence.
38In the case of economies with a larger informal sector due to either worse overall institutions
or a smaller detection probability, the value of employing a formal worker is generally lower, which
also affects how formal firms respond to economy-wide shocks. The value of employing a worker is
lower since formal firms in these economies tend to accumulate less capital, which (ceteris paribus)
lowers the marginal product of labor. Also, depending on the institutional proxy that generates
changes in informality, formal wages may rise with the size of the informal sector, and higher wages
put downward pressure on the value of employing a formal worker from the firm’s perspective. Both
mechanisms lower the steady-state value of hiring formal workers relative to an economy with a
smaller informal sector, and this lower value makes formal firms’ decisions to hire workers more
sensitive to productivity shocks. Comparing the three different institutional scenarios, the fact
that the marginal product of capital is lower in economies with a larger informal sector plays a
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economy, the value of hiring formal workers rises more sharply in these economies as
firms want to take advantage of the increase in productivity (much more so relative
to firms in economies with lower informality due to the difference in the steady-state
marginal product of capital), which in turn leads to sharper adjustments in formal
vacancy postings on impact.39 The increase in vacancy postings affects employ-
ment in subsequent periods and is accompanied by sharper adjustments in capital
accumulation since capital and formal labor are used jointly in production. The
more aggressive rise in vacancy postings translates into more volatile investment.
Finally, since this volatility is eventually reflected in firm profits, and firm profits are
part of the household’s resources, higher consumption volatility follows from higher
investment volatility.40
Changes in overall institutional quality Consider a change in aF that affects
both sectors simultaneously. A higher aF raises the value of hiring workers and
accumulating capital in the formal sector. It also lowers the incentive to hire workers
in the informal sector by raising the detection probability. Even though higher
more prominent role in driving the results.
39To see more clearly the connection between the value of employing a formal worker and the
sensitivity of vacancies to productivity shocks, consider the contemporaneous term in the value of











ŵF,t + ... (2.33)
where hatted variables represent log deviations from steady state. In economies with a larger
informal sector, the weight that dictates the response of the value of having a formal worker
to movements in aggregate productivity (or in the marginal product of labor) is larger (partly
because of the steady-state value of employing a formal worker, and partly because of the higher
price of formal output). Thus, since the value of hiring workers is more sensitive to shocks in these
economies, vacancy postings are more volatile as well.
40This last argument is similar to Andrés, Doménech, and Fatás (2008), who find that an
increase in government size leads to higher investment and consumption volatility.
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formal output puts downward pressure on the price of intermediate formal output,
the rise in capital accumulation and the improvement in sectoral productivity due to
a stronger institutional environment increases the steady-state value of hiring formal
workers and the marginal product of capital over and above the direct influence of
a higher aF on the marginal product of labor. As argued above, this makes vacancy
postings and capital accumulation less sensitive to productivity shocks, and reduces
the volatility of formal employment, investment and consumption. Despite the
reduction in informal output, the rise in capital accumulation and output in the
formal sector dominate and lead to a higher capital-output ratio where both steady-
state capital and output are higher.
Recall that total output is a combination of formal and informal output. The
volatility of formal output increases marginally with the size of the informal sector,
whereas the volatility of informal output falls (marginally as well). If informality
falls due to improvements in overall institutional quality, we obtain a a very mild
positive relationship between total output volatility and the size of the informal
sector. Given the quantitative change in total output volatility is negligible, the
link between informality and output volatility predicted by the model is in line with
the evidence presented in the empirical motivation, where there is no significant
relationship between output volatility and informal sector size.
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Figure 2.4: Informal Sector Size and Aggregate Volatility
Note: The volatility of a variable is defined as the standard deviation of the cyclical component
of the log of the variable of interest, where the cyclical component is obtained using an HP-filter
with smoothing parameter 1600.
Going back to the resource constraint, note that the volatility of consump-
tion, investment, and vacancy postings (as well as the comovement between these
variables) have an impact on output volatility. As of the size of the informal sector
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Figure 2.5: Informal Sector Size and Aggregate Volatility (Continued)
Note: The volatility of a variable is defined as the standard deviation of the cyclical component
of the log of the variable of interest, where the cyclical component is obtained using an HP-filter
with smoothing parameter 1600.
rises, the volatility of consumption, investment, and formal vacancies rise. This
puts upward pressure on the volatility of output. Conversely, the volatility of in-
formal vacancies falls. Note that the rise informality is also accompanied by a rise
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in informal vacancies. Furthermore, steady-state total output falls with the size of
the informal sector. Combining the last two results implies that the volatility of
informal vacancies exerts more influence on the volatility of output, and counteracts
the rise in the volatility of consumption, investment, and formal vacancies.41 The
end result is a very small rise in the volatility of output as the size of the informal
sector increases.
Changes in enforcement Now consider an economy with stricter enforcement in
the informal sector through either a higher informal separation rate δI or a higher
enforcement parameter ι in the detection probability. The positive relationship
between consumption and investment volatility and informal sector size is similar
to the case where informality falls due to aF . The intuition for this result remains
the same: a rise in ι (or a rise in δI) lowers informal labor market tightness, which
puts downward pressure on formal wages. The fall in formal wages increases the
value of posting formal vacancies and the marginal product of capital (as formal
employment rises) and this makes the response of formal firms less sensitive to
aggregate productivity shocks. The cyclical behavior of formal vacancies reduces the
volatility of investment, which in turn reduces the volatility of consumption through
a reduction in the volatility of formal profits. In contrast to an economy with a
higher aF , a smaller informal sector due to a higher δ
I is associated with higher total
output volatility. Since the informal sector is more sensitive to changes in δI relative
41This can be seen more explicitly in a log-linearized version of the resource constraint. Note
that if we were to subtract vacancy costs from the resource constraint and compute a measure of
output net of these costs, the positive relationship between output volatility and informal sector
size would be stronger.
63
to changes in aF , higher enforcement increases the volatility of informal output
by more than it decreases the volatility of formal output. From the perspective
of the resource constraint of the economy, the counterfactual relationship between
steady-state output and informal sector size diminishes the impact that the rise in
consumption and investment volatility would have on total output volatility. While
the changes in total output volatility are quantitatively small, their direction is
contrary to the economy where informality changes due to aF (and also to the
evidence in Ferreira-Tiryaki, 2008).
Differences in labor market volatility The steady-state results showed that
the underlying source of changes in the size of the informal sector matters for the
relationship between informality and particular long-run macro outcomes. Figure
2.3 suggests that the same result holds for labor market volatility.
The qualitative steady-state response of formal and informal employment to
changes in either overall institutional quality or enforcement is similar regardless of
the underlying source of changes in informality: formal employment rises and infor-
mal employment falls with better institutions. However, the quantitative response
of steady-state unemployment is different depending on what makes informality
change, which causes the volatility of employment and unemployment to respond in
different ways to the same productivity shocks and to the same change in informal
sector size (as a share of output).
In the case of changes in δI , the relationship between formal employment
volatility and the size of the informal sector is non-monotonic. As a starting point,
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consider an economy with a very high level of informality (i.e., a very low δI). As
enforcement increases, the fall in informality puts downward pressure on formal
wages, which raises the value of hiring formal workers. At the same time, the rise in
steady-state unemployment implies a higher job-filling probability for formal firms.
These elements lead to a reduction in the volatility of formal vacancies, and in
turn to a reduction in the volatility of formal employment. However, there is an
enforcement threshold beyond which the steady-state unemployment level becomes
less sensitive to a higher δI (since the role of informal employment becomes less
important. This attenuation is evident in column 2 of Figure 2.3). This affects the
change in the formal job-filling probability as δI changes, as well as the incentive to
post formal vacancies in such a way that further increases in δI increase the response
of formal hires to shocks. This explains the U-shaped relationship between formal
employment volatility and the size of the informal sector.
Now consider changes in aF . The fact that the steady-state value of hiring
formal workers rises with aF makes formal employment less volatile in the presence
of aggregate shocks. The opposite holds true for informal employment, since a higher
aF reduces the steady-state value of hiring informal workers, so that informal firms
react more aggressively through vacancies when aggregate productivity fluctuates.
Similarly, an increase in δI or ι reduces the future value of hiring informal workers
(i.e. the right-hand side of the job creation condition is now smaller), which makes
informal employment more volatile. For example, when a positive productivity
shock hits the economy, informal firms will want to take advantage of the rise in
productivity by hiring at a more rapid pace, thereby causing more volatility in
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informal employment. Overall, however, unemployment volatility increases with a
higher aF , thereby leading to a negative relationship between informality and the
variability of unemployment.
For all three economies, a smaller informal sector increases the volatility of
informal employment. Note that a fall in informal sector size from 40 to 10 percent
due to an increase in aF doubles the volatility of informal employment, whereas
a comparable decline in informality due to a higher δI more than quadruples the
volatility of informal employment. Furthermore, while a higher aF leads to a re-
duction in steady-state unemployment, stricter enforcement through a higher δI
generates a sharp rise in steady-state unemployment since higher enforcement has
a larger impact on the informal sector relative to the formal sector, and informal
separation rates only affect formal job creation indirectly through the value of the
unemployment option. The positive impact of a higher δI on steady-state unem-
ployment outweighs its positive impact on formal employment such that cyclical
fluctuations in formal employment have a smaller impact on the cyclical behavior
of unemployment. Similarly, the influence of the response of informal employment
to a positive productivity shock is also weakened by the higher level of steady-state
unemployment, and the end result is a positive relationship between informality and
unemployment volatility in response to changes in δI . Combining these effects, we
can begin to see how the dynamic behavior of unemployment may differ starkly
across economies with the same informal sector size.
Figure 2.6 illustrates this point by showing the impulse response function of
unemployment to a positive aggregate productivity shock under three scenarios: the
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benchmark economy with a share of informality of 40 percent of output; an economy
with a share of informality of 20 percent due to better overall institutional quality
(a higher aF ); and an economy with a share of informality of 20 percent due to a
higher informal separation rate δI .
Figure 2.6: Impulse Response Function of Unemployment to a Positive Aggregate
Shock: Benchmark Economy
Recall that an increase in aF reduces the size of the informal sector and lowers
steady-state unemployment. Conversely, an increase in δI lowers informality but











where hatted variables correspond to log deviations from steady state (i.e. x̂t =
log xt−log x). Since higher overall institutional quality increases formal employment
and decreases both informal employment and unemployment in steady state, the
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response of formal employment to a productivity shock has a larger impact on
unemployment. This causes a larger fall in unemployment in response to a positive
aggregate shock when the steady-state size of the informal sector is reduced through
a higher aF . Furthermore, since the variability of informal employment increases
with a smaller informal sector, fluctuations in informal employment will also have a
larger impact on unemployment dynamics.42
Now consider an increase in δI . Despite the larger change in informal employ-
ment volatility under δI , the sharp rise in unemployment as δI rises curtails the
impact of this volatility on unemployment volatility. In fact, the rise in steady-state
unemployment is large enough to more than offset the rise in informal employment
volatility such that a smaller informal sector leads to lower unemployment volatility.
The stark differences in the response of unemployment volatility for the same change
in informal sector size echo the message outlined in the analysis of the steady state of
the model for different shares of informality: the underlying source of changes in the
size of the informal sector matters for characterizing the consequences of informality
for macroeconomic outcomes, and for labor market volatility in particular.
42If we consider the variance of unemployment in this expression, we can see that, even if the





may be large enough to increase the variance of unemployment, which is indeed the
case in the benchmark simulations.
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2.6.3 The Importance of the Elasticity of Substitution Between For-
mal and Informal Production
The benchmark model assumed an elasticity of substitution parameter between
formal and informal intermediate goods in the final goods production function of
0.5, which makes formal and informal intermediate goods imperfect substitutes.43 A
lower value for γ (as in Ulyssea, 2010) would strengthen the quantitative implications
of changing the size of the informal sector, and would keep the relationship between
output and informal sector size qualitatively intact in Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3: an
increase in aF would deliver a higher level of output and a smaller informal sector,
whereas the opposite would be the case under a higher δI or a higher detection
probability ρ(nI , aF , ι) arising from a higher ι. A similar claim holds for the links
between informal sector size and aggregate volatility. Moreover, the differences in
the response of unemployment to productivity shocks when the size of the informal
sector changes would become even starker. When formal and informal intermediate
inputs are less substitutable, changes in enforcement in the informal sector have a
larger impact on the steady-state level of unemployment. As stricter enforcement
reduces the size of the informal sector and increases steady-state unemployment
sharply, movements in formal and informal employment in response to productivity
shocks have less influence on unemployment fluctuations. Following equation (2.34),
as the steady-state ratios of sectoral employment to unemployment fall, the volatility
of unemployment also falls. If a reduction in informality is due to an improvement
43Recall that the elasticity of substitution between the two intermediate goods is given by 1
1−γ
,
where γ is the elasticity of substitution parameter.
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in overall institutional quality aF , we observe a sharper reduction in unemployment
after a positive aggregate shock mainly because of the beneficial impact that better
institutions have on the steady-state level of unemployment in the economy. From
(2.34), lower steady-state unemployment makes unemployment more sensitive to
fluctuations in sectoral employment over the business cycle, i.e. the opposite result
when compared to changes in δI .
Results are different once formal and informal intermediate goods become
better substitutes (i.e. if we assume a higher γ). Figure 2.5 shows how the responses
of unemployment to a positive productivity shock change for values of γ ranging from
0.4 to 0.7.44
The impulse response functions in Figure 2.7 once again illustrate three differ-
ent economies: the benchmark economy; an economy with an informal sector of 20
percent of output due to better overall institutional quality; and an economy with
an informal sector of 20 percent of output due to stricter enforcement in the form
of higher informal worker separation rates. As the exercise suggests, for low values
of γ, unemployment is more responsive to productivity shocks in an economy with
a smaller informal sector due to a higher aF , while unemployment fluctuations are
44Acemoglu (2001) and Ulyssea (2010) suggest that the two intermediate inputs are unlikely to
be perfect substitutes, and Ulyssea (2010) shows that in his model, there are multiple equilibria
when γ ∈ {0.8, 0.9, 1}. Intuitively, when formal and informal intermediate production are very good
substitutes, the fall in informal output resulting from a higher δI or a higher detection probability
is easily offset by the rise in formal production. A smaller informal sector puts downward pressure
on formal wages and pushes formal firms to increase formal vacancies, employment, capital, and
finally output. However, the root cause of changes in the size of the informal sector still matters
for the volatility of unemployment, even as the degree of substitutability between the two sectors
increases. What ends up happening is that the results are reversed for high values of γ. This is due
to a combination of the change in the sensitivity of steady-state unemployment to changes in aF
and δI , and the change in the volatility of each employment state as the substitutability between
formal and informal intermediate goods increases.
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Figure 2.7: The Importance of the Elasticity of Substitution
more subdued when informality is lower due to more stringent enforcement through
a higher δI . Hence, the results from the benchmark experiments are magnified.
However, for values of γ above the benchmark value, the results are reversed and
unemployment is now less volatile in economies with a smaller informal sector due
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Figure 2.8: Changes in Steady-State Unemployment for Different Elasticities of
Substitution: γ = 0.4 and γ = 0.7
to better overall institutional quality. Conversely, unemployment is more volatile
in economies with a smaller informal sector due to stricter enforcement through a
higher informal separation rate.
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To understand this result, consider what happens to steady-state unemploy-
ment for different values of γ when we change aF and δ
I , respectively. This is shown
in Figure 2.8. As the elasticity between intermediate goods in final output increases,
the response of steady-state unemployment to exogenous changes in aF and δ
I falls.
It is still the case that unemployment is decreasing (increasing) in aF (δ
I), as in the
benchmark model. However, the changes in unemployment in response to exoge-
nous changes in institutional quality are less dramatic in both cases. To make this
transparent, consider how the economy responds when enforcement δI increases and
γ is higher than its benchmark value: the changes in steady-state unemployment
as informality falls are much smaller.45 As I discussed above, this ultimately affects
how unemployment volatility responds to changes in the size of the informal sector.
Furthermore, when yF and yI are more substitutable, the ease with which interme-
diate output in the two sectors can be substituted in the production of the final
good increases, and this also affects how intermediate firms make hiring decisions in
response to aggregate productivity shocks. Indeed, when γ is higher, the absolute
change in the volatility of formal employment and informal employment is larger as
the size of the informal sector changes. For a higher δI , the smaller change in steady-
state unemployment combined with the larger absolute change in the volatility of
formal employment and the negative link between informal employment volatility
and informality will cause unemployment volatility to rise with a smaller informal
sector.46 When aF increases and γ is higher, the fall in the volatility of formal em-
45For a higher γ, unemployment rises 4 percentage points as opposed to almost 9 percentage
points when δI generates a fall in informality from 40 to 10 percent of output.
46The intuition for this result is as follows: since formal and informal output become more
substitutable, a rise in enforcement reflected in a higher informal separation rate will tilt the
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ployment as the size of the informal sector falls is larger as well (relative to the same
case under a lower γ). Furthermore, the fact that steady-state unemployment is less
sensitive to changes in aF reduces the impact that changes in informal employment
volatility would otherwise have on unemployment volatility (again, relative to the
benchmark case). The larger fall in formal employment volatility as the size of the
informal sector falls therefore leads to a fall in unemployment volatility.
At first sight, these results seem striking since in both cases the volatility of
formal employment is increasing in the size of the informal sector. For a relatively
high degree of substitutability between intermediate outputs, we should not expect
substantial differences in unemployment dynamics. The reason for the discrepancy
between an economy where aF rises and an economy where δ
I rises has to do with
the influence of the volatility of informal employment on the variability of unem-
ployment. In the case of a higher δI under a higher γ, the changes in informal
employment volatility as the size of the informal sector changes are much larger
than in an economy where aF is higher. As γ increases, the volatility of informal
employment plays a more important role in affecting the volatility of unemployment,
even as the share of informal employment is decreasing. This is not the case when
we change aF since the changes in informal employment volatility are much less
adjustment to aggregate shocks away from informal firms and into formal firms (relative to an
economy with less substitutability between intermediate outputs). This is particularly the case as a
rise in δI effectively reduces the value of long-term employment relationships in the informal sector.
Thus, for a given productivity shock, formal employment will now be more sensitive to shocks under
a higher γ. This, however, is not enough to lead to higher variability in unemployment. In addition
to this effect, the lower sensitivity of steady-state unemployment to changes in δI increases the
influence of the volatility of informal employment relative to the benchmark results. When the
substitutability between the two types of intermediate output was lower, the volatility of informal
employment played a small role in affecting unemployment. Under a higher γ, this is no longer the
case, leading to higher unemployment volatility in economies where formal employment represents
a larger share of total employment.
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pronounced.
While the impact of informality on the volatility of unemployment across
economies is sensitive to the elasticity of substitution between formal and infor-
mal output, the model still delivers a positive relationship between informal sector
size and consumption and investment volatility, regardless of the main factor be-
hind the change in informality. This takes place because the relationship between
the value of having a formal worker and the size of the informal sector remains
qualitatively intact to changes in γ. Also, despite the sensitivity of unemployment
to changes in γ, the main message of the paper holds: even though the size of the
informal sector may be the same across two economies, this does not imply that
the labor market response of these economies to aggregate shocks (or the levels of
consumption, output, and unemployment) will be the same.
2.6.4 Changes in Hiring Regulations
The results in Table 2.1 suggest that even after controlling for enforcement and
overall institutional quality, hiring regulations could still play a role in explaining
differences in the size of the informal sector. Changing the cost of posting vacancies
in the formal sector in the model – a proxy for changes in hiring regulations – yields
similar results to those obtained when overall institutional quality in the economy
changes: the size of the informal sector and the level of output (the unemploy-
ment rate) are negatively (positively) correlated, while informality and investment
and consumption volatility (unemployment volatility) are positively (negatively) re-
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lated. This simple exercise suggests that policies that have a direct impact on the
behavior of agents in the formal sector tend to yield results that are in line with the
cross-country evidence on informality and its relationship to macroeconomic aggre-
gates. Even though more stringent formal labor regulations imply a larger informal
sector, aggregate output volatility changes marginally. This result is inconsistent
with the empirical findings in Loayza, Oviedo and Servén (2004), who document a
positive relationship between labor regulations and real GDP per capita volatility.
Thus, the model suggests that informality itself may not be the channel through
which stricter labor regulations may be associated with higher output variability in
the data. However, the absence of a link between informality and output volatility in
the model is consistent with some of the regression results in Table 2.2. Finally, note
that if we were to increase hiring regulations and overall institutional quality simul-
taneously, we would obtain a smaller informal sector as well as lower consumption
and investment volatility in the economy. This fact is consistent with some of the
evidence for rich OECD countries with relatively strict labor market regulations.47
2.6.5 Fixed Detection Probability
Recall that the probability of detection in the benchmark model is an endoge-
nous object that depends positively on the measure of informal workers. This means
that even if the enforcement parameter, ι, in the detection probability is held fixed in
the benchmark model, the probability of detection in the informal sector can change
47Merkl and Schmitz (2010) and Rumler and Scharler (2009) document a negative relationship
between labor regulations and the volatility of various macroeconomic aggregates in developed
OECD countries.
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with δI and aF when changes in these parameters affect informal vacancy postings
and hence the measure of informal employment. Shutting down the endogenous de-
tection probability in the model does not affect the main results from the benchmark
model. In the case of changes in institutional quality that only directly affect the
formal sector, the positive impact on total output is larger relative to the benchmark
model since the endogenous detection probability has an additional negative impact
on informal output when institutions improve. This effect would not be present in
a model with exogenous detection.48 In this sense, the results from the benchmark
model represent a lower bound for the impact of institutional quality on informal
sector size (and in turn on aggregate volatility). These results also show that the
behavior of the formal sector tends to dominate the response of the informal sector
to changes in the institutional environment that directly affect formal firms.
2.6.6 Introducing Investment in the Informal Sector
In this modified version of the benchmark model, the production function for
informal firms is given by yI,t = ztf(nI,t, kI,t), which is assumed to be constant-
returns-to-scale. The representative informal firm therefore chooses a sequence of
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48This is straightforward to see in the informal sector job creation condition, where detection
would merely act as a constant tax on the marginal product of labor.
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subject to
nI,t+1 = (1− δ
I)(nI,t + vI,tq(θI,t)) (2.36)
and
kI,t+1 = (1− δ)kI,t + iI,t (2.37)








pI,t+1(1− ρ(nI,t+1, aF , ι))zt+1fnI,t+1(nI,t+1, kI,t+1)








and a standard Euler equation for capital used in informal firms
1 = EtΞt+1|t {pI,t+1(1− ρ(nI,t+1, aF , ι))zt+1fkI (nI,t+1, kI,t+1) + 1− δ} (2.39)
Now, total investment is determined by the sum of investment in the formal sector
and investment in the informal sector, and the resource constraint of the economy
is modified accordingly. An increase in overall institutional quality in the economy
– an increase in aF affecting both sectors – pushes formal firms to increase formal
investment while informal firms decrease capital accumulation. The former domi-
nates the latter such that investment and consumption volatility fall. At the same
time, unemployment falls and unemployment volatility increases for the same reason
as in the benchmark model. Conversely, a rise in δI leads to a decrease in capital
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accumulation in the informal sector, but to a larger fall in informal and total output.
As was the case in the benchmark economy, investment and consumption volatility
decrease with a rise in δI . In summary, the main qualitative conclusions from the
benchmark model do not change when I allow for informal sector investment.
2.7 Conclusion
The empirical evidence on informality shows that the quality of institutions
is one of the most important factors behind cross-country differences in the size
of the informal sector. Institutional quality can manifest itself in different ways,
influencing the level of enforcement of regulations in specific sectors or having a
broad impact on economy-wide productivity. While better institutional quality and
better enforcement both lead to a lower level of informality in my model, I show
that different parameters affecting institutions that have a similar impact on the size
of the informal sector may have differing implications for both long-run macroeco-
nomic outcomes and short-run aggregate volatility. I build a two-sector business
cycle search and matching model with informal salaried employment that replicates
several stylized facts in the data, including the link between institutions and infor-
mality, output levels and informality, and the relationship between informality and
consumption and investment volatility.
Using the model, I consider two main experiments: the first one generates
changes in the average size of the informal sector through stricter enforcement in
the informal sector, proxied by a higher informal worker separation rate and a higher
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probability of detection in the informal sector. The second focuses on changes in
informality due to improvements in overall institutional quality that are reflected si-
multaneously in higher exogenous productivity in the formal sector and in a higher
detection probability in the informal sector. Both cases recreate a negative link
between informality and the quality of institutions. However, the first experiment
generates a positive link between the size of the informal sector and the level of
output, which goes against the existing cross-country evidence. The second experi-
ment generates the correct link between output in the economy and informal sector
size in the data. I also obtain a positive link between informality and consumption
and investment volatility consistent with the empirical evidence, regardless of the
root cause of the change in informality. Intuitively, this takes place because the
hiring decisions of formal firms in economies with a larger informal sector are more
sensitive to aggregate shocks, which leads to higher volatility in formal hiring and
investment. This volatility ultimately translates into higher consumption volatil-
ity since firm profits are a component of household resources (similar to Andrés,
Doménech, and Fatás, 2008).
While the results for consumption and investment volatility are independent
of the the origin of differences in informality levels may not matter, the same is not
true for labor market volatility. I find a negative relationship between the size of the
informal sector and unemployment volatility when better overall institutional qual-
ity leads to lower informality. Conversely, I find a positive link between informality
and unemployment volatility when informality falls due to stricter enforcement in
the form of higher informal worker separation rates. The link between informal
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sector size and unemployment volatility depends heavily on how the underlying
source of changes in the size of the informal sector affects the steady-state level of
unemployment in the economy. When overall institutional quality increases, both
informality and unemployment fall in steady state. Conversely, with stricter en-
forcement in the informal sector, informality drops but steady-state unemployment
rises sharply. This last result reduces the sensitivity of unemployment volatility to
fluctuations in formal and informal employment in response to aggregate shocks,
thereby generating a positive link between unemployment volatility and informal
sector size.
In the model, formal and informal output are assumed to be imperfect substi-
tutes in the production of final output. I find that the impact of informality on the
volatility of unemployment is sensitive to the substitutability of output between sec-
tors. For high levels of substitutability, improvements in overall institutional quality
generate less unemployment volatility, whereas the opposite occurs with higher en-
forcement in the informal sector. Intuitively, the more substitutable formal and
informal goods are in total output, the lower the impact of stricter enforcement on
the level of unemployment in the economy, and the larger the impact of fluctua-
tions in formal and informal employment on the variability of unemployment over
the business cycle. Thus, a high level of substitutability can reverse the benchmark
results for unemployment volatility, but the general message of the paper remains
intact: the underlying reason for differences in the size of the informal sector matters
critically for characterizing the connection between informality, long-run macroeco-
nomic outcomes and the cyclical behavior of the labor market. Looking at the size
81
of the informal sector in isolation may yield misleading conclusions about the con-
sequences of changes in the employment structure for labor market and business
cycle fluctuations. These results carry an important message when thinking about
policies to address informality.
The model abstracts from other important features that characterize informal
economic activity, such as the rich heterogeneity in that exists across workers and
firms. In light of the main conclusions of the paper, incorporating other types
of rigidities (institutional or otherwise) that are likely to affect informality and
investigating their impact on aggregate volatility may be worthwhile. Including the
explicit (and endogenous) fiscal costs of enforcing regulations may be important as
well. In addition, to preserve tractability, I ignored job-to-job flows between the
two sectors. Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2006, 2009) and Bosch and Maloney (2010)
find these flows to be empirically relevant. These sectoral worker flows could have
different implications for the behavior of employment, consumption, investment,
and output in response to shocks. A similar comment applies to the exclusion of
the self-employed in the model. Analyzing the root causes of informality and its
implications for labor market and aggregate fluctuations in richer settings appears




Self-Employment and Business Cycle Persistence: Does the
Composition of Employment Matter for Economic Recoveries?
3.1 Introduction
Countries are well-known to exhibit differences in employment arrangements.
While developed economies have high salaried employment and low self-employment
shares, developing economies exhibit the opposite pattern (see Table 3.1 and Gollin,
2008). A number of studies document that a majority of the self-employed are
independent workers with no salaried employees, who nonetheless account for an
important share of employment, firms, and economic activity (ILO, 2002; Perry et
al., 2007; Sanandaji, 2010; Kucera and Roncolato, 2008). Despite their small scale
and limited capital usage, these individuals are often capital-constrained and must
rely on external financing from input suppliers and other informal sources (Beck et
al., 2008).
Recent cross-country evidence highlights two more facts about self-employment.
First, self-employment expands during downturns. Second, this expansion arises
mainly from an increase in transitions from unemployment into self-employment in
recessions (see Table 3.2 or Bosch and Maloney, 2008; and Loayza and Rigolini,
2011).1 The cyclical behavior of self-employment raises a number of questions: if
1Transitions from salaried employment into self-employment are mildly procyclical, while tran-
83
self-employment is a feasible outside option to salaried work during recessions, how
does it alter labor market dynamics? If owner-only firms are created during down-
turns, does this affect the pace of recoveries from adverse shocks? If so, through
what channels? Figure 3.1 shows that there is a negative relationship between the
cyclical persistence of output and the share of self-employment in non-agricultural
employment for a sample of developed and developing countries.2 This fact, docu-
mented here for the first time, suggests that self-employment may play an important
role in business cycle dynamics, and particularly, economic recoveries.
In this paper, I build a business cycle model with frictional labor markets
where individuals can be self-employed or employed in salaried firms. I use the
model to shed light on the channels through which self-employment influences the
pace of economic recoveries, and show that economies with higher self-employment
shares exhibit faster recoveries from negative aggregate productivity shocks. This
result hinges critically on whether self-employment is a feasible outside option to
salaried work in downturns, and whether the ease of entry into self-employment
changes as the economy recovers. This last fact makes the cyclicality of transition
rates into self-employment particularly important for understanding how differences
sitions from self-employment into unemployment are strongly countercyclical. Transitions from
non-participation into self-employment are almost acyclical (see Bosch and Maloney, 2008). A
decomposition by type of employment similar to the one in Table 3.2 is not possible for most
countries due to limited data on labor flows.
2This finding is in line with Calderón and Fuentes (2010) regarding the recovery speed in
emerging market economies. I use real GDP for years 1985 through 2007 from the World Devel-
opment Indicators to compute the cyclical persistence of output. Cyclical persistence is measured
as the first-order autocorrelation of cyclical annual real GDP where the cyclical component of real
GDP is obtained using an HP filter with smoothing parameter 100, consistent with annual data.
The data on the share of self-employment as a percent of non-agricultural employment is obtained
from the OECD for years 2000 through 2007. The relationship between output persistence and
self-employment in Figure 3.1 holds even after controlling for the level of development and other
factors that may influence the persistence of output. See Appendix B for details.
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in the composition of employment affect business cycle dynamics. Rising entry
into self-employment during downturns is difficult to explain with existing business
cycle models of entrepreneurship and liquidity constraints: if individuals require
external financing to start and run their businesses, they should be less likely to
enter self-employment during bad times, when credit conditions deteriorate and the
availability of credit from financial intermediaries falls. A series of empirical studies
underscore the relevance of supplier or interfirm trade credit as a major source of
external financing for small firms. Furthermore, a related line of research suggests
that trade credit initially expands in downturns (see Section 3.3). This evidence
offers a way to reconcile the fact that transitions into self-employment increase in
recessions. It also hints at two relevant connections between larger salaried-sector
firms that act as input suppliers and small-scale, self-employed enterprises: the first
one rooted in trade credit relationships, and the second one embedded in the labor
market.
Table 3.1: Self-Employment Rates Around the World
Self-Employment Min. Max. Obs.
Africa 45.5 11.6 88.7 26
Asia 31.5 5 75.4 15
Latin America 37.9 18.9 64.7 19
Developed Countries 14.3 6.7 28.6 23
Source: OECD (2009).
Indeed, if self-employment is an attractive alternative to salaried work, fluc-
tuations in the ease of entry into self-employment can affect salaried labor market
dynamics in important ways. In economies with higher self-employment shares,
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Table 3.2: Cyclical Correlations of Employment and Job-Finding Rates with Output
Cyclical Correlation with Output: Brazil Mexico
Self-Employment -0.219 -0.415
Formal Salaried Employment 0.616 0.780
Transition Rate from Unemployment to:
Self-Employment -0.600 -0.433
Formal Salaried Employment 0.652 0.798
Notes: Taken directly from Bosch and Maloney (2008). Self-employment corresponds to informal
self-employment (own-account workers and business owners with less than 5 employees) as a share
of the working-age population. The authors use quarterly data, and all variables are logged and HP-
filtered with smoothing parameter 1600. Entry into informal (unprotected) salaried employment
from unemployment is procyclical and therefore similar to formal salaried employment.
Figure 3.1: Self-Employment and Cyclical Output Persistence Across Countries
Notes: Author’s calculations. The self-employment share corresponds to the average of annual self-
employment as a percent of non-agricultural employment from 2000 to 2007. The autocorrelation
of output corresponds to the first-order autocorrelation of the cyclical component of log annual
real GDP from 1985 to 2007, using an HP filter with smoothing parameter 100. See Appendix B
for more details.
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self-employment is likely to exert more influence on overall labor market conditions
since the structure of labor markets is tilted towards low-scale, owner-only firms.
The fact that self-employment has a larger presence in the labor market modifies
the decisions of salaried firms and households in the wake of economic fluctuations,
which in turn shape the economy’s response to shocks. This channel has not been
explored in the existing literature.
In my framework, self-employment consists of own-account or independent
workers who operate owner-only firms.3 I use these terms interchangeably through-
out the paper to refer to individuals working on their own who do not hire workers.4
Furthermore, the self-employed rely on capital from input suppliers to produce.
Since supplier credit is a relationship-based source of financing, capital matching
frictions present a natural modeling choice to capture the difficulty in obtaining
capital to finance self-employment ventures. I assume that unemployed individuals
must match with a capital supplier to enter self-employment. This process is costly
and time-consuming. Salaried firms act as trade credit suppliers by devoting unused
capital in the salaried sector to the self-employed in frictional capital markets. Capi-
tal search frictions play three crucial roles in my model: they establish a link between
the salaried firms that supply capital and the self-employed who demand capital;
3It is well known that self-employment exhibits substantial heterogeneity, with a small share of
individuals running businesses that start small but grow rapidly. In this paper, I explicitly abstract
from these individuals (often labeled entrepreneurs) and instead focus on those that run their own
businesses without hiring salaried workers (which represent the majority of the self-employed)
to explore whether the presence of an alternative employment state matters for business cycle
dynamics. I consider the model in this paper as a stepping stone that can easily be expanded to
account for those self-employment who eventually expand their firms by hiring workers.
4The International Labor Organization (ILO) considers own-account workers excluding (high-
skilled) professionals; unpaid family workers; and business owners with less than five employees as
“informal self-employed”.
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they endogenize self-employment entry, where the supply and demand for capital
determine the availability of self-employment capital and therefore the likelihood of
becoming self-employed; and finally, they allow me to capture the countercyclicality
of both the stock of self-employment and the entry rate into self-employment from
unemployment in the data.
Two key features are critical to explaining the relationship between the share
of self-employment and the pace of recoveries in the model. First, flows into self-
employment respond to aggregate conditions and depend on the availability of cap-
ital used in self-employment. So, entry into self-employment is determined by the
explicit decisions of households and firms in the economy, and will therefore change
depending on the phase of the business cycle. Second, self-employment may not
be a readily accessible alternative to salaried employment, since capital is needed
to set up shop and finance production. Thus, differences in the ease of entry into
self-employment will have direct static and dynamic consequences for the returns to
salaried work, and therefore on the hiring and investment decisions in the salaried
sector. Economies with higher self-employment shares tend to have lower capital
utilization rates in the salaried sector, and therefore a higher supply of capital to
the self-employment sector. The higher the availability of these inputs to potential
self-employed individuals, the more likely it is for an unemployed individual to enter
self-employment, and the larger is the influence of the self-employment outside op-
tion on salaried wages and aggregate labor market conditions. This has important
implications for the economy’s response to negative aggregate shocks.
In standard models with frictional labor markets, the probability of entering
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salaried employment falls in downturns as firms cut back on vacancies. This result
is present in my framework. However, inflows into self-employment increase in re-
cessions as capital utilization in the salaried sector falls and hence the availability
of unused capital for self-employment increases. The expansion in self-employment
takes place even though demand for self-employment capital also increases dur-
ing downturns. In economies with higher average self-employment shares, the self-
employment outside option exerts more influence on labor market conditions, and
its improvement at the onset of recessions lessens the initial fall in salaried wages
when a negative aggregate shock hits the economy. Salaried firms in these economies
respond by reducing vacancies and the share of capital used in production by more,
causing a larger initial contraction in investment, salaried output, and total output
when the shock hits the economy.
As aggregate productivity slowly returns to trend, salaried firms adjust their
capital usage upwards more drastically relative to economies with less self-employment
to take advantage of the recovery in aggregate productivity, which sharply curtails
the initial increase in the availability of capital to the self-employed. This makes
the increase in the entry rate into self-employment less persistent after the shock in
economies with higher steady-state self-employment. Since the increase in the like-
lihood of moving into self-employment in these economies is more short-lived, and
self-employment has a larger presence in these economies, the initial fall in wages
becomes more persistent following the shock. This occurs since the deterioration
in the self-employment outside option puts downward pressure on salaried sector
wages, much more so in economies with higher average self-employment. A more
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prolonged fall in wages coupled with a recovery in aggregate productivity creates
a larger benefit from hiring workers, which in turn bolsters hiring and investment
in the salaried sector. The faster recovery in salaried employment and investment
boosts salaried sector output and translates into a faster recovery in total output
in the economy. Thus, the model suggests that changes in the ease of entry into
self-employment after a negative shock play a critical role in shaping the recovery
path of wages in the salaried sector. This affects firms’ hiring and investment deci-
sions in the salaried sector, and the recovery of output in the economy. This is an
important mechanism that can explain why economies with more self-employment
recover faster from downturns in the model. In particular, this last fact cannot be
explained if the likelihood of becoming self-employed is fixed over the business cycle.
Finally, I show that the model can successfully capture the empirical relationship
between output persistence and self-employment shown in Figure 3.1. This gives
additional validity to the framework used to capture self-employment that I propose
in the paper.
My work expands on two different literatures. The recent theoretical literature
on labor flows in developing countries, rooted in the Mortensen and Pissarides search
and matching framework, has generally abstracted from modeling self-employment
(see Albrecht, Navarro, and Vroman, 2006; Bosch and Esteban-Pretel, 2012, among
others). Similarly, the business cycle labor search literature has placed little atten-
tion on the role of self-employment in business cycle dynamics. I offer a tractable way
to introduce self-employment in a business cycle search environment that explicitly
accounts for endogenous transition rates into self-employment. To my knowledge,
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this is the first paper to capture important stylized facts about the cyclical behavior
of self-employment in a business cycle framework with frictional labor markets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 offers a summary
of related literature and Section 3.3 presents four stylized facts on small firms and
capital constraints. These facts motivate how I introduce endogenous and frictional
entry into self-employment in the model, which I present in Section 3.4. Section 3.5
describes the calibration of the model, Section 3.6 discusses the simulation results,
and Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
Using data for 22 OECD countries, Koellinger and Thurik (2009) find that
entrepreneurship is highly responsive to aggregate shocks, increasing during reces-
sions when outside employment options become more scarce. These results are in
line with Loayza and Rigolini (2011), who show that self-employment is on average
countercylical using a large sample of developed and developing countries.5 Us-
ing Argentinian data, Mandelman and Montes-Rojas (2009) find that transitions
into self-employment are higher during downturns, and the probability of becom-
ing self-employed is increasing in the length of the downturn. They find that most
self-employed workers are own-account workers with no employees, in line with the
evidence for other countries documented in ILO (2002) and Perry et al. (2007).
Kumar and Schuetze (2007) use a partial equilibrium labor search model where
5The authors also show that the countercylicality of self-employment is decreasing in the level
of self-employment.
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transitions from unemployment into self-employment depend positively on the job-
finding probability for salaried workers, and the self-employed do not require exter-
nal resources to produce. They analyze the steady state impact of unemployment
insurance, minimum wages, and taxation on self-employment, and their main focus
is on business owners who hire workers.6 While they do not analyze business cycle
dynamics, the entry rate into self-employment would be procyclical in their model.
Also, in contrast to my framework, the salaried wage in their model is indepen-
dent of conditions in self-employment. This last fact eliminates the key channel
through which self-employment affects aggregate dynamics in my model. Rissman
(2007) presents a search model with salaried employment and own-account work
(i.e., self-employed individuals with owner-only businesses) to analyze the influence
of startup costs on employment transitions. She posits a probability of receiving a
business idea linked to a stochastic profit that individuals observe before deciding to
become self-employed given current conditions in the labor market.7 My modeling
approach endogenizes the transition rate into self-employment by linking it to tight-
ness in physical capital markets and hence the availability of resources needed to
start production. Access to capital has been shown to be an important constraint for
6One of their extensions addresses own-account work, but the endogenous transition rate from
unemployment into self-employment in their benchmark model – which is driven by the job-finding
rate in salaried work – does not change when they consider entry into own-account work.
7Individuals entering self-employment must pay a fixed startup cost, but no resources are
needed to operate in self-employment thereafter. Hobijn and Şahin (2007) have a similar frame-
work with business idea shocks and occupational choice. Individuals with an idea above a given
threshold become entrepreneurs subject to labor search frictions to hire workers. The authors ab-
stract from owner-only firms and focus on steady state outcomes. For a related setup to Rissman
(2007), see Rissman (2003), where self-employment is assumed to be a second-best alternative to
salaried employment, where individuals can optimally search for salaried employment from self-
employment. In this setup, entry into self-employment depends solely on paying a fixed cost. It
still takes one period to become officially self-employed. Exit from self-employment depends on
whether search by the self-employed yields an acceptable wage offer in salaried employment.
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starting small business ventures. Endogenous transition rates into self-employment
add a dynamic component to the self-employment outside option absent in other
frameworks, and the latter ultimately affects salaried wages when the economy is
subject to shocks. This channel is crucial in explaining the link between economic
recoveries and self-employment in the model. Lastly, Narita (2010) introduces infor-
mal self-employment into a life-cycle partial-equilibrium labor search environment
with formal and informal salaried labor.8 Transitions into self-employment require
prior experience in salaried employment to learn about potential ability to be self-
employed. I propose an alternative way of introducing self-employment in a search
environment that is more suitable for the analysis of business cycles, where I can
account for the empirical relevance of external resources required for production
during self-employment.
Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2003) use capital matching frictions to model
long-term relationships between borrowers (entrepreneurs) and lenders (financial in-
termediaries) and analyze the propagation of aggregate shocks. In their framework,
households channel savings through financial intermediaries while entrepreneurs
match with lenders to obtain funds for production.9 In contrast, Kurmann and
Petrosky-Nadeau (2007) explore the role of capital frictions as a propagation mech-
8Margolis, Navarro, and Robalino (2012) and Bargain et al. (2012) introduce informal self-
employment in a partial equilibrium search environment with formal and informal salaried employ-
ment. In these papers, as in Rissman (2003, 2007), self-employment opportunities arise randomly
each period, after which individuals decide whether or not to enter self-employment, and transi-
tion rates into self-employment are exogenous. None of these papers address the business cycle
implications of self-employment.
9In contrast to other papers modeling the search for capital, their model includes asymmetric
information and other contracting rigidities that complement search frictions.
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anism in an environment without financial intermediaries.10 In a similar vein, Nico-
letti and Pierrard (2006) propose an RBC model with labor and capital search fric-
tions in which small firms match with banks to obtain capital before hiring workers,
while large firms face frictionless capital markets. Their setup yields a procyclical
probability of finding a financial intermediary that supplies capital. In contrast to
these papers, I focus on the behavior of own-account work and its influence on labor
market and output dynamics. I also eliminate financial intermediaries and assume
a direct lending relationship between salaried firms supplying capital and the self-
employed. Finally, my framework yields a countercyclical probability of finding a
capital supplier, which is a key component needed to generate important cyclical
differences in wage dynamics, salaried employment, and output in the model. To
the best of my knowledge, my model is the first to capture the cyclicality of the
transition rate from unemployment into self-employment observed in the data. Fur-
thermore, I show that cyclical fluctuations in this transition rate have important
implications for labor market and business cycle dynamics.
Fiess, Fugazza, and Maloney (2010) propose a small open economy general
equilibrium model where the informal self-employed are subject to entry barriers in
the form of liquidity constraints. Their work highlights the importance of identi-
fying the sources of shocks to understand the cyclical movements in informal self-
employment, since the latter depend on the type of shock affecting the economy. I
emphasize search for productive inputs as an entry barrier to self-employment, fo-
cus on the implications of self-employment for the cyclical persistence of output in a
10For an optimal policy approach, see Arseneau, Chugh, and Kurmann (2008).
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closed economy setting, and investigate the model’s implications quantitatively. My
model can capture the main argument in Fiess et al. (2010) by including a sectoral
productivity shock in self-employment.
Finally, Bergoeing, Loayza, and Repetto (2004) argue that regulatory imped-
iments distort the resource reallocation process among firms in the aftermath of
adverse aggregate shocks, thereby leading to slower recoveries. They suggest that
policies and regulations that push otherwise inefficient firms to stay in the market
during downturns can lead to slower recoveries by distorting the restructuring pro-
cess that takes place during recessions. My paper is related to Bergoeing et al.’s in
that countries with high self-employment have many small inefficient firms and a
weaker institutional environment that adversely affects productivity in the salaried
sector. I show that, despite an expansion of the low-productivity sector in reces-
sions, economies with more self-employment exhibit faster recoveries from aggregate
shocks.
3.3 Capital Frictions and Self-Employment: The Role of Input Sup-
pliers
In this section, I outline four facts established by previous literature that
motivate the use of capital search frictions to model entry into self-employment.
Frictions in obtaining capital affect firm creation and financing Blanch-
flower (2004) documents that frictions in obtaining capital are an important obstacle
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for small-firm creation in the United Kingdom and other developed countries. Other
studies show that micro and small firms – a large majority of which are owner-only
– tend to be more credit constrained and are more likely to consider access to credit
as a major obstacle relative to medium and large firms (Kantis et al., 2002; IDB,
2005a; Cull, McKenzie, and Woodruff, 2008).
Trade and supplier credit is a major source of financing for small firms
Chavis, Klapper, and Love (2011) use a sample of more than 100 countries and
document that young firms in developing and developed countries tend to rely more
on trade credit from input suppliers, friends and family, and informal lenders.11
Input suppliers and customers act as important sources of working capital for both
young and older firms (Kuntchev et al., 2012), and are one of the most relevant
sources of financing among small nascent firms in Latin America and Asia (IDB,
2005b).12 These are two regions where interfirm trade credit is particularly prevalent
as a source of external finance and working capital for small firms (Demirgüç-Kunt
and Maksimovic, 2001; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2008).
Supplier credit often involves goods and not cash loans Poor institutional
quality in developing countries worsens access to formal credit and pushes young
11For a comprehensive review of trade credit in the U.S., see Petersen and Rajan (1997). For
evidence on the extent of trade credit across countries, see Brown, Chavis, and Klapper (2011) and
Kuntchev et al. (2012). Klapper, Laeven, and Rajan (2011) cover in detail the characteristics of
trade credit contracts. McMillan and Woodruff (1999) analyze the use of trade credit in Vietnam.
Fabbri and Klapper (2009) have a related study on China. Hall and Monge-Naranjo (2003) present
evidence on trade-credit use by Costa Rican manufacturing firms.
12Chavis, Klapper, and Love (2010) find that only 15 percent of young firms in low-income
countries use formal banking as a source of financing. Credit through input suppliers is also
used to avoid the regulatory burden that often characterizes formal credit relations (IDB, 2005b;
Safavian and Wimpey, 2007).
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firms to tap informal financing sources (McMillan and Woodruff, 1999). A deficient
institutional environment in these economies, combined with the asymmetric infor-
mation problems intrinsic to lending relationships, makes credit based on goods –
in-kind or input credit – more prevalent than cash-based credit since goods are easier
to monitor than cash loans (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2004). Relatedly, Eisfeldt and
Rampini (2009) show that in the U.S., many small firms lease a substantial amount
of capital to finance their operations, confirming that input credit and input leas-
ing through suppliers and customers are important sources of external finance in
developed countries as well.13
Trade credit tends to be countercyclical Ramey (1992) suggests that trade
credit is countercyclical in the U.S. Using evidence on Mexico and East Asia, Love,
Preve, and Sarria-Allende (2007) find that trade credit provision to firms by suppliers
increases right after a financial crisis, and then falls in the aftermath, suggesting that
trade credit is countercyclical. Using the World Bank’s Financial Crisis Survey,
Klapper and Randall (2011) document that a non-negligible fraction of firms in
Eastern European countries extended supplier credit during the 2008-2009 financial
crisis. The countercyclicality of trade credit may offer one way to rationalize the
countercyclicality of self-employment, since the self-employed rely on trade credit to
operate their firms.
I take the facts above as supporting evidence for using capital search frictions
13As Chavis, Klapper, and Love (2011) point out, leasing is different from trade credit since the
former is typically backed by assets, and hence more prevalent in developed economies. However,
both leasing and trade credit seem to involve establishing a (long-term) relationship of some sort
with input suppliers.
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to model self-employment: entry into the sector requires external finance through
in-kind trade credit. Since trade credit relationships take time to materialize and
are often long-lived, capital search frictions are a natural way to model frictional
and endogenous transition rates into self-employment.
3.4 The Model
The economy is comprised of households and salaried firms. Salaried firms
hire wage workers in frictional labor markets and accumulate capital. In contrast
to the standard RBC labor search model, these firms also make a capital allocation
decision: each period, they decide on the fraction of capital used inside the firm.
Any unused capital is devoted to matching with potential self-employed individuals
outside the firm, who use matched capital to produce in self-employment. All goods
in the economy are identical. A representative household with many family members
posts self-employment projects to attract capital in frictional capital markets, and
sends its members to find salaried employment. There is perfect risk-pooling in the
economy. There is no on-the-job search and search for salaried employment is undi-
rected. Separations from salaried employment and self-employment are exogenous.
Lump-sum taxes are used to finance unemployment benefits. I focus on urban labor
markets and therefore abstract from self-employment in the agricultural sector.
The search process for the self-employed works in the following way: each pe-
riod, after stochastic productivity is realized and separations from each employment
state take place, the household chooses the number of self-employment projects
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posted today as well as the measure of self-employed individuals it would like to
have producing next period. At the same time, salaried firms accumulate capital in
a frictionless environment and choose the fraction of capital to be used for produc-
tion inside the firm, which determines the fraction of capital available for matching
with self-employment projects. The capital supplied by salaried firms can be con-
sidered as input trade credit to the self-employed.14 A matching function brings
together unused salaried firm capital and potential projects and determines the cre-
ation of productive self-employment ventures. Capital market tightness is defined as
the ratio of self-employment projects (capital demand) to the salaried firms’ supply
of unused capital for matching (capital supply). A tighter capital market implies
that households find it more difficult to match with capital suppliers, which in turn
lowers the probability of entering self-employment. Each self-employed individual
requires one unit of capital to produce, so the measure of self-employed individuals
in the current period is given by last period’s amount of newly matched capital
plus the stock of last period’s self-employed individuals remaining after exogenous
separations have taken place.
A successful match allows the self-employed to access a stochastic production
technology that depends on an aggregate technology shock and a sectoral shock that
reflects the additional volatility of the sector.15 For each unit of matched capital,
households must supply one inelastic unit of self-employed labor for production to
14An equally valid way to interpret this is to assume that firms offer funds to the self-employed,
where the funds are considered a “productive input” (den Haan, Ramey and Watson, 2003).
15This sectoral shock plays an important role when comparing the prediction of the model
against the data as it allows me to introduce additional volatility in the self-employment sector.
The shock also generates differences in the volatility of self-employment earnings relative to wage
earnings, which is supported by empirical evidence.
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take place. To focus on the behavior of the self-employed, I abstract from the reasons
why the self-employed do not expand their projects by hiring salaried workers since
most self-employed run owner-only businesses. Salaried firms rent the matched
capital to the self-employed while retaining full ownership during the length of the
match. The rental rate paid by self-employed household members is determined
by Nash bargaining between the self-employed individual and the firm. This setup
captures the fact that establishing a trade credit relationship is costly and time-
consuming and characterizes the prevalence of external financing barriers for new
firms.16
The timing of events is as follows: at the beginning of the period, the produc-
tivity shocks are realized. Separations in all employment states take place and un-
employment is determined. Salaried firms recover the capital separated at the begin-
ning of the period and cover the depreciation of capital in surviving self-employment
relationships. Firms also post salaried vacancies, choose the fraction of the capital
stock used inside the firm, and choose investment. They also choose next period’s
salaried employment and self-employment capital. At the same time, households
post self-employment projects and decide on next period’s self-employment capi-
tal. Matching in labor and physical capital markets takes place. Firms and salaried
workers bargain over wages while firms and the self-employed bargain over the rental
rate on capital. Finally, production takes place, workers receive wage payments, and
the self-employed pay the rental rate to firms.
16Informational asymmetries may distort trade credit relationships as well, but these can be
overcome with time. I abstract from information frictions to keep the model tractable.
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3.4.1 Households
As in Andolfatto (1996), I assume an infinitely-lived representative household
of measure one, consisting of a large number of family members with perfect risk-
pooling across household members. Within the household, individuals can be in
salaried employment, self-employment (i.e., own-account or independent work), or
unemployment. There is no labor force participation margin and labor supply is
perfectly inelastic. Utility only depends on an aggregate consumption good whose
price is normalized to one. Households cannot accumulate capital but they are
the final owners of salaried firms in the economy.17 To move into self-employment,
potential self-employed household members must be matched to salaried firms to
rent capital for their projects. This is a key distinction from Arseneau, Chugh,
and Kurmann (2008) and Kurmann and Petrosky-Nadeau (2007), where firms are
the ones posting projects to attract capital in a frictional capital market. The
household’s problem is to choose paths of consumption ct, total capital demand
next period khSE,t+1 (where each self-employed household member uses one unit of
17This is similar to den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2003), who assume that entrepreneurs
use external funds from financial intermediaries and their own effort to produce. In other words,
entrepreneurs cannot accumulate their own capital and must rely solely on external financing. An
alternative would be to assume that the household accumulates capital but only uses part of it
to finance the projects of the self-employed. The remaining amount would come from external
sources such as trade credit. To keep the model tractable, I assume the potential self-employed
rely solely on external finance. If the model included on-the-job search where individuals can move
from wage employment into self-employment, then capital accumulation while on-the-job may be
an alternative assumption to model transitions into self-employment. However, assuming some
dependence on external financing or inputs suppliers is in line with the evidence on the constraints
faced by small firms.
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subject to the budget constraint
ct + ψSEκ (vSE,t) = (ztaSE,t − rSE,t)k
h
SE,t + wS,tnS,t +ΠS,t − Tt + but (3.2)
and the law of motion for capital used by the self-employed
khSE,t+1 = (1− δ
SE)(khSE,t + vSE,tp(θSE,t)) (3.3)
where ψSE is the resource cost of posting projects and κ (vSE,t) is a convex func-
tion of self-employment projects such that κ
′
(vSE,t) > 0 and κ
′′
(vSE,t) > 0. The
term ψSEκ (vSE,t) can be considered as a start-up cost that the household pays to
attract capital suppliers. This cost is required to move into self-employment but
does not guarantee that the projects will become productive (i.e., regardless of the
payment, there is a positive probability that some projects may not match with
capital suppliers and hence may not become active).18 Total production in the
self-employment sector is ySE,t = ztaSE,tk
h
SE,t, which depends on matched capital,
khSE,t, aggregate productivity in the economy, zt, and self-employment sectoral pro-
18This idea is similar to the cost that entrepreneurs have to pay during the initial phase of a
project in den Haan and Kaltenbrunner (2009). Note that once a match with an input supplier
occurs, ψSE no longer has to be paid to maintain an existing relationship. Instead, matched self-
employed individuals pay a rental rate on capital each period for as long as the relationship with
the capital supplier lasts.
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ductivity, aSE,t. Both zt and aSE,t follow independent stochastic processes. The
shock aSE,t captures the additional volatility inherent to the self-employment sector
(Maloney, Cunningham, and Bosch, 2004).19 Each self-employed individual uses a
single unit of matched capital for production. Thus, khSE,t is also the measure of
active self-employed individuals. Individual earnings for each self-employed mem-
ber of the household are given by πSE,t = (ztaSE,t − rSE,t). wS,t and ΠS,t stand for
the salaried sector wage and salaried firm profits, respectively. b represents unem-




is the probability of finding a capital supplier, where
m(vSE,t, (1−ωt)kS,t) is a constant-returns-to-scale matching function that takes self-
employment projects from households vSE,t and capital supply from salaried firms




Note that a higher θSE,t implies a tighter capital market and corresponds to house-
holds finding it more difficult to match with a capital supplier. This reduces the
unemployed’s probability of entering self-employment, so that p(θSE,t) is a decreasing
function of capital market tightness.
Since a household member who is matched to a firm in the capital market has
access to the capital necessary to start production, self-employment nSE,t evolves in
exactly the same way as khSE,t, so that
nSE,t+1 = (1− δ
SE)(nSE,t +m(vSE,t, (1− ωt)kS,t)) (3.4)
19In a setting with idiosyncratic shocks, this shock would capture project risk (see Akyol and
Athreya, 2009, or Buera and Shin, 2011).
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The total employed labor force is given by
nt = nS,t + nSE,t (3.5)
where nj,t represents the labor measure in employment state j = S, SE. I normalize
the total labor force to one and define unemployment as
ut = 1− nS,t − nSE,t (3.6)
Denote the representative household’s instantaneous utility function by U(ct) =
c1−σt
1−σ
and the marginal utility of consumption as Uc(ct). Combining first-order conditions
















The left-hand side represents the expected marginal cost of looking for capital to
start a project while the right-hand side captures the expected marginal benefit of
matching with a salaried firm that supplies capital. The expected benefit includes
both the benefit from producing with that unit of capital net of the cost of renting
the unit of capital, zaSE − rSE, and the benefit of having the lending relationship
continue into the future, i.e. the continuation value. Since households are the







salaried firms’ stochastic discount factor.
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3.4.2 Production
The production sector is comprised of a salaried sector with firms that hire
salaried workers in a frictional labor market and a self-employment sector with
owner-only firms operated by the self-employed who use rented capital and their
fixed effort to produce. This section focuses on the salaried firms’ problem since
the self-employed’s problem was described above. Output from salaried firms is
a function of salaried labor nS, physical capital kS, the share of capital used in
production ω, stochastic aggregate productivity z, and a time-invariant parameter
aS meant to capture the quality of the institutional environment in the economy.
Varying this parameter will affect the steady-state composition of employment in
the economy.20 The firm’s production function is assumed to be constant-returns-
to-scale. Salaried sector production is given by
yS,t = ztaSf(nS,t, ωtkS,t) (3.8)
Since ωt is the share of the firm’s capital stock kS,t used in salaried production in
period t, unused capital (1−ωt)kS,t represents the supply of capital for matching with
the self-employed. Firms choose a sequence of vacancies for salaried employment
vS,t, salaried employment next period nS,t+1, total capital next period kS,t+1, the
fraction of the capital stock used in production today ωt, and capital to be lent out
20This is a natural parameter to vary since the institutional setting of a country, particularly
as it influences employment arrangements, affects mainly the salaried sector (Akyol and Athreya,
2009; Fiess et al., 2010). See Pietrobelli, Rabellotti and Aquilina (2004) and Ardagna and Lusardi
(2008) for an overview of some of the main determinants of self-employment and entrepreneurship.
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subject to the law of motion for salaried employment
nS,t+1 = (1− δ
S)(nS,t + vS,tq(θS,t)) (3.10)
the evolution of capital used in the self-employment sector
kfSE,t+1 = (1− δ
SE)(kfSE,t + (1− ωt)kS,tq(θSE,t)) (3.11)
and the evolution of the firm’s total capital stock21
kS,t+1 = it + (1− δ)ωtkS,t + (δ
SE − δ)kfSE,t (3.12)
+
[
(1− δ)(1− ωt)kS,t − (1− δ
SE)(1− ωt)kS,tq(θSE,t)
]
The term ψSvS,t captures the total cost of posting salaried vacancies.
22 The salaried
employment job-filling probability is q(θS,t) =
mS(ut,vS,t)
vS,t
, where mS(vS,t, ut) is a
constant-returns-to-scale matching function for salaried employment, δS is the sep-
aration rate for salaried workers, and δSE is the self-employment separation rate.
21Note that combining the law of motion for capital held by the firm and the law of motion for
capital in self-employment yields a standard law of motion for total capital in the economy.
22One can introduce a resource cost of supplying capital to proxy for the administrative and
monitoring costs associated with the supply of input credit. Introducing such a cost does not
change the main results of the paper. A similar comment applies to investment adjustment costs.
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where once again θSE,t =
vSE,t
(1−ωt)kS,t
embodies tightness in the market for phys-
ical capital. Note that higher capital market tightness from the salaried firms’
perspective means that firms find it easier to match their unused capital with
self-employment projects. Thus, q(θSE,t) is increasing in θSE,t. The expression
[
(1− δ)− (1− δSE)q(θSE,t)
]
(1 − ωt)kS,t captures the fact that firms subtract the
capital matched in t after taking into account separations, which is given by (1 −
δSE)q(θSE,t)(1− ωt)kS,t, from the capital that was devoted to matching in t, net of
depreciation, which is given by (1 − δ)(1 − ωt)kS,t. As in Kurmann and Petrosky-
Nadeau (2007) and Arseneau et al. (2008), the firm considers unmatched capital as
part of capital accumulation, net of depreciation. The term δkfSE,t is an expense for
the firm since capital in self-employment depreciates each period, so the term must
be subtracted from the capital available for allocation at the beginning of period
t+1 after accounting for the capital that is returned to the firm due to separations,
given by δSEkfSE,t. For future reference, define uk,t ≡ (1 − q(θSE,t))(1 − ωt)kS,t as
unmatched idle capital before depreciation. Combining first-order conditions yields















a standard Euler equation for capital kS:
1 = EtΞt+1|t {zt+1aSfωkS(nF,t+1, nI,t+1, ωt+1kS,t+1) + (1− δ)} (3.14)
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and a capital supply condition for capital allocated to matching with self-employment
projects:

















The job creation condition states that the expected marginal cost of a vacancy
is equal to the expected marginal benefit of having a worker in the firm, which takes
into account the continuation value since employment relationships are long-lived.
The capital Euler equation balances the cost and benefit of obtaining an additional
unit of capital, regardless of whether it is used within the firm or lent out to a
self-employed individual.
The capital supply condition is similar but not identical to the one in Arseneau
et al. (2008). The left-hand side gives the expected marginal cost of lending an ad-
ditional unit of capital to self-employed workers. This cost includes the opportunity
cost of devoting a unit of capital to matching, ztaSfωkS(n S,t, ωtkS,t), which is the
marginal product of capital used inside salaried firms. The second term captures
the fact that if capital is matched today with probability q(θSE,t) and survives with
probability (1 − δSE), then the firm must set aside that capital and hence cannot
count it as part of idle capital (after matching) within the firm. The right-hand side
gives the expected benefit of a matched unit of capital. The benefit for the firm is
the rental rate obtained if the relationship survives next period, net of the depreci-
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ation of capital δ, which the firm must cover for surviving relationships. Also, the
firm takes into account that the match ends with probability δSE, in which case the
firm gets back a unit of capital. The last term on the right-hand side reflects the
continuation value of a long-term capital relationship. The intertemporal nature of
the optimal capital supply decision arises due to the existence of long-term relation-
ships between the self-employed and their input suppliers. Note that the capital
supply condition is a decision made by the firm and not by the household, since
salaried firms are the ones making capital accumulation decisions. Furthermore, the
expected cost of investing capital in self-employment ventures will depend on the
marginal product of capital within the firm since the firm faces a tradeoff between
trying to match capital and using it in-house. These are two key distinctions relative
to the setting in Arseneau et al. (2008).
3.4.3 Labor Market Search, Capital Search, and Nash Bargaining







, respectively. Thus, salaried labor market tightness is θS,t =
p(θS,t)
q(θS,t)
. The probability of finding a capital supplier is p(θSE,t) =
mSE(vSE,t,(1−ωt)kS,t)
vSE,t









3.4.3.1 Household Value Function










where labor income is weighted by the marginal utility of consumption, λht = Uc(ct).
The value function of a self-employed individual currently matched with a capital
supplier, WSE,t, is given by
WSE,t = λ
h
t (ztaSE,t − rSE,t) + Etβ
{




To incorporate the probability of entry into self-employment in the value function
of an unemployed individual, define vuSE,t ≡
vSE,t
ut
, which gives the number of project
postings per unemployed household member. Hence, the effective probability of
finding a capital supplier per unemployed individual, which I denote by pu(θSE,t), is
given by vuSE,tp(θSE,t). The value function of an unemployed individual, WU,t, can
















where b denotes unemployment benefits measured in consumption units.23
3.4.3.2 Firm Value Functions
The marginal value of a salaried firm from having a salaried worker, JS,t, is
given by





The marginal value of a salaried firm from renting a unit of capital to a self-employed
household member is
JSE,t = rSE,t + (δ





where the firm takes into account that the credit relationship will survive into the
next period with probability (1 − δSE). Also, recall that firms must cover the
depreciation of the matched unit of capital, δ, but gain a unit of previously matched
capital if it is separated with probability δSE. This yields the term (δSE − δ) in the
expression for JSE,t above. Finally, the value of having unused, idle capital is given
23In principle, the expression for WU,t suggests that it is possible for an unemployed individual
to be matched simultaneously to more than one type of employment. Assuming otherwise would
rule out closed-form solutions for the wage and the rental rate. Since these price expressions
provide intuition for the influence of self-employment on wages (and therefore hiring), I assume
that individuals can only be in a single type of employment at any given time after being matched.
An alternative would be to fully account for the fact that, if there is a match in a given employment
state, the same individual cannot be matched in the other employment state. This would imply
that the wage in period t can only be expressed as a function of each of the value functions in t+1
and no closed-form solutions could be obtained. The downside of this approach is that we would
not be able to explicitly observe how the possibility of self-employment affects the wage and the
capital rental rate.
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by Juk,t = (1− δ) since capital depreciates every period at rate δ.
3.4.3.3 Nash Bargaining: Wage and Rental Rate Determination
Real wages for salaried workers are determined by Nash bargaining with salaried
















is the worker’s surplus, JS,t is the salaried firm’s surplus, and νS
is the worker’s bargaining power. In a similar fashion, the Nash bargaining problem



















JSE,t − Juks ,t
)
, where the threat point is the value of unmatched,
idle capital.
Using the first-order conditions from (21) and (22), the Nash bargaining solu-
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tion for the wage and the rental rate can be shown to be24

















Similarly, the rental rate for matched capital is






















The wage and the rental rate depend, among other things, on market tightness in
the other employment state. Intuitively, in a model with search frictions and two
types of employment, the prices of factors of production should not only depend on
the marginal product of each of the factors but also on the potential opportunities
in other employment states, which are embodied in market tightness in each of these
states. Thus, salaried wages and the rental rate on capital used in self-employment
24Appendix B describes the derivation of the wage and rental rate equations.
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are affected by the outside options available in the economy.
3.4.3.4 Intuition Behind the Wage and Rental Rate Equations
To understand better how conditions in one labor market spill over into other
markets, consider the wage in the salaried sector. The wage equation in a standard
one-sector search model without self-employment would be given by
wS,t = νS [ztaSmplS,t + ψSθS,t] + (1− νS)b
where mplS,t is the marginal product of labor and νS is the bargaining weight for
workers. Both higher labor market tightness θS,t and a higher outside option in
unemployment b lead to a higher wage.
Now, consider the expression for the wage in the economy with self-employment.
To see how market tightness in the capital market – and hence the self-employment




















constant-returns in matching, θSE,t =
q(θSE,t)
p(θSE,t)
. The first term inside the brackets rep-
resents the foregone marginal product of capital if the capital devoted to matching
were instead used inside the firm. The second element captures the fact that firms
participating in the capital matching process must set aside (1−δSE) units of capital
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in the current period for those new matches that become productive next period,
and must cover depreciation costs for matched capital next period. This second
term is also part of the opportunity cost of successfully matching capital. Thus, it is
weighted by the probability of a successful match from the household’s perspective.




since firms net out the depreciation of
capital from the total opportunity cost of storing the capital today until it becomes
productive next period. In summary, the term in brackets is akin to the vacancy
posting cost for salaried employment, except that the cost of matching capital de-
pends on the opportunity cost of capital and the cost of covering depreciation for
capital relationships.
Having described each component of the wage, note that an increase in capital
market tightness θSE,t ceteris paribus decreases the expected cost to the firm of
devoting capital to matching. Given that the household’s probability of finding a
capital supplier p(θSE,t) is decreasing in θSE,t, an increase in capital market tightness
reduces an unemployed individual’s probability of entering self-employment.25 This
implies that an increase in θSE,t reduces the salaried sector wage since the worker’s
outside option of going into self-employment is now less valuable. In other words,
while an increase in salaried labor market tightness θS,t tends to push the wage up,
an increase in capital market tightness θSE,t goes in the opposite direction since the
latter implies a lower probability of moving into self-employment – and therefore a
25Clearly, an increase in θSE,t has implications for the marginal product of capital used inside
the salaried firm if θSE,t changes due to (1−ωt)kS,t. Thus, the impact of a change in θSE,t is more
complex than what my description suggests. However, for the purposes of developing intuition
about the wage and the rental rate, it proves useful to see how changes in θSE,t due to vSE,t,
holding everything else constant, would affect each of the prices.
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weaker outside option – from the point of view of household members.
Now consider the determinants of the capital rental rate for the self-employed.
First, from equation (3.24), the rental rate depends positively on output of a given
self-employed individual, ztaSE,t. This is similar to the wage equation, in which the
wage is increasing in the marginal product of labor. Also, an increase in the value
of the other two outside options for the household (unemployment or salaried em-
ployment) through higher salaried market tightness θS,t or a higher outside option b
puts downward pressure on the rental rate and increases self-employment earnings.
Meanwhile, an increase in capital market tightness θSE,t puts upward pressure on
the rental rate, since a tighter capital market reduces the matching probability for
households p(θSE,t) and raises the capital matching probability for salaried firms
q(θSE,t). Finally, note that a higher marginal product of capital for salaried firms
increases the opportunity cost of devoting capital to matching, which pushes firms
to decrease the supply of capital for matching. Since this increases θSE,t for a given
number of self-employment projects, the impact on the rental rate is in principle
ambiguous. However, note that a higher marginal product of capital also pushes
firms to post more salaried vacancies, thereby increasing salaried labor market tight-
ness. Higher labor market tightness, in turn, puts downward pressure on the rental
rate. Then, we should expect the rental rate to be lower if the change in labor mar-
ket tightness dominates the influence exerted by capital market tightness and the




















Lower capital market tightness θSE,t puts upward pressure on wS,t since the self-
employment option becomes a more accessible employment alternative. Also, as
I discuss in detail in the results section below, wS,t and rSE,t are more sensitive
to fluctuations in θSE,t in economies with higher steady-state self-employment (or
equivalently, lower θSE).
3.4.4 Government, Total Output, and Resource Constraint
The government levies lump-sum taxes to finance unemployment benefits, so
the government budget constraint is
Tt = but (3.26)
Total output yt is given by the sum of output from salaried firms, yS,t, and output
from the self-employed, ySE,t:
yt = yS,t + ySE,t (3.27)
In the model, yt represents observed output in the data. Most countries follow
United Nations guidelines and incorporate estimates of output from the informal sec-
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tor, which most of the self-employed belong to, into their national income accounts
(Quintin and Pratap, 2006; United Nations, 2008).26
As in most models with labor search frictions, the costs of posting vacan-
cies and posting projects are resource costs and enter explicitly into the economy’s
resource constraint. Thus, the aggregate resource constraint is given by
yt = ct + it + ψSvS,t + ψSEκ(vSE,t) (3.28)
where total output yt and investment it were defined above.
3.4.5 Competitive Equilibrium
Definition (Competitive Equilibrium) Taking the set of exogenous processes
{zt, aSE,t} as given, the allocations {ct, nS,t, nSE,t, θS,t, θSE,t, kS,t, kSE,t, ωt, ut, Tt, yt}
∞
t=0
as well as prices {wS,t, rSE,t}
∞
t=0 satisfy the law of motion for capital used in self-
employment (3.3), the law of motion for self-employment (3.4), the definition of
unemployment (3.6), the self-employed’s demand for self-employed capital (3.7), the
law of motion for salaried employment (3.10), the salaried firms’ salaried job cre-
ation condition (3.13), the Euler equation for capital (3.14), the salaried firms’ cap-
ital supply of self-employed capital (3.15), the Nash wage and the Nash rental rate
equations (3.23) and (3.24), the government budget constraint (3.26), the definition
of total output (3.27), and the economy’s resource constraint (3.28).
26I focus on urban employment and therefore abstract from economic activity in agriculture,
even though developing countries have large self-employment shares in the sector. Strictly speaking,
total output should include an additional term that captures the contribution of the agricultural
sector to total production. In my framework, this could be done by including a constant term in
the definition of total output.
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3.5 Calibration and Solution Method
Given my interest in economies with sizeable self-employment shares, a natural
choice for the calibration of the model is a developing country. I choose Mexico as
a benchmark because its household and firm surveys give a detailed overview of
self-employment in the labor market. Moreover, Bosch and Maloney (2008) have
documented the cyclical dynamics of salaried employment and self-employment in
Mexico, so their work is an excellent source for some of the parameter values and
calibration targets used to simulate the model.
To analyze the dynamic behavior of the economy, I log-linearize the model
around the non-stochastic steady state and compute a first-order approximation of
the equilibrium conditions. I simulate the economy for 2100 periods, drop the first
100 periods, and use the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with smoothing parameter
1600 to filter the simulated data, extract the cyclical component and compute the
moments of interest.27
3.5.1 Functional Forms and Stochastic Processes
Aggregate productivity zt and self-employment productivity aSE,t follow inde-
pendent AR(1) processes:
ln zt = ρz ln zt−1 + ε
z
t (3.29)
27I use Dynare for all dynamic simulations. Using higher-order approximations does not change
the main conclusions of the paper.
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∼ N(0, σSE), and ρSE < 1. Salaried out-
put is Cobb-Douglas and given by yS,t = ztaS (nS,t)
1−αS (ωtkS,t)
αS , 0 < αS <
1. Recall that aS is a time-invariant parameter in the salaried sector and not
a shock. The cost of posting projects is given by κ (vSE,t) = (vSE,t)
ηSE with
ηSE > 1. The matching function for salaried employment is constant-returns-to-




S,t , 0 < ξ < 1, where MS is the salaried match-
ing efficiency parameter, ut is unemployment, and vS,t denotes salaried vacancies.




















S,t. The matching function in the capital market is also Cobb-Douglas, so
that mSE((1 − ωt)kS,t, vSE,t) = MSE((1 − ωt)kS,t)
ξSE(vSE,t)
1−ξSE , 0 < ξSE < 1. The


















3.5.2 Parametrization and Calibration Targets
I borrow a number of parameter values that have been used in related studies
and calibrate the remaining parameters using specific targets for Mexico. Table 3.3
below presents the parameter values adopted from existing literature. Table 3.4
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shows the parameters whose values are obtained by imposing particular calibration
targets from the data and solving for the model’s non-stochastic steady state.
Parameters Taken from Existing Literature The time period in the model
is one quarter, so I set the discount factor β to 0.98, consistent with common values
assumed for developing countries. The capital share in the firm’s production func-
tion is set to αS = 0.30, a common value in DSGE models. The depreciation rate
of capital is set to 0.02. Bosch and Maloney (2007) compute transition probabilities
between employment states for Mexico using quarterly data from the National Sur-
vey on Urban Employment (Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano, or ENEU) for
years 1987 through 2002. They find that separation rates for informal salaried work-
ers are at least twice as high as those for formal salaried workers. Self-employment
separation rates are closer to those of formal workers.
Table 3.3: Parametrization: Benchmark Economy
Parameter Value Parameter Description Parameter Source
αS 0.30 Salaried Capital Share DSGE Lit.
aS 0.60 Institutional Quality Benchmark Assumption
b 0 Unemployment Insurance No Unempl. Benefits
β 0.98 Discount Factor DSGE Lit.
δ 0.02 Capital Depreciation Rate DSGE Lit.
δS 0.05 Salaried Separation Rate Bosch, Maloney (2007)
δSE 0.03 SE Separation Rate Bosch, Maloney (2007)
νS 0.50 Salaried Bargaining Power Search Lit.
νSE 0.50 SE Bargaining Power Search Lit.
ρz 0.90 Autocorrelation of TFP DSGE Lit.
ξ 0.50 Matching Elasticity, Labor Search Lit.
ξSE 0.50 Matching Elasticity, Capital Search Lit.
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Since I have a single type of salaried employment, I set the salaried separation
rate to be a weighted average of the two salaried separation rates, where the weights
are given by each salaried type’s contribution to total salaried employment. This
implies that δSE < δS. The conclusions in the paper remain intact if I make a
distinction between formal and informal salaried employment in the model. I set
the persistence parameter for zt to 0.90, in line with the DSGE literature. The
elasticities of the matching functions and the bargaining power parameters are set
to ξ = ξSE = 0.50 and νS = νSE = 0.50, respectively, consistent with the labor
search literature (and to maintain as much symmetry as possible). aS is a free
parameter that I vary to generate changes in steady-state self-employment in the
model. I fix its value to 0.60 in the benchmark economy. Variations in aS allow
me to generate sizeable changes in steady-state self-employment, ranging from 6
percent to 79 percent of the labor force. The benchmark value for aS allows me
to obtain these changes in steady-state self-employment while keeping the share of
capital used in salaried production bounded below one. 28
As I discuss below, I treat this parameter as a proxy for institutional quality.
Calibrated Parameters The remaining parameters are jointly calibrated by solv-
ing for the non-stochastic steady state of the model and imposing specific data
targets. The calibrated parameters are: ηSE,MS,MSE, ψS, ψSE, ρSE , σSE, and σz.
Recall that ηSE governs the curvature of the cost of posting self-employment projects
28Even though the benchmark value for aS may suggest that productivity in the salaried sector
is lower than productivity in self-employment, computing labor productivity for the benchmark
economy reveals that labor productivity is indeed higher in the salaried sector relative to the
self-employment sector, as it should be.
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and therefore the probability of entry into self-employment through the household’s
project posting condition. I calibrate ηSE to match the volatility of the transition
probability from unemployment to self-employment reported in Bosch and Maloney
(2008). Given my benchmark assumption for aS, I choose the matching scale param-
etersMj , for j = S, SE to match the average shares of salaried employment and self-
employment in the total labor force for Mexico from 1987 to 2002, which are obtained
from the ENEU and the ILO. The sectoral productivity shock to self-employment
aSE,t aims to capture the added volatility and riskiness of the self-employment sector.
Given the structure of self-employment entry in the model, I calibrate the persistence
of the self-employment productivity shock to match the cyclical correlation between
output and the transition rate from unemployment to self-employment documented
in Bosch and Maloney (2008). I set the vacancy posting cost for salaried positions
ψS to be 3.5 percent of wages, as documented in Levy (2007). The target for the
posting project cost parameter ψSE is taken from McKenzie and Woodruff (2006),
who document evidence on startup costs among microenteprises for different sec-
tors using Mexico’s microenterprise survey (Encuesta Nacional de Micronegocios,
or ENAMIN). The target for ψSE represents three months of wages, which is a
lower-bound estimate for micro firms in construction and personal services.
I calibrate σSE to match the cyclical correlation between the transition rate
from unemployment into salaried employment and output in Bosch and Maloney
(2008).29 Note that this also generates a volatility differential between self-employment
29While I use the cyclical correlation between the transition rate from unemployment to self-
employment and output in the data to calibrate the persistence of the shock to self-employment
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Table 3.4: Calibrated Parameters and Targets: Benchmark Economy
Parameter Value Parameter Description Target
ηSE 1.11 Curvature, Project Postings σpu(θSE,t) = 9.4
MS 0.198 Formal Matching Efficiency nS = 0.72
MSE 0.028 SE Matching Efficiency nSE = 0.23
ψS 0.027 Formal Vacancy Cost 3.5 percent of wages
ψSE 0.759 Project Posting Cost 3 months of wages
ρSE 0.67 Autocorr. SE Prod. ρpu(θSE,t),yt = −0.43
σSE 0.025 SD SE Productivity Shock ρp(θS,t),yt = 0.66
σz 0.0155 SD Aggregate TFP Shock σy = 2.17
earnings and salaried employment earnings, which is in line with the evidence on
the higher earnings volatility in self-employment (see Hamilton, 2000, for the U.S.,
and Bargain and Kwenda, 2010, for Brazil and Mexico).30 Finally, the standard
deviation of TFP is chosen to match the standard deviation of output for Mexico
as reported in Lama and Urrutia (2012).
Table 3.5 shows the moments generated by the benchmark calibration of the
model. It also shows three additional moments that are not targeted, mainly the
cyclical correlation between self-employment and output, the cyclical correlation be-
tween salaried employment and output, and the correlation between unemployment
and output for Mexico. The third column shows the same moments generated by
an alternative version of the benchmark model where there are no capital search
productivity, the model still generates the countercyclical transition rate from unemployment into
self-employment (and the countercyclicality of self-employment) when I shut down the sectoral
shock. The only reason I use this moment as a target is to avoid assigning arbitrary parameter
values to the self-employment productivity process. Calibrating the process also allows me to have
a more disciplined quantitative experiment.
30Since I make no distinction between formal and informal salaried workers in the model, the
target for the cyclical correlation of entry into salaried employment and output is a weighted
average of the cyclical correlations for the two employment states, where the weights are given by
the respective shares of formal and informal salaried workers in total salaried employment.
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frictions, and transitions from unemployment into self-employment depend solely
on a fixed probability of becoming self-employed.31
Table 3.5: Benchmark Economy vs. Model with Exogenous Transition Rate Into
Self-Employment











The benchmark model is able to explain the negative correlations between
output and self-employment and unemployment observed in the data. In contrast,
a model with an exogenous transition rate into self-employment and no capital
search frictions cannot replicate the contemporaneous cyclical correlation between
self-employment and output observed in the data.32 This model also yields weaker
cyclical correlations between salaried employment and output and unemployment
and output, respectively. The results in Table 3.5 highlight the importance of endo-
genizing the transition rate into self-employment to capture the cyclical facts about
31The latter can be interpreted as the probability of receiving an idea for a self-employment
venture. This alternative version of the model assumes that (fixed) effort is the only input in
self-employment.
32There are no plausible parameter values for the self-employment productivity process that
yield the cyclicality of entry into self-employment (or the cyclicality of self-employment) in the
model with exogenous entry into self-employment.
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self-employment as well as other cyclical features of the labor market.
Changes in the steady-state share of self-employment across simulations are
engineered by varying the salaried sector productivity parameter, aS. I interpret
changes in this parameter as differences in the quality of institutions, which have
been shown to be important for cross-country differences in self-employment rates
(see, for example, Loayza and Rigolini, 2011).33
3.6 Simulation Results
3.6.1 Steady State
Figure 3.2 shows the steady-state relationship between self-employment and
other model variables traced out by variations in the institutional quality parameter
aS, holding other model parameters fixed. The parameter aS is centered at 0.60 for
the benchmark economy and varies between 0.54 and 0.63 to generate steady-state
self-employment shares ranging from 6.6 percent of the labor force to 79 percent
of the labor force.34 First, note that an increase in aS causes a fall in steady-state
self-employment by raising the marginal product of salaried labor and the marginal
product of capital used in the salaried sector.
These changes in marginal products increase the value of posting salaried
33The correlation between aS in the model and the index of Law and Order from Political Risk
Services is 0.55 and significant at the 1 percent level, while the correlation between aS and Rule
of Law from the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators is 0.63 and significant at the 1
percent level as well. The correlation between the self-employment share in the data and Law and
Order (Rule of Law) is -0.62 (-0.68) and significant at the 1 percent level.
34Given the response of steady-state unemployment to changes in aS , this implies a range for
self-employment of 7 percent to 87 percent of total employment (which is the variable plotted in
Figure 3.1).
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Figure 3.2: Model Steady State and Self-Employment (Share of Labor Force)
vacancies and decrease capital supply to the self-employed, respectively.35 Thus,
35The marginal product of salaried employment would be lower even if increases in steady-state
self-employment originated from changes in capital matching efficiency or other parameters that
affect the share of self-employment in the economy. Intuitively, regardless of the parameter I use
to change the share of self-employment in the model, economies with more self-employment use
less capital in the salaried sector, which decreases the marginal product of labor for a given level
of employment. Thus, the general conclusions I present do not depend on using aS to change the
share of self-employment.
127
vacancies in salaried employment fall as the steady-state share of self-employment
rises in the economy, as do steady-state salaried-firm capital and investment. The
fall in vacancies and the increase in unemployment explain the fall in salaried labor
market tightness for higher steady-state self-employment levels. Naturally, given
the behavior of salaried vacancies, salaried employment and self-employment are
negatively related. Since both physical capital and the share of the capital stock used
in salaried production are higher in economies with less self-employment, salaried
output and self-employment are negatively related.
The positive relationship between steady-state self-employment and unemploy-
ment suggests that self-employment cannot fully absorb the individuals who move
into unemployment when vacancies in the salaried sector fall. While the household
has an incentive to post more self-employment projects when salaried labor mar-
ket tightness is lower, the increase in project postings does not cause an increase
in capital market tightness, because a lower aS reduces the share of capital de-
voted to production in the salaried sector, which implies an increase in the supply
of capital to matching. The increase in capital supply is larger than the increase
in capital demand, causing a decrease in capital market tightness. Output in the
self-employment sector is positively related to self-employment, since production
in the sector in the steady state depends solely on the share of self-employment
in the economy. The share of self-employment output in total output is therefore
increasing in self-employment.36
36The ratio for the benchmark economy is close to 0.20. We can consider this as the share of
output from informal enterprises, which excludes output from informal workers in formal firms but
includes most of the output from self-employment, in total output. In Mexico, this ratio was 0.173
for years 2003 through 2006 (see http://wiego.org/informal-economy/statistical-picture).
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The model yields a negative relationship between total output and the share
of self-employment, which is in line with the cross-country empirical evidence on the
link between GDP and self-employment. Market conditions in each of the employ-
ment states are important determinants of the wage and the rental rate. In particu-
lar, recall that salaried sector wages are increasing in salaried labor market tightness
and decreasing in capital market tightness. Plotting steady-state self-employment
against the wage and the rental rate reveals that wages decline as self-employment
rises, suggesting that the impact on wages from lower labor market tightness out-
weighs the impact from lower capital market tightness. If we consider the rental
rate of capital, an increase in labor market tightness puts downward pressure on
the rental rate because the probability of transitioning into salaried employment
is higher. The opposite holds true for capital market tightness. However, simi-
lar to the case of wages, the effect of labor market tightness is stronger in steady
state, which makes the rental rate rise with self-employment. Thus, wages and self-
employment are negatively related while self-employment and the rental rate are
positively related. This implies that the cost of renting capital is lower in economies
with higher institutional quality aS. In terms of understanding the cyclical dynamics
reported below, the most relevant steady-state results are the negative relationship
between self-employment and capital market tightness, the positive links between
self-employment, project postings, and the supply of capital, and the negative con-
nection between self-employment and salaried labor market tightness.
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3.6.2 Dynamic Response to a Negative Aggregate Productivity Shock
I first describe the dynamic response of the model’s variables to a negative ag-
gregate productivity shock zt for the benchmark economy. I then discuss how cyclical
dynamics differ across three economies with different steady-state self-employment
levels, obtained by varying the salaried sector productivity parameter aS. The
shocks are the same across economies. I examine an economy with steady-state self-
employment of 7.5 percent of total employment, which corresponds to the level in
the United States; an economy with 23 percent self-employment, which corresponds
to the level in the benchmark economy, Mexico; and an economy with 50 percent
self-employment, which corresponds to the level in Colombia. These three choices
are only meant to be illustrative.37 The following discussion refers to the results in
Figures 3.3 through 3.5.
Benchmark Economy On impact, the fall in aggregate TFP immediately lowers
the marginal product of labor in salaried employment and the marginal product
of capital used by salaried firms. Firms cut back on vacancies and investment.
Since unemployment is predetermined in period t, salaried labor market tightness
responds solely to changes in vacancies and falls, causing matching in the salaried
sector to fall. This implies an upward jump in the probability of filling a salaried
vacancy from the point of view of salaried firms.
37The only parameter that varies across economies is aS . I do not claim that the model
economies with 7.5 and 50 percent self-employment capture the U.S. and the Colombian economies,
respectively.
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Figure 3.3: Impulse Response Functions to a Negative Aggregate Productivity Shock
The fall in aggregate productivity pushes firms to decrease the share of capital
used in salaried sector production, ω. Since the capital stock is predetermined in
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Figure 3.4: Impulse Response Functions to a Negative Aggregate Productivity Shock
(Continued)
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Figure 3.5: Impulse Response Functions to a Negative Aggregate Productivity Shock
(Continued 2)
t, a fall in the share of capital used by salaried firms implies that the supply of
capital for matching, (1 − ω)kS, increases on impact. As I describe below, the
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rental rate on self-employment capital falls on impact. Households respond to the
decline in both the probability of finding a salaried job and in the capital rental
rate by posting more self-employment projects relative to the previous period. The
increase in the supply of capital by salaried firms dominates the increase in project
postings, so that capital market tightness falls on impact.38 Recalling that p(θSE) is
decreasing in capital market tightness, the fall in θSE translates into an increase in
the probability of finding a capital supplier from the point of view of the household,
and hence an increase in the probability of entering self-employment.39 Therefore,
transition rates from unemployment into self-employment are countercyclical. Even
though self-employment expands, output in the self-employment sector falls due to
the fall in aggregate TFP. Since salaried output is also lower, this implies that total
output in the economy falls on impact as well.
The initial responses of the wage and the rental rate are more subtle to analyze.
First, note that a fall in capital market tightness raises the probability of becoming
self-employed and puts upward pressure on wages. Second, a fall in salaried labor
market tightness puts upward pressure on the rental rate, whereas the fall in capital
market tightness has the opposite effect. In the end, the effect of salaried labor
market tightness drives the behavior of wages, while the effect of capital market
tightness dominates in explaining the behavior of the rental rate. Hence, both the
wage and the rental rate fall on impact. This result is intuitive: for a given level
38In principle, the impact response of capital market tightness is ambiguous since both the
supply and the demand for self-employment capital have increased. For a reasonable calibration,
the supply of capital always dominates.
39This holds whether we look at the total probability of entering self-employment, p(θSE), or
the probability per unemployed individual, vuSEp(θSE). The latter is the appropriate variable to
compare against the salaried job-finding probability.
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of self-employment, conditions in salaried employment should exert more influence
on wages than conditions in self-employment, even though the latter still affects
the behavior of wages. As I discuss below, important differences emerge once we
analyze economies with different steady-state self-employment levels since capital
market tightness plays an increasingly important role in shaping the response of
wages as the steady-state level of self-employment increases.
Due to labor matching frictions, the initial fall in vacancies leads to a persistent
fall in salaried employment. Also, since investment falls on impact, the lower capital
stock next period slows down the recovery of the marginal product of salaried labor,
which negatively affects salaried employment in subsequent periods. This has a
direct impact on the recovery of salaried employment and output in the aftermath
of the shock. Despite the effect of capital on salaried employment, there is a large
rebound in salaried vacancies (and salaried labor market tightness) in the period
after the shock. To understand this, note that in the benchmark economy wages
fall further in the period after the shock, and the self-employment outside option
plays a key role in this result. The recovery in aggregate productivity (and hence the
marginal product of capital) pushes salaried firms to use more capital in-house. This
reduces the supply of capital to the self-employed, which exerts upward pressure on
the self-employment capital rental rate.40 In response to the rise in the rental rate,
households post fewer self-employment projects. The lower demand for capital in
40Note the tension between the rise in the marginal product of capital – which pushes firms to
devote less capital to matching and hence increases ω – and the rise in the rental rate – which
pushes firms to devote more capital to matching and hence decreases ω. The first effect eventually
dominates the second effect, which brings the share of capital used in salaried production back to
steady state.
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self-employment lowers the probability of entering self-employment and effectively
reduces the self-employment outside option by enough that wages fall further after
the period of the shock. Since the marginal product of labor also starts to recover as
aggregate productivity slowly rises back to steady state, the salaried firm’s surplus
from hiring workers increases, which further feeds the rise in salaried vacancies.
Eventually, the downward pressure from the value of the self-employment option on
wages winds down and is offset by rising labor market tightness, and wages begin
their upward path back to steady state.
Absent the effect of endogenous movements in capital market tightness on
salaried wages after the shock, real wages in the economy would simply fall on impact
and start recovering in the subsequent period. This is a natural consequence of the
fact that vacancies, labor market tightness, and the marginal product of labor all rise
with the recovery of aggregate productivity, as in the standard labor search model.
Hence, the dynamic response of the ease of entry into self-employment is critical
to the speed of recovery of salaried employment and output, as the probability of
becoming self-employed affects the recovery path of salaried wages. I show below
that this mechanism becomes more relevant as self-employment in the economy
increases.
Differences Across Economies on Impact The impulse response function for
total output at the bottom of Figure 5 shows that economies with more steady-state
self-employment recover faster from an adverse aggregate productivity shock. This
is one of the main results of the paper. To understand this result, it proves useful
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to first see how the impact responses differ across economies.
Economies with more self-employment have a lower steady-state value of va-
cancies, which reflects the lower level of labor productivity in the salaried sector.41
Thus, when salaried firms in these economies face an adverse aggregate shock,
the proportional downward adjustment in salaried vacancies will be larger, caus-
ing salaried labor market tightness to fall by more as well, as shown in Figure 3.3.
The larger decrease in vacancies is accompanied by a larger fall in the share of cap-
ital used in production, ω. The fall in investment is larger in economies with more
steady-state self-employment, which is due both to the larger drop in vacancies – a
larger fall in vacancies lowers the incentive to accumulate capital since salaried em-
ployment will be lower next period – and to the lower steady-state capital-output
ratio in these economies. Even though ω falls by more in economies with more
self-employment, the lower steady-state capital stock in these economies implies
that capital supply to the self-employed, given by (1 − ω)kS, expands by less in
the period of the shock. Hence, the increase in transitions into self-employment
is smaller in economies with more steady-state self-employment due to the weaker
surge in capital supply for matching. Lastly, note that the larger fall in total output
in economies with more steady-state self-employment is driven by the response of
salaried sector output on impact, which drops by more due to the behavior of the
41Once again, note that this is not an artifact of the way I obtain different levels of steady-state
self-employment through changes in the salaried sector productivity parameter aS . For example, if
I change steady-state self-employment by varying the capital matching efficiency parameter MSE ,
the results are qualitatively the same: the value of salaried vacancies is lower in economies with
more self-employment because labor productivity is lower. This last result is due to the allocation
of capital in the economy: more capital allocated to the self-employed implies a lower marginal
product of labor in the salaried sector because the amount of capital used by salaried firms is lower
for a given level of salaried employment.
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share of capital used in the salaried sector, ω.
Since the fall in salaried labor market tightness is larger in economies with
higher self-employment shares, we would expect wages to fall by more as well, but
this is not the case in the model. To understand this result, recall that steady-state
salaried labor market tightness is decreasing in self-employment. This implies that,
for a given deviation from steady-state, a fall in labor market tightness has less of
an effect on wages in economies with more self-employment. Intuitively, relative
to economies with less self-employment, the self-employment outside option plays
a larger role in stabilizing wages since the steady-state supply of capital for self-
employment is larger, implying a higher likelihood of entering the sector. Even
if conditions in salaried employment change, they will have less of an effect on
wages since self-employment plays a more prominent role in shaping labor market
conditions in these economies. This unique feature of the model arises from the
fact that capital market tightness, and therefore the probability of becoming self-
employed, is endogenous and affects how wages respond to aggregate productivity
shocks.
To make this argument more transparent, consider the terms involving self-




























is the marginal product of capital for salaried firms, and λht is the
marginal utility of consumption. There are several things to note. First, the com-














which is larger in absolute value in the calibrated economies with more steady-state
self-employment, mainly due to the lower steady-state value of salaried wages and
capital market tightness. This makes intuitive sense: given that the self-employment
sector is larger in these economies, any movements in capital market tightness will
have a larger impact on salaried wages through variations in the self-employment
outside option, and conditions in self-employment more generally. Since θ̂SE,t has
a negative impact on wages, this implies that a fall in capital market tightness
will limit the fall in wages resulting from lower labor market tightness and a lower
marginal product of salaried labor in the period of the shock. Put another way, the
counteracting effect on wages due to the self-employment outside option is greater
in economies with more steady-state self-employment, which implies that wages fall
by less on impact.42 A similar claim holds for increases in project postings per
unemployed individual vuSE,t in response to the negative shock, since the weight on
v̂uSE,t in absolute value is the same as for θ̂SE,t. Again, this is intuitive since the
larger presence of self-employment in the economy implies that changes in market
conditions in self-employment exert more influence on salaried labor market condi-
42Note that this is the case even if capital market tightness falls by less on impact in economies
with more self-employment.
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tions. Hence, a given change in individual project postings in economies with more
steady-state self-employment will have a larger stabilizing influence on the response
of salaried wages in the period of the shock, and will make wages more rigid on
impact.
Analyzing numerically each of the components of the coefficient on θ̂SE,t in
(32) shows that the larger steady-state supply of capital to self-employment is key to
explaining the greater influence of θ̂SE,t in economies with more self-employment: the
supply of capital ultimately determines how accessible the self-employment outside
option is, even though the availability of self-employment capital also depends on
project postings.43 The upshot is that wages will fall by less on impact in economies
with more self-employment: the larger steady-state supply of capital for matching
effectively bolsters the self-employment outside option in the period of the downturn,
which in turn reduces the impact response of wages to changes in aggregate economic
conditions. This relative rigidity in wages causes vacancies to take a larger hit in
the period of the shock in economies with more steady-state self-employment.
In contrast to the behavior of wages, the rental rate is more sensitive to changes
in capital market conditions in economies with more steady-state self-employment.
Going back to the rental rate equation, recall that a fall in salaried labor market
tightness puts upward pressure on the rental rate since the probability of find-
ing salaried employment is lower. This effect is weaker in economies with more
43Using the definition of θSE and v
u
SE , we can write (v
u
SEzaSfωkS )/(θSEwS) as ((1 −
ω)kSzaSfωkS )/(uwS). While aS and the supply of capital (1 − ω)kS move in the opposite di-
rection, the change in (1− ω)kS dominates the change in aS such that ((1− ω)kSzaSfωkS )/(uwS)
increases with the share of self-employment in the economy. What is key here is that the numerator
rises by more than the denominator.
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self-employment since conditions in salaried employment have less influence on self-
employment, and on labor market conditions in general. Conversely, a fall in cap-
ital market tightness puts downward pressure on the rental rate, and this effect is
stronger in economies with more self-employment due to the higher steady-state
supply of capital devoted to self-employment.44 As it turns out, the second effect
dominates, so that the rental rate will fall by more in economies with more self-
employment.
As I argue below, the response of salaried wages plays a key role in the recovery
process, so a brief summary of the impact response of wages is in order. First,
recall that steady-state salaried labor market tightness is lower in economies with
more self-employment, which makes wages fall by less when vacancies (and therefore
salaried labor market tightness) fall in response to the shock. Second, the steady-
state supply of capital to the self-employed in these economies is higher, implying
a higher steady-state entry probability into self-employment. Thus, a fall in capital
market tightness arising from an adverse aggregate shock will put more upward
pressure on wages in economies with more self-employment. Both effects make
wages initially less responsive to shocks in economies with more self-employment,
while the opposite is true for the rental rate. The intuition is clear: economies
with more self-employment are associated with a more accessible outside option in
self-employment, which in turn has more influence on salaried-sector wages in the
economy and makes wages initially less responsive when an aggregate shock hits the
44The coefficient on θ̂SE,t in the log-linearized rental rate equation is the same as the one in
the log-linearized wage equation, but with a positive sign. Thus, a fall in θSE,t in response to a
negative aggregate productivity shock tends to lower the rental rate, ceteris paribus.
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economy.
Differences Across Economies After the Shock To understand how the econ-
omy’s steady-state level of self-employment affects the recovery path of total out-
put, consider how the hiring pattern in the salaried sector evolves differently across
economies in the aftermath of the shock. We know that the marginal product of
labor starts to recover after the shock since TFP slowly returns back to steady state.
In fact, the recovery path of this variable is virtually identical across economies since
all economies face the same shock. What differs, however, is the behavior of wages.
Recall that wages fall less on impact in economies with more self-employment. By
itself, this causes a larger initial drop in salaried employment and output, and would
tend to slow down their recovery. However, as shown in Figure 3.4, wages in these
economies also have a more pronounced U-shaped recovery and keep falling several
periods after the shock. This last fact is crucial to explaining why these economies
recover faster in the model. As I describe below, the self-employment outside option
plays a central role in shaping the path of wages after the shock.
Intuitively, changes in the probability of becoming self-employed as aggregate
productivity recovers effectively determine how accessible the self-employment out-
side option is in the periods following the shock. In particular, the likelihood of
becoming self-employed falls back to steady state more quickly in economies with
more self-employment, thereby making self-employment a less accessible employ-
ment option. This puts downward pressure on wages, so that wages fall even further
in the aftermath of the shock. In turn, the more persistent fall in wages promotes a
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more rapid recovery of salaried vacancies, which leads to a faster recovery of salaried
employment, investment and output.
The mechanism works as follows: first, steady-state capital market tightness is
lower in economies with more steady-state self-employment, which implies a smaller
rise in the probability of self-employment entry on impact. Second, since the pace of
recovery in the marginal product of capital due to TFP is similar across economies,
the share of capital used in salaried production recovers at a faster pace in economies
with more self-employment since the former experienced a larger initial fall in these
economies. This reduces the amount of capital devoted to matching with the self-
employed by more, which in turn causes a faster recovery in the rental rate in the
periods subsequent to the shock since the rental rate is more sensitive to changes
in the supply of capital in these economies. The faster recovery in the rental rate
in economies with more self-employment after the period of the shock sharply re-
duces the benefit from posting self-employment projects. Moreover, the larger col-
lapse in salaried vacancy postings from the period of the shock translates into a
larger increase in unemployment. Combining these last two facts, we see that self-
employment project postings per unemployed individual fall back to steady state
earlier in economies with more self-employment as the shock subsides. The larger
contraction in capital supply reduces the availability of self-employment capital,
and hence the probability of entry into self-employment falls back more quickly
after the shock in economies with more self-employment. In simple terms, the self-
employment outside option deteriorates faster in the aftermath of the shock in these
economies.
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As the possibility of becoming self-employed becomes less and less likely –
which happens much earlier in economies with more self-employment as the avail-
ability of capital for self-employment falls more rapidly – the drop in the self-
employment outside option puts continued downward pressure on wages in these
economies. Thus, wages continue to fall for several periods after the shock, which
creates a larger surplus from posting salaried vacancies. Salaried labor market tight-
ness also starts to return to steady state in the period after the shock, which tends to
raise wages. Eventually, the downward pressure arising from the lower availability of
self-employment capital winds down, and the rise in salaried vacancies allows wages
to begin their recovery back to steady state. What is important is that wages fall
further after the shock in economies with more steady-state self-employment, even
though wages are initially more rigid. Since the marginal product of labor begins
its recovery immediately after the period of the shock as TFP recovers, this creates
a larger difference between the marginal product of salaried labor and the wage – a
larger contemporaneous value from hiring workers – which bolsters a faster recovery
in vacancy postings in subsequent periods.45 In turn, the faster recovery of vacan-
cies and employment in the salaried sector leads to a faster surge in investment in
economies with higher steady-state self-employment shares. Finally, a faster recov-
ery in salaried employment and investment bolster the recovery in salaried output,
which in turn leads to a faster recovery in total output.
45To make this argument clear, consider the ratio of the wage to the marginal product of salaried
employment, shown in Figure 3.4. On impact, this ratio is greater in economies with more self-
employment exactly because wages fail to fall as much as in economies with less self-employment.
The persistent fall in wages induced by the evolution of the self-employment outside option pushes
the ratio of the wage to the marginal product of labor down by a larger proportion in subsequent
periods. This drives the larger surge in salaried vacancies.
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The Importance of Endogenous Transition Rates into Self-Employment
The existence of self-employment by itself is not sufficient to explain faster output
recoveries in economies with higher steady-state self-employment. The evolution of
the value of the self-employment outside option in response to shocks is critical to
explaining why total output recovers faster in economies with more self-employment.
A model with an exogenous transition rate into self-employment and no capital
search frictions would not be able to explain the observed stylized fact in the data.46
Furthermore, the wage channel – whereby the dynamic behavior of the ease of
entry into self-employment affects the self-employment outside option and hence
the recovery path of wages after a negative shock – would not be present in such
a model. Hence, an alternative model with a fixed transition probability into self-
employment cannot explain why output would recover faster in economies with
more self-employment. The contributions of this paper are therefore twofold: I offer
a tractable framework that replicates the cyclicality of self-employment and the
transition rate into self-employment from unemployment in the data, and I propose a
plausible channel through which differences in the composition of employment across
economies may have important consequences for the pace of economic recoveries.
3.6.3 Model and Data Comparison
To determine whether the model can yield reasonable predictions about the re-
lationship between self-employment and business cycle persistence, I check whether
46In this alternative model, salaried employment, investment, salaried output, and total output
recover more slowly in economies with higher steady-state self-employment.
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it can capture the empirical relationship initially shown in Figure 3.1.
Figure 3.6: Output Persistence and Self-Employment Rates: Data and Model Com-
parison
To compare the prediction of the model against the relationship in the data,
I take the simulated series for quarterly output and create an unfiltered annual
output series in levels. I then log the series and extract the cyclical component
of the annual series using the HP filter with smoothing parameter 100, as I did
with the data. Finally, I compute the first-order autocorrelation of the cyclical
output series for different economies by varying the parameter aS to change the
steady-state level of self-employment. I then plot a second-order polynomial fit for
the data, the data points for all the countries in the sample, and the relationship
generated by the model. Figure 3.6 shows that the model can capture the change
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in the autocorrelation of output for countries with high shares of self-employment
reasonably well.
As a simple exercise, I regress the autocorrelation of output in the data,








where standard errors are shown in parentheses. The R-squared of the regression
is 0.17, implying that the model can explain 17 percent of the variation in the
autocorrelation of cyclical output.
The model’s ability to replicate the negative relationship between output per-
sistence and self-employment rates in the data depends on the response of the vari-
ability of self-employment output to changes in the share of self-employment in the
economy. As I briefly discuss below, the presence of the self-employment productiv-
ity shock plays an important role in capturing the quantitative relationship between
self-employment and output persistence.
In a version of the model without a self-employment productivity shock, the
increase in the volatility of salaried output when self-employment increases would
be offset by the decrease in the volatility of self-employment output as the sectoral
output weights shift and raise the share of self-employment output in total output.48
47The idea for this experiment is borrowed directly from Moscoso Boedo and Mukoyama (2012).
Using the model, I target the share of self-employment (as a percent of employment) for each
country in Figure 3.1 (for a total of 83 countries). Then, for each self-employment share, I compute
the autocorrelation of cyclical output using the simulated series, which yields AC(y)simulated .
48The covariance term between salaried output and self-employment output plays a minor role
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The change in employment composition would merely change the composition of the
volatility of total output without changing its level. This, in turn, would result in
virtually no change in the persistence of output in the economy as the share of
self-employment increases. Having a sectoral productivity shock in self-employment
effectively reduces the sensitivity of self-employment output volatility to steady-
state changes in the composition of employment. Intuitively, this is the case since the
added variability from the sectoral shock dilutes the effect of changes in the volatility
of self-employment on the variability of output in self-employment.49 Including a
sectoral productivity shock to self-employment output substantially improves the
model’s ability to reproduce the empirical link between output persistence and self-
employment, and also allows the model to capture additional qualitative stylized
facts about the volatility of self-employment earnings, and the volatility of output
across economies.
The inclusion of a sectoral shock in the self-employment sector can be justified
on three grounds. First, this sector is well-known to face higher risk and higher
volatility (Maloney, Cunningham, and Bosch, 2004). One way to capture this is
to include a sectoral shock. Second, shutting down the sectoral shock generates
similar volatilities in self-employment earnings and salaried labor earnings. This fact
is inconsistent with the empirical evidence for various countries, which documents
that self-employment earnings are more volatile than wage earnings (Hamilton, 2000;
in determining changes in the variance of total output.
49This holds even though the volatility of self-employment changes with the variance of the
sectoral shock. Note that increasing the volatility of the sectoral shock beyond the benchmark
value would generate a stronger negative relationship between output persistence and the share of
self-employment, even though the volatility of self-employment output is decreasing in the share
of self-employment.
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Bargain and Kwenda, 2010; Narita, 2010). In the simulations, I can capture this
last stylized fact with the self-employment productivity shock aSE,t. Finally, as I
discuss below, if the shock hitting the economy originates in the self-employment
sector, the model can deliver episodes of procyclical self-employment, which Fiess et
al. (2010) have documented for particular time periods in certain Latin American
countries. The inclusion of this shock allows me to test this fact in the data.
Even though I highlighted the model’s quantitative success in replicating Fig-
ure 3.1, the main conclusion to draw from this exercise is that the model can cap-
ture the negative relationship between self-employment and output persistence in
a qualitative fashion.50 I take this to be an important indicator that the model of
self-employment I propose is heading in the right direction.
3.6.4 Additional Comments
Total Factor Productivity Differences Recall that production in the salaried
sector is given by yS,t = ztaSf(nS,t, ωtkS,t) = ztaS (nS,t)
1−αS (ωtkS,t)
αS , 0 < αS < 1,
where recall that aS is a proxy for institutional quality and zt is exogenous aggregate
productivity. Naturally, economies can differ in total factor productivity (TFP) be-
cause of differences in aS, which I consider exogenous. Following Lama and Urrutia
(2012), we can rewrite yS,t as
50Clearly, the polynomial fit (or a simple linear fit of the data) will change slightly if the countries
with the highest shares of self-employment from the sample (70 percent or more) or some of the
apparent outliers are excluded. However, the negative link between self-employment and cyclical
output persistence would still hold despite changes in the country sample.
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yS,t =








and hence decompose measured TFPt into an exogenous component, ztaS, and
an endogenous component, ωαSt . I can then compute steady-state differences in
measured and endogenous TFP across economies.51
The simulations under the benchmark calibration show that measured TFP
in an economy with 7 percent self-employment – equivalent to a country like the
United States – is only 5 percent higher than in an economy with 23 percent self-
employment, 16 percent higher than in an economy with 50 percent self-employment,
and 57 percent higher than in an economy with 87 percent self-employment (the up-
per bound for the country sample in Figure 1). Similarly, endogenous TFP in an
economy with 7 percent self-employment is only 1.5 percent higher than in an econ-
omy with 23 percent self-employment, and 6 percent higher than in an economy
with 50 percent self-employment. These results suggest that the allocation of cap-
ital across sectors in each economy accounts for a small share of the differences in
measured TFP across economies.
The Response to a Positive Shock to Self-Employment Productivity The
model can capture the countercylicality of self-employment and self-employment
51For some related literature on cross-country differences in productivity, see Hsieh and Klenow
(2009), Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2013), Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011), among
others. For a recent study on capital misallocation and institutions in Africa, see Kalemli-Ozcan
and Sorensen (2012). Also, see Hopenhayn (2012), who proposes a simple mapping between dis-
tortions and aggregate productivity and finds much smaller effects on TFP from these distortions,
in contrast to the existing literature.
150
entry in the data. Using data from four Latin American countries, Fiess et al.
(2010) document particular episodes where self-employment is procyclical in these
countries. They argue that the source of shocks may be important in determining
whether self-employment expands or contracts in response to shocks to the economy.
The inclusion of a sectoral productivity shock in self-employment allows me test this
claim in the model. Both total output and self-employment expand in response to to
a positive productivity shock in the self-employment sector. Intuitively, the shock
increases the value of devoting resources to the self-employment sector, thereby
causing a reallocation of accumulated capital in the salaried sector towards the
self-employment sector and generating increased entry into self-employment. The
contraction in capital used by salaried firms reduces vacancy postings in the salaried
sector, but the increase in the supply of self-employment capital causes wages in the
salaried sector to expand. Despite the higher value of supplying capital to the
sector, investment falls. The expansion in self-employment output due to higher
entry into the sector more than offsets the contraction in salaried output, leading to
an expansion in total output. Thus, the model is able to both capture the evidence
in Fiess et al. (2010) and generate the countercyclical behavior of self-employment
documented in Loayza and Rigolini (2011).
Endogenous Separations in Self-Employment Bosch and Maloney (2008)
document that separations from self-employment are strongly countercyclical. Would
the model be able to generate the cyclicality of the separation rate in self-employment
if separations are endogenous? Relatedly, would the main results in the paper be ro-
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bust to the inclusion of endogenous separations in self-employment? The benchmark
model shows that salaried firms will respond to a negative TFP shock by using less
capital in production and devoting more capital to the self-employment sector. This
takes place despite the fact that the shock affects both sectors. With endogenous
separations, salaried firms have an additional margin of adjustment and can decide
to destroy less capital relationships since having capital in the self-employment sec-
tor acts as an additional source of income during bad times. If we assume that
both old and new matches in self-employment start with the same idiosyncratic
productivity each period, the threshold idiosyncratic productivity value that de-
termines destruction in the sector can either rise or fall in response to a negative
aggregate productivity shock. Thus, it is not clear whether separations would be
countercyclical.
Assuming that new self-employment matches always start with higher pro-
ductivity than existing matches would push salaried firms to destroy old matches in
response to an adverse aggregate shock, and reallocate that capital to new matches
that start with the highest productivity.52 This would not only yield countercycli-
cal separations in self-employment, as in the data, but would also allow for a net
expansion of self-employment during recessions. More importantly, the mechanism
through which differences in the share of self-employment affect the speed of recov-
eries – mainly, how the ease of self-employment entry affects the dynamic path of
salaried wages in the aftermath of an aggregate shock – would not change relative
52For a setup that uses this assumption in a model with two types of salaried employment, see
Bosch and Esteban-Pretel (2006).
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to the benchmark economy. For example, as aggregate productivity slowly recovers
after a negative shock, the separation rate from self-employment would begin to fall
back to steady-state, and salaried firms would start to use more capital in-house.
The fall in the amount of capital supplied to the self-employed would reduce the self-
employment outside option, thereby putting downward pressure on salaried wages.
This would generate similar qualitative dynamics relative to the benchmark model.
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I explore the role of self-employment in the recovery process
from recessions. Four key facts motivate my focus on self-employment and business
cycle dynamics: self-employment is a pervasive feature of labor markets around the
world; most self-employed run owner-only businesses with no salaried workers; and
self-employment generally expands in recessions. I also document a robust negative
relationship between the share of self-employment and the persistence of output
over the business cycle in a sample of developed and developing countries. This link
suggests that self-employment may be important for understanding differences in
economic recoveries.
I build a business cycle model with frictional labor markets where individuals
can be self-employed or work in salaried firms, and explore the channels through
which self-employment influences the pace of recoveries. I find that economies
with higher self-employment shares recover faster from negative aggregate pro-
ductivity shocks. In the model, unemployed individuals who want to enter self-
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employment must match with capital suppliers in order to finance their business
ventures. Salaried firms supply unused capital in the salaried sector to the self-
employed in frictional capital markets. Capital search frictions play three key roles.
First, they determine the availability of capital to the self-employed, thereby mak-
ing transition rates into self-employment endogenous and dependent on aggregate
economic conditions. Second, the supply and demand for self-employment capi-
tal create a direct link between conditions in self-employment and salaried wages.
Third, access to self-employment, and therefore the self-employment outside option,
changes in response to fluctuations in aggregate economic conditions. In particular,
transition rates from unemployment into self-employment in the model expand in
downturns, as in the data. This last fact is difficult to obtain in existing business
cycle models of entrepreneurship and liquidity constraints. One contribution of my
paper is to reconcile the fact that the self-employed require external resources to
produce with the empirical evidence on the countercyclicality of self-employment.
Furthermore, the model I propose is consistent with other stylized facts about self-
employment and labor market dynamics.
Since self-employment is an alternative to salaried employment, cyclical move-
ments in the ease of entry into self-employment affect salaried wages directly. Fur-
thermore, the average level of self-employment in the economy determines how much
the self-employment outside option influences the response of wages at the onset of
a downturn, as well as the path of wages in the aftermath of a negative aggregate
shock. When a negative aggregate shock hits the economy, wages in the salaried sec-
tor are initially more rigid in economies with higher average self-employment. These
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economies exhibit larger drops in vacancies, investment, and output, thereby gener-
ating sharper contractions. As aggregate productivity begins to recover, the avail-
ability of self-employment capital falls, which weakens the self-employment outside
option much faster in these economies. This causes more persistent, or long-lasting,
salaried wage contractions in economies with more self-employment, which creates a
faster recovery in salaried employment and investment as salaried firms post vacan-
cies and invest at a faster rate. Salaried output recovers faster, and this drives the
faster recovery in total output in economies with higher average self-employment
rates. The model helps us identify a subtle channel through which the long-run
level of self-employment has implications for the economy’s speed of recovery from
downturns. In addition, the dynamic behavior of unemployment, investment, and
output in response to shocks is consistent with the empirical evidence on business
cycles in developed and developing economies.
The model goes a long way in capturing the relationship between the auto-
correlation of output and the share of self-employment observed in the data. I find
that allowing for a sectoral shock to self-employment productivity is important to
capturing this relationship quantitatively. Furthermore, the inclusion of the shock
allows the model two capture two additional stylized facts in the data: the higher
output volatility in economies with more self-employment, and the higher volatility
in self-employment earnings relative to wage earnings, which is consistent with em-
pirical evidence on the higher riskiness and volatility in the self-employment sector.
More broadly, this paper suggest that it is critical to account for the fact that the
likelihood of entering into self-employment – and hence the self-employment outside
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option – is not fixed but rather fluctuates with the aggregate state of the econ-
omy. Existing models have ignored this relevant cyclical feature of self-employment.
Movements in the attractiveness of, and ease of entry into, self-employment over the
business cycle – which are ultimately affected by the structure of the labor market –
feed into the decisions of agents in the salaried sector, with important consequences
for economic recoveries and business cycle dynamics.
The model does not differentiate between high and low-ability self-employed
individuals, which prevents me from capturing other very relevant features of self-
employment highlighted in the empirical literature, such as the fact that a proportion
of the self-employed enter the sector during economic expansions and expand their
firms by creating salaried positions. It would be particularly interesting to incor-
porate this heterogeneity in the current version of the model and address business
cycle dynamics and firm growth simultaneously. For example, we would be able to
explore the policy implications of promoting small firm creation during downturns.
It would also allow us to investigate whether targeting small firm creation based
on observables such as the human capital of firm owners matters for the policy’s
success. This framework would be relevant even for countries like the U.S. since
a large majority of the self-employed tend to be own-account workers. Relatedly,
the fact that agents are perfectly insured within the household – a common as-
sumption in labor search models – prevents me from appropriately addressing the
relevance of higher riskiness in self-employment. In principle, the higher volatility of
self-employment earnings should arise endogenously due to occupational choice risk,
production risk, or other characteristics that are determined within the economic
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environment, and should not rely on an exogenous process as is currently the case
in the model. Indeed, some of the benefits from self-employment may be reduced
once we take into account the risk involved in entering the sector. Also, to the
extent that risk and uncertainty may increase in recessions, the model might yield
an incomplete picture of the actual behavior of the self-employed. Finally, while the
existing evidence on trade credit supported the use of capital search frictions as a
reduced-form modeling device, there is little empirical work done in this area. The
increasing availability of surveys that capture the obstacles faced by micro-firms in
developing countries provides an exciting avenue that can take us deeper into the
frictions that affect firm creation over the business cycle. Much remains to be under-
stood about the cyclical implications of differences in the structure of labor markets.
Taking these shortcomings into account, this paper offers a framework that incor-
porates self-employment in a tractable way to help us deepen our understanding of
the link between business cycle dynamics and the composition of employment. I
plan to explore the limitations and extensions outlined above in future work.
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Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 2
A.1 Data Sources and Empirical Specification
A.1.1 Data Sources
For the determinants of informal sector size, the largest sample includes 94
countries (in Africa, Asia, Latin America, as well as rich OECD countries). For
the analysis of aggregate volatility, I take the same country sample as Ferreira-
Tiryaki (2008) to have easily comparable results, but exclude Argentina from the
sample since it represents an outlier in the sample, leaving 43 countries. Most of the
series for the explanatory variables I use are taken from Catini, Panizza and Saade’s
(2010) compilation of the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). The
list below includes a brief description of each of the variables I use in the empirical
analysis, along with its corresponding source. More detailed information can be
obtained by visiting the primary sources.
Informal sector size Measured as a share of official GDP and borrowed from
Schneider et al. (2010). Their work provides comparable yearly estimates of the
size of the informal sector for 162 countries from 1999 to 2007. I use the estimates
from year 2002 to have a single point estimate per country.
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Distance from the Equator Measured as the distance (in degrees) from the
Equator. Taken from Rodrik et al. (2004).
French legal origin Dummy variable equal to one if the legal system is based on
the French legal system. Taken from Djankov et al. (2004).
Law and Order Measure of institutional quality from the Political Risk Services
(PRS) Group’s International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) for years 1998 through
2007. It takes values from 1 to 6, where higher values denote better institutions. I
use year 1999 to have a point estimate for each country, and also experiment with
years 2000 and 2001 as a robustness check.
Rule of Law Measure of institutional quality. It takes values from -2.5 to 2.5,
where higher values denote better institutions. I use year 1998 to obtain a point
estimate for each country since year 1999 is not available, and experiment with
year 2000 as a robustness check. Source: World Bank’s Worldwide Governance
Indicators.
Engfrac and Eurofrac Engfrac and Eurofrac refer to the fraction of the popula-
tion that speaks English, and the fraction of the population that speaks a Western
European language, respectively. Source: Rodrik et al. (2004).
Legal enforcement of contracts Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the
World Report 2010. Based on the Doing Business report, it provides a summary
of the time and monetary cost of collecting a debt. More information about the
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construction of this index is provided in the Explanatory Notes and Data Sources
from the Economic Freedom of the World: 2010 Annual Report.
Log Real Gross Domestic Product in 1999 The logarithm of real GDP in
1999 expressed in 2000 dollars. Source: WDI.
Hiring regulations (HR) Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World Re-
port 2010. This index is available starting in 2002. Hiring regulations (HR) captures
whether fixed-term contracts can be offered for tasks or jobs that generally do not
expire, the maximum duration and number of renewals of fixed-term contracts, and
the ratio between the minimum wage and the average value added by the worker.
This index is based on the Difficulty of Hiring Index (DHI) in the World Bank’s Do-
ing Business Report. HR takes values from 0 to 10, where higher values of HR denote
less stringent hiring regulations (Gwartney, Hall, and Lawson, 2010). I use HR from
2002. More information about the construction of HR is provided in the Explanatory
Notes and Data Sources from the Economic Freedom of the World: 2010 Annual Re-
port. http://www.freetheworld.com/2010/reports/world/EFW2010-appendix.pdf.
Dismissal costs (DC) Fraser Institute’s Economic Freedom of the World Report
2010. This index is available starting in 2002. Dismissal costs (DC) are expressed
in weeks of salary and capture any severance payments, explicit costs of notifying
workers and third parties in advance of termination, and penalties that the firm faces
when the firm formalizes a worker separation. We can think of this measure as an
approximation of the explicit resource costs that a firm has to incur when a worker
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separation occurs. DC takes values from 0 to 10, where higher values denote lower
dismissal costs (Gwartney, Hall, and Lawson, 2010). I use DC from 2002. More
information about the construction of DC is provided in the Explanatory Notes
and Data Sources from the Economic Freedom of the World: 2010 Annual Report.
http://www.freetheworld.com/2010/reports/world/EFW2010-appendix.pdf.
Labor Regulations (LR) This index, obtained from Fraser Institute’s Economic
Freedom of the World Report 2010, is composed of six subindices: hiring reg-
ulations and minimum wage, hiring and firing regulations, centralized collective
bargaining, hours regulations, mandated cost of worker dismissal, and conscrip-
tion. The sources to construct the index are the World Bank’s Doing Business
Report, the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report, and the In-
ternational Institute for Strategic Studies. This index is available starting in 2000.
I use the measure from 2002. For more information, see the Explanatory Notes
and Data Sources from the Economic Freedom of the World: 2010 Annual Report.
http://www.freetheworld.com/2010/reports/world/EFW2010-appendix.pdf.
Consumption volatility Standard deviation of the cyclical component of an-
nual private consumption using the Baxter-King band-pass filter from 1985 to 2002.
Source: Ferreira-Tiryaki (2008). The original data is obtained from the International
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS).
Investment volatility Standard deviation of the cyclical component of annual
gross capital formation using the Baxter-King band-pass filter from 1985 to 2002.
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Source: Ferreira-Tiryaki (2008). The original data is obtained from the International
Monetary Fund’s (IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS).
Output volatility Standard deviation of the cyclical component of annual log real
GDP using the Baxter-King band-pass filter from 1985 to 2002. Source: Ferreira-
Tiryaki (2008). The original data is obtained from the International Monetary
Fund’s (IMF) International Financial Statistics (IFS).
Government spending-GDP ratio General government final consumption ex-
penditure as a percent of GDP for years 1985 through 2002. Source: WDI.
Openness Constructed as the sum of imports and exports divided by GDP from
1985 to 2002. Averaged over the sample period to obtain one point estimate per
country. Constructed with data from the WDI.
Domestic credit Domestic credit to the private sector as a share of GDP from
1985 to 2002. Averaged over the sample period to obtain one point estimate per
country. Source: WDI.
Table A1 presents descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the em-
pirical motivation.
A.1.2 Estimation: Determinants of Informal Sector Size
Table A2 presents the results of an OLS regression where the dependent vari-
able is a measure of institutional quality. I present the regression results for a
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Table A.1: Cross-Country Descriptive Statistics
Variable Years Obs. Mean Standard Dev. Min. Max.
Informal Sector 2002 116 32.1 13.0 8.6 66.5
Law and Order 1999 102 4.10 1.42 1 6
Hiring Reg. 2002 95 6.44 2.78 0 10
Dismissal Costs 2002 93 5.52 3.25 0 10
Log Real GDP 1999 1999 116 23.7 2.46 19.1 30.8
Consumption Volat. 1985-2002 44 2.38 1.41 0.5 6.1
Investment Volat. 1985-2002 44 6.56 3.10 2 14.7
Output Volat. 1985-2002 44 1.74 0.88 0.7 4
Gov. Spending 1985-2002 45 15.7 5.22 8.18 29.3
Domestic Credit 1985-2002 46 65.4 41.3 12.4 197.3
Openness 1985-2002 46 67.1 54.7 18.2 368.2
wide range of institutions measures to determine whether there is a particular vari-
able that is common across institutional quality measures.1 The results show that
Distance from the Equator is strongly significant for all measures of institutions,
whereas the fraction of the population that speaks English (engfrac) is strongly
significant for all measures except Law and Order (from PRS). More importantly,
French legal origin is significant only for Legal Enforcement of Contracts.
The estimation equation for the determinants of informality has the form




Where n ≥ 5 and ISi denotes the size of the informal sector as a percent
of official GDP in country i, Enforcementi is captured by French legal origin,
1I do so because there is no a priori reason to think that one measure of institutional quality
is better than another. The choice of rule of law is simply guided by its use in other empirical
papers.
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Table A.2: Institutional Quality and Instruments
Dependent Law Rule Control Regulatory Legal
Variable: and of of Quality Enforc.
Order Law Corruption Contracts
Dist. Equator 0.058*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.035*** 0.040***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.012)
Engfrac 0.039 0.022 0.051 0.040 -0.191
(0.512) (0.338) (0.359) (0.330) (0.892)
Eurofrac -0.118 0.491*** 0.595*** 0.616*** 1.037**
(0.283) (0.188) (0.200) (0.183) (0.438)
UK Leg. Orig. 0.622* 0.386* 0.351 0.337 -0.898
(0.362) (0.299) (0.243) (0.223) (0.589)
French Leg. Orig. -0.147 -0.095 -0.074 -0.056 -1.932***
(0.317) (0.208) (0.221) (0.203) (0.521)
R2 0.56 0.61 0.60 0.53 0.45
Obs. 101 115 115 115 93
Note: The constant term is omitted for expositional purposes. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. Law and Order is from the PRS Group’s ICRG. Rule of Law, Control of Corruption,
Government Effectiveness, and Regulatory Quality are from the World Bank’s Worlwide Gover-
nance Indicators (WGI). Legal Enforcement of Contracts is from the Fraser Institute’s Economic
Freedom of the World Report 2010. Engfrac and Eurofrac refer to the fraction of the population
that speaks English, and the fraction of the population that speaks a Western European language,
respectively (see Rodrik et al., 2004). *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level, ** denotes
significance at the 5 percent level, * denotes significance at the 10 percent. Robust standard errors
are shown in parentheses.
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Institutionsi denotes the measure of institutions (Law and Order), HRi, DCi are
hiring regulations and dismissal costs, respectively, from the Economic Freedom of
the World dataset, and εi is an error term. Higher values for hiring regulations and
dismissal costs denote less stringent regulations. Xki includes the log of real GDP
in 1999.2
A.1.3 Estimation: Informal Sector Size and Aggregate Volatility
The estimation equation has the form




Where σj,i denotes the volatility of variable j in country i, where j can be
aggregate consumption, investment, or output. ISi is informal sector size, and µi is
an error term. As before, Xki encompasses mean government spending as a share
of GDP, a measure of openness to trade, and the mean of domestic credit to the
private sector as a share of GDP. Additional controls to test for robustness (not
shown in the main regression results) include the median inflation rate, a measure
of exchange rate fluctuations, and the growth rate in trend real GDP, similar to the
2The log of real GDP per capita is highly correlated with the institutional quality measure. As
a robustness test, Xki includes other variables that could potentially affect the size of the informal
sector, including the inflation rate, a measure that captures the mean tax rate, and business
regulations. Based on Loayza, Servén, and Sugawara (2009), it may be important to control for
business regulations. However, when I do so, the measure of business regulations turns out to be
very highly correlated with institutional quality. Also, a natural extension would be to include
interaction terms between institutions and the two measures for labor regulations to test whether
the impact of regulations falls with better institutions. I tested this by introducing interaction
terms but found that institutional quality becomes insignificant since there is a high degree of
multicollinearity between the interaction terms and the measure of institutional quality. Thus, the
main specifications do not include any interaction terms.
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regressors used in Ferreira-Tiryaki (2008).3
A.2 Solution to the Nash Bargaining Problem and Wage Equations
To derive the wage equations, I use the following equations:
WF,t = wF,t + EtΞt+1|t
{




WI,t = wI,t + EtΞt+1|t
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3One difference relative to Ferreira-Tiryaki’s (2008) work is that I do not include the standard
deviation of the cyclical component of the Solow residual as an explanatory variable in the volatility
regressions.
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Now, following Arseneau and Chugh (2008), define
ξF =
νF

























JI,t = (WI,t −WU,t) (A.12)
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Now, using the asset values for the workers, we have
WF,t −WU,t = wF,t − b+ EtΞt+1|t
{
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Writing (WI,t −WU,t) in a similar way, we have
νI
1− νI













































pI,t+1(1− ρ(nI,t+1, aF , ι))zt+1

























which, using the firms’ asset values once again, implies that





































A.3 Additional Impulse Response Functions
Figure A.1: Impulse Response Functions to a Positive Aggregate Shock: Benchmark
Economy
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Figure A.2: Impulse Response Functions to a Positive Aggregate Shock: Benchmark
Economy (Continued)
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Figure A.3: Impulse Response Functions to a Positive Aggregate Shock: Economy
with γ = 0.7
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Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 3
B.1 Summary Statistics and Relationship Between Self-Employment
and Output Persistence
Table B.1: Cross-Country Descriptive Statistics: Full Sample
Variable Years Obs. Mean SD Min. Max.
SE Rate 2000-2007 86 31.8 20.72 5.00 88.7
AC of Output 1985-2007 115 0.574 0.20 -0.251 0.840
Log Real GDP 1985 1985 115 23.4 2.24 18.9 29.4
AC of Output refers to the autocorrelation of the cyclical component of output.
SE refers to Self-Employment. I use Catini, Panizza, and Saade’s (2010) compilation
of the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) to obtain the annual
series for real GDP for each country from 1985 to 2007. I HP-filter the series with
a smoothing parameter of 100 to extract the cyclical component of the series and
compute the first-order autcorrelation, which I take to be the measure of cyclical
persistence in the paper. Self-employment is obtained from the OECD (2009) and
corresponds to the average share of self-employed individuals in non-agricultural
employment for years 2000 through 2007. Self-employment includes own-account
workers, employers, and contributing family members. Figure 3.1 in the text uses
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83 observations and excludes countries with an autocorrelation of output lower than
0.1.
The estimation equation for the persistence of the cyclical component of real
GDP can be written as




Where AC(GDPi) denotes the first-order autocorrelation of the cyclical com-
ponent of the log of real GDP in country i. SEi is the average self-employment
rate as share of non-agricultural employment for years 2000 through 2007, µi is an
error term, and Xki encompasses other regressors of interest including a measure of
openness over the sample period, the log of real GDP per capita in 1985 as a proxy
for the country’s level of development, the government spending-to-GDP ratio over
the sample period, and a measure of the quality of institutions (Law and Order
from Political Risk Services, PRS).1 Openness is defined as the sum of imports and
exports divided by GDP. All the regressors except for the self-employment rate and
Law and Order are taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) for years
1985 through 2007. The results in Table B2 omit the constant term in the regression
for expositional purposes. As the table shows, the coefficient on self-employment is
significant at conventional levels and fairly stable across specifications.2 Eliminat-
1All these variables except for log real GDP per capita in 1985 and Law and Order are averages
from 1985 to 2007. I also experiment with log real GDP in 1985, which has a lower correlation with
self-employment, when excluding institutional quality and obtain qualitatively similar results.
2For now, I ignore the possibility that self-employment might be influenced by the persistence
of output, though it is not strictly correct to claim causation from self-employment to output
persistence without taking care of the potential endogeneity between the two variables. One piece
of evidence regarding entrepreneurship that acts in favor of the approach I present here is that,
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Table B.2: Self-Employment and Cyclical Persistence: Cross-Country Evidence
Dep. Variable: Autocorrelation of Output
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Self-Employment -0.003*** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.004***
Log RGDP 1985 - 0.015 0.015 0.013 -
Openness - - -0.000** -0.000** -0.000*
Gov. Spending - - - -0.002 -0.002
Law and Order - - - - -0.001
Adj. R2 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.21
Obs. 83 82 82 82 78
Note: The results above use the sample for self-employment with 83 observations, which excludes
countries with an autocorrelation of output lower than 0.1.
ing potential outliers (countries with autocorrelations less than 0.2 and countries
with a share of self-employment higher than 85 percent) reduces the coefficient on
self-employment only slightly. However, the results are still significant at conven-
tional levels and remain essentially the same. Restricting the sample to developing
countries does not change the main conclusions either.
While the level of income and the quality of institutions are considered impor-
tant determinants of self-employment in the literature, it is important to assess how
controlling for these two factors affects the results. After all, institutional quality
might influence the persistence of cyclical output in other ways unrelated to this
while the business cycle might affect entry into self-employment over the life-cycle, this effect seems
to be temporary and only delays entry into entrepreneurship (see, for example, Yu, Orazem, and
Jolly, 2009). Thus, the deep determinants of self-employment are likely to be less dependent on
short-run economic activity and more dependent on other structural features of the economy.
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variable’s impact on self-employment. Table B2 shows that the significance of self-
employment holds for all specifications, with little variation in the coefficient value.
Using a smoothing parameter of 6.25 to extract the cyclical component of output,
which is another common value used in the literature, does not alter the qualita-
tive results or the strength of the relationship between the cyclical persistence of
output and self-employment. The measure of self-employment I use only considers
self-employment in non-agricultural employment. Since developing countries have
large self-employment shares in agriculture as well, one may wonder whether the
link between self-employment and output persistence over the business cycle still
holds when we control for the share of employment in agriculture or the share of
agricultural production in GDP. The sign and significance of the relationship remain
virtually unchanged when I control for either one of these measures.3 Finally, the
results remain qualitatively the same if I use non-agricultural real GDP as opposed
to total real GDP to compute the measure of cyclical persistence.4
3The share of employment in agriculture and the share of agricultural production in GDP
are highly correlated with initial GDP per capita. A similar comment applies to the proxy for
institutional quality, Law and Order. Thus, when I regress output persistence on the share of
non-agricultural self-employment, I exclude initial GDP per capita as well as Law and Order.
4In fact, the relationship between self-employment and the cyclical persistence of non-
agricultural output is still negative, but becomes stronger.
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B.2 Derivation of Nash Wage and Rental Rate Equations
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and λht = Uc(ct). The Nash bargaining first-order con-

















(JSE,t − Juk,t) (B.7)
First, write














Similarly, we can write












Using the first-order conditions from Nash bargaining, we have:
νSE
1− νSE











































































, and Juk,t = (1−δ).
After some algebra and using the three facts above along with λht = Uc(ct), we obtain
expressions for wS,t and rSE,t:
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